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 As a Rogerian mental health therapist, a personal journey was taken that 
establishes my practice ethics as an applied theatre practitioner. What was 
undertaken was the unpacking of a practice ethics gained through my training as 
an actor and therapist.   
 
This thesis examines the role of codes or standards of practice in humanistic 
counselling, applied theatre and a synthesized practice between both. Standards 
of practice shape these practices through the specific ideologies relevant within 
the institutional cultures in which the practice is applied. This is especially 
problematic when the institutional setting understands care delivery as practice 
shaped by problem identification, interventions and expected outcome goals. 
Further, the ideology that underpins the standard, becomes self-reinforcing and 
tends to exert influence over what type of practice is culturally relevant or 
considered best practice within the institutional setting. This is of concern for 
practitioners who practice from a different or multiple ideological base from the 
institutional setting in which they work.   
 
A shaping goal of the research was to test-out, through critical evaluation, if the 
American Counseling Association’s (ACA’s) standards of practice was relevant 
2 
 
and applicable to a synthesized practice between humanistic counselling practice 
and applied theatre practice. The results posed by the critical evaluation suggest 
that the ACAs standard is not applicable because it promotes empirical, or rather, 
evidenced-based models of practice over humanist ones. Because of its limited 
scope of application, the ACAs model is not applicable to synthesized or dual 
practices that bridge particular fields. Through lines of valuing within bridged fields, 
usually represent multiple ideological drivers. It was found that as a standard of 
practice the British Association of Counsellors and Psychotherapists (BACP) 
standard is a better fit. It is compatible with social construction.      
 
Within the research Carl Rogers’ humanistic, client-centered and non-directive 
therapy is contrasted with Joseph Chaikin’s brand of experimental theatre 
exemplified in his The Presence of the Actor. Chaikin’s book is used as a tool to 
reconstruct examples of what I came to understand as ethical practice while 
attending drama school in the UK. The understandings gleaned by the 
juxtaposition impacts how I understand the ACAs utility as a practitioner.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Establishing the Metrics of the Interrogation 
 
Ridout, Pendergast and Saxtons’ statements are at the core of the interrogation of 
this research.  
 
Even before you begin this work, you need to be clear about your own 
understanding of what is important to you, what it is that you value and see 
as fair, what it is that you are prepared to give up. You need to create a 
sense of safety for yourself and others that will free you and them to work at 
optimum. 
                   (2009: 193) 
 
In addressing these statements at issue within this chapter is the following, well-
articulated by Joseph Chaikin, a director who helped establish the experimental 
theatre of The Open Theatre: 
 
 With each new stage of my own training and experience, I have learned  
 that to study or to talk about the theater is to come face to face with   
 assumptions beyond those which I could see at first. 
          (Chaikin 1972: vii) 
 
Also, at issue is the following, articulated by Carl Rogers: 
 
 Very compelling is the evidence that our most serious problems are not  
 brought about by the failures of our society, but by its successes. Hence,  
 our past and current paradigms cannot possibly deal with our present   
 increasing maldistribution of wealth, the increasing alienation of    
 millions, or the lack of a unified purpose and goal by increasing efficiency 
 of production, increasing the automation of society, accelerating our  
 technology, or increasing our reliance on profit motive of multinational  
 corporations – some of the major operational principles that have brought 
 us to our present state. Science and manipulative rationality are not   
 sufficient to meet these problems. 




The motivation: The Gospel According to Eve: building a positive introject1 
As a therapist, I had a private practice in a rural region of Idaho. There I saw, what 
are termed, private pays and insured clients. They were generally professionals 
and educated. Over time, I saw a number of women with the same issue; they had 
raised their families, many had careers, some were divorced – all wanted 
something else in life but didn’t know what. Many were in therapy in order to 
discover their potential and many had given up thinking that they had any. As a 
therapist, I was beginning to feel the same and was burnt out. 
 
I decided to go back to school to do course work that would allow me to get a 
Ph.D. in Medical Ethics. There was a program at the University of Utah that I 
wanted to attend. As a former RN and mental health therapist, I thought it was the 
right choice. I hadn’t studied philosophy in years, so I felt a bit tentative about the 
whole thing.  
 
During the course of the next couple of years, I took some philosophy classes, 
mainly from Professor Carl Levinson. He had a literary style that I had not 
encountered when taking philosophy courses previously. Some of the motifs that 
he used to build his lectures were similar to ones that had always captured my 
imagination, especially the idea of something coming from nothing and a sum 
adding up to more than its parts. When it came time to submit a paper I gave him 
a vignette that I had written. It concerned a woman in search of something, but not 
knowing what it was.  
 
I was called into his office. I expected to find myself in trouble for having handed in 
a short one-act rather than an essay. Professor Levinson quite liked it. He told me 
that I was a writer and that I should follow my passion – theatre. I enrolled in the 
                                            
1 An introject is a common psychodynamic term. It means that an individual has internalized an 
idea or expectation from outside his or her self. A negative introject is one that the self disowns 
subconsciously. For a Rogerian, a negative introject needs to be externalized within the therapeutic 
process so that the client can move towards becoming more actualized, or rather, authentic. The 
client knows that they are free of negative introjects because they don’t experience incongruence, 
or feelings of dissonance. Within this research, I put forward that negative introjects can be 
replaced with positive ones. They are positive because the client understands them as authentic to 
their person. The result is that they feel congruent. 
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Masters program in the Theatre Department of Idaho State University, wrote a 
play about women like myself, and directed and produced the play in the black box 
of the Stephen’s Performing Arts Center on campus. Two years later I arrived in 
England, this time to work on a Ph.D. 
 
As a Rogerian, I understood that the activity of writing, directing, and producing a 
play built within me the ability to have and exercise potential. Importantly, working 
within an ensemble environment, while involved in my project, furnished the 
interconnection I needed to become self-determining and self-directing, as well as 
allowing me to be open to new experiences – all concepts that were built into Carl 
Rogers’s therapeutic practice.  
 
Identifying key problems for the research 
I am an American, a mental health therapist (LPC) and a Registered Nurse (RN) 
as well as a theatre practitioner. During my practice as a therapist, I became 
disillusioned with therapeutic interventions that were meant to empower and 
promote positive change within the marginalized and vulnerable groups with whom 
I worked. I found myself turning to the experimental theatre practice derived from 
my training as an actor at drama school in the UK years before. The reason I 
turned to this earlier practice was to find solutions to the problem of resistance that 
I encountered when working with these populations. Individuals from these 
populations were basically turned off to therapy because of their long-term 
exposure to therapeutic measures, methods, and end goals, which had been 
repeatedly imposed upon them. However, the synthesizing of my brand of 
experimental theatre with counselling was problematic. As a licensed therapist, 
under the terms and conditions for licensure, I was obligated to practice ethically, 
which means under standards of practice for counsellors set down by the state in 
which I practiced. The code or standard implemented by Idaho, the state in which I 
live and practice, comes out of the American Counseling Association (ACA2).  
 
Problematically, the code overtly privileges scientist-practitioner models of 
                                            
2 I retain the American spelling used in quotations of American writing. 
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counselling over ones that are strongly humanistic. I am a humanistic, or rather, a 
Rogerian counsellor. The scientist-practitioner model of counselling currently 
determines what practice ethics amounts to for counsellors. What is happening at 
this point in the counselling profession’s history is that the ACA reinforces the use 
and privileging of one model to the exclusion of other models. It also means that 
any methods, positive valuing, principles of practice, or end goals promoted by the 
scientist-practitioner models, currently drive what counsellor conduct should look 
like, limiting the actions, attitudes, or behaviours taken within practice. Additionally, 
what results is a strong feedback loop. The loop functions to exclude other 
practice models, and therefore, the ideologies or philosophies from which they 
arise. This impacts what is considered when formulating a code of ethical practice. 
In effect, the ACA’s code promotes parochialism and gatekeeping. And, the loop 
affects what can be considered ethical practice, enforcing and reinforcing the 
scientist-practitioner models of care. This mechanism, or feedback loop, 
contributed hugely to my burnout as a practitioner. 
 
The feedback loop promoted by the ACA’s brand of ethics is not very penetrable 
by other practice models or the ideologies that contribute to the methods, 
principles of practice and end goals of the specific ideologies, or philosophies. 
Problematically, this means that there is no multiple ideological feed into the 
ACA’s ethics that would create a more diffuse boundary for what constitutes good 
practitioner conduct. For a humanistic practitioner, a static, exclusionary, standard 
– one that frustrates the building of a dynamic model of ethics, which is reliant 
upon the dialogic exchange that only multiple perspectives can furnish – can only 
be regarded as promoting unilateralism within the profession. According to 
humanistic practice, this is an unethical position. In order to thrive, humanistic 
practice and the ethics derivable from it, require dynamism rather than 
gatekeeping and parochialism. Promoting dynamism is a core, ethical position for 
a Rogerian when considering what practice ethics should look like. A key principle 
of my practice ethics is being open to possibility, which is diametrically opposite to 
promoting a static and inflexible code that predetermines conduct for relative 
human conditions and contexts. 
13 
 
Further, allowance for a multiple or dynamic perspective in determining a practice 
ethics may invite in new methods and philosophical outlooks that could enhance 
the efficacy of counselling, and circumvent client resistance to counselling 
measures. This brings me to an issue that has become a core motivator for me 
while pursuing my research: because the ethics of the ACA are less inclusive, it 
has been difficult for me to bridge the fields of counselling and experimental 
theatre – both of which have helped formulate my particular brand of applied 
theatre. My form of theatre – one that combines Rogerian practice ethics, 
techniques, and philosophy with my training as an actor and the philosophy behind 
that training – has demonstrated a remarkable ability to break through resistance. 
Resistance is a problem that I have observed impacting the well being of clients 
who have been over-institutionalised within systems of care and rehabilitation. My 
assumption was that these clients, whom I was meant to serve, became resistant 
to treatment because of long-term exposure to therapeutic interventions and their 
continued experience of being identified as a self ruled by a psychological deficit.  
 
Importantly, for me as a practitioner, the loop created by therapeutic biases 
excludes the possibility that my humanistic type of blended practice could be 
viewed as strongly ethical or efficacious. This fact means that I have no possibility 
of building a ground for practice that tests out my observations, and therefore, my 
therapeutic assumptions can only be considered anecdotal. The scientist-
practitioner models and the ethics derived from the ideology that supports them, 
known as empirical science, frowns on anecdotal justifications when substantiating 
what is ethical practitioner conduct. The question for me as a humanistic 
practitioner becomes: how do I move beyond anecdotal justification? Where do I 
find a field of practice that allows me to test out my case theories? Do I need to 
make the leap into doing applied theatre exclusively? Are there similarities 
between Rogerian practice and my form of applied-theatre practice that would 
allow for such a leap? 
 
The loop sets up scientist-practitioner models and an accompanying ideology that 
monopolizes counselling practice. As a setup, it monopolizes the conversation 
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amongst counsellors that are members of the ACA concerning what is effective, 
appropriate, and safe treatment. The dialogue surrounding the issue, in effect, 
becomes homogenized and domesticated. The problem gains force because 
many, if not all, state licensing boards follow the ACA’s ethics as their own. At this 
time, there is no platform with professional clout that can stand up to the ACA and 
the feedback system it promotes; no platform where multiple schools of 
counselling might engage in a creative and dynamic dialogue to discuss the 
problem of over-institutionalisation as a cause of resistance. In fact, the term over-
institutionalisation is not to be found in research because it implicates 
overexposure to counselling methods and goals as a part of the problem of 
resistance. The term implicates every type of counselling practice as ineffective. 
 
Through the course of this research, I have sat on the fence regarding how to 
position myself, whether as an applied-theatre practitioner or as a counsellor. To 
come down off the fence is not an easy task. As an American, I have very practical 
considerations that strongly color where I sit or stand as a practitioner.  
 
 Theatre has its place within a broad spectrum of performance,    
 connecting it with the wider forces of ritual and revolt that thread through  
 so many spheres of human culture. In turn, this has helped connections  
 across disciplines. 
             (Harvie and Rebellato in Ridout 2009: viii) 
 
 
Applied theatre has gained professional status within the UK and Australia. It has 
strong standing in some parts of Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa. I have 
personally witnessed, within the University of Exeter where I have undertaken this 
research, that the UK’s academic institutions have legitimized its study, research, 
funding, and profile. This is not the case in the U.S., except for a few academic 
institutions. The academic institutions that do recognise the importance of applied 
theatre are usually situated in large cites away from rural areas. In rural areas, the 
mainstay of departments of Theatre and Performing Arts is the training of 
professional actors, directors, technicians, and playwrights. These departments 
are concerned, primarily, with entertainment rather than social advocacy, literacy, 
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or justice programs. Providing entertainment is how they legitimize their existence 
within the university setting while they fight an uphill battle to survive huge budget 
cuts; cuts put in place so that STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) 
courses can be better funded. Applied theatre is usually offered as a single course 
every two years within rural academic institutions, if it is offered at all. It is a 
specialty course. The funding opportunities available to an applied-theatre division, 
if it exists as a division of the Performing Arts Department within the university, are 
limited or non-existent. This lack has important implications concerning the 
financial viability of the applied-theatre practitioner: making a living as an applied-
theatre practitioner within a rural area is, at present, impossible. I live in a rural 
area. And although coming down off the fence – choosing between theatre and 
counselling – is not a simple task; the jump may be my only true recourse. 
 
What research offered me was a critical means by which I could search for 
answers to the question: Is there, implicit within Rogerian ethics, a trajectory to 
move ‘beyond’ therapy? Rogers proposed that therapy amounted to the forging of 
relationship and a building of a safe ground by which to manage that relationship. 
Implicit within that understanding is that his therapy was quotidian, a common 
ground of intimacy building, but one built not through techniques aimed at outcome 
goals, but rather, through relationships between others.  
 
As a Rogerian, I understand client well-being as the outcome of people coming 
together and enacting what it takes to be in relationship. This position rules out the 
possibility that therapeutic introjections, in the form of problem identification, stock 
interventions and targeted goals, which originate in institutionalised and highly 
regulated and prescriptive methodologies, is core when considering what is ethical 
practitioner or participant conduct. Therapy, gleaned looked at from a relational 
perspective, is not a therapeutic concern (Henson 2014: ix), it is an interrelational 
and expressive concern that involves a reflexive process (Burr 2002: 156-157).  
 
Applied theatre practice has the advantage of not being under the auspices of a 
codified ethics promoted by a powerful, regulating institution with a singular, 
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ideological feed, which makes it less than dynamic, and thus unable to deal with 
the process necessary in the development of what it means to be in relationship 
with one’s ‘other’.  
 
The philosophical underpinnings that figure into critically evaluating the 
ethics of my personal practice  
As a humanistic practitioner, I appeal to some of the principles of democratic 
essentialism. This is not necessarily the brand of essentialism that informs 
Science as Realism, the ideological outlook that scientist-practitioner models of 
counselling are based on. Instead, I appeal to an ideological essentialism, which 
has as its base-line principle of practice the understanding that we are all, by virtue 
of our very being, of worth and dignity. As beings, we are of humanity in all its 
many and different manifestations. However, as an ideological essentialist I 
understand that I need to consider relativism, that I cannot reduce individuals and 
groups to being the same. I also understand that the upholding of this principle is 
not based in a universalist outlook as much as it is on personal commitment; I 
uphold it because it feels right. 
 
Paradoxically, backing my ideological essentialism is the ‘silent understanding’ 
that these principles are rights and are natural to, or inherent, within us. In this 
respect, I am a Universalist. I also understand humanity as inherently 
developmental and drawn towards a good for all if given the right conditions. A 
Universalists perspective is at odds with my ideological essentialism. I cannot 
rationalize it away. 
 
As an ideological essentialist, I understand that my methods, interventions, 
principles and goals of practice are ideologically derived, and therefore, are 
culturally dependent. I will, because I embrace the principles of democracy, use 
techniques that build introjects derived from that ideology, and that impacts my 
client, or other. In effect, I will build a democratic citizen that matches my political 
philosophy. This research has helped me come to terms with all of the above. It is 
something I had not put together before its undertaking. 
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Some of the principles of democracy underscore what my problem identification 
would be when working with my other. The principles derived from this ideology 
will determine what my therapeutic interventions look like. And, they will determine 
what my outcome goals should be. In short, they will determine how I act towards 
my other: they will determine my normative ethics.  
 
Social Construction  
I maintained a private practice. However, I contracted with agencies so that I could 
work with persons that had no insurance and were under the State of Idaho’s 
Health and Welfare system (H&R). When I worked as a therapist using theatre-
training techniques, under the terms and conditions of employment in all 
instances, I was fulfilling the position of therapist. The using of theatre as a proxy 
for therapy was well intentioned and gleaned corrective measures; the clients 
responded positively to the addition of theatre into their therapeutic course, which 
was evidenced by their strong engagement in the play and the taking on of 
positive and productive behaviours. However, I was no longer simply doing 
therapy. I was bridging practices as a dual practitioner, therefore broadening out 
my job description. Importantly, the ACA standards didn’t address synthesized 
practice, and my practice measures were not necessarily protected under a 
regulating agency, job description or the law. This was of concern because the 
U.S. is a litigious culture. However, it was evident, according to Rogerian practice, 
that I was working through therapeutic measures with a well-entrenched history 
that substantiated my practice as ethical. 
 
Because there were no pre-existing, codified standards of practice that applied to 
dual practitioners, I needed to find some other recourse through which to provide 
evidence that I practiced ethically in my dual role, and that would prove due 
diligence, or a critical evaluation of what was at stake ethically in my particular 
synthesis of theatre and therapeutic practice. This research will provide the 





To account for my personal practice ethics within this research, I needed to 
interrogate my therapeutic practice as a Rogerian as well as examine the values 
inherent within my training as an actor. I also realized that my dual practice aligns 
with some of the concerns of applied theatre, a brand of theatre that is not widely 
practiced in the rural state where I am based in the U.S. 
 
This research is meant to help unravel what is important ethically when I practice 
as a therapist in tandem with the applied theatre practices of my particular brand. 
It was meant to identify specific sites of understanding that could answer the 
question: How do I need to conduct myself towards my other as a blended 
practitioner? The unraveling of these issues was understood to facilitate the 
uncovering of the major assumptions that covertly have driven my practice in the 
past. Additionally, it was meant to expose some of the conflictual elements that 
might arise within a practice ethics that combines individual fields and the 
ideologies that accompany them. At the close of the research, I realized that I was 
undecided about whether I was doing therapy or applied theatre. What this 
research amounted to, as it concluded, was the building of a stable ground from 
which to land within the landscape of applied theatre practice and its many inviting 
forms. 
 
During the course of my research, I have moved from an initially essentialist 
perspective concerning ethics to a perspective that embraces social construction, 
especially the understanding that the self is culturally constructed. This shift in 
understanding has acted as a catalyst, sometimes shaking up my more 
essentialist leanings, particularly in what it means to be open, self-directing and 
self-formulating – important exemplars of Rogerian practice. I have in my past, 
taken these characteristics of emancipatory and participatory democracy as self 
evident and as unquestionable rights. If the self is composed through introjects, it 
will be composed of elements of participatory and emancipatory democracy, such 
as having the ability to be self-determining and self-directional. It will be composed 
as the result of the understanding that a self is of worth and dignity. These 
principles organize my self to a huge degree. I seek out ways that reinforce my 
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understanding that these elements are a part of who we humans are. As a 
Rogerian, I understand that conditions that set up choice-making opportunities, 
positive visualizations of our self, or shared processing can be contributors to this 
definition of humanness. However, if that is the case, is not the individual of social 
construction a self-reinforcing system? During the course of this research, I have 
had to deal with both the appeal of social construction’s understanding of the self, 
while making a case against the individual and cultural solipsism it suggests. 
  
Since the self is, at least in part, composed through an internalization of the 
exemplars of emancipatory and participatory types of democracy, any technique 
that proposes to work on the psychology or psyche of an individual is promoting an 
ideological bias. Techniques of practice can only be looked upon as means that 
promote the internalization of cultural norms. If this is the case, then central to the 
understanding of any type of applied psychology is that it can be said to affect how 
one behaves according to techniques based on a norm. Psychology is a cultural 
derivative and is not effective in internalizing norms, only culture is. Although 
cultures, through the ideologies that background them, can essentialise principles, 
they are not based in an immutable reality. Central to postmodernism is the 
recognition that ‘reality’ is itself a construct or representation and that it needs to 
be looked upon as contextual and changing rather than concretely actual. It is 
further suggested that we are not able to directly grasp what is outside us. We are 
imprisoned within our own subjective understanding of the world and ourselves: ’ 
 
Human subjectivity makes sense of its world, imposes upon it a meaningful 
design using those conceptual tools culture provides. We never encounter 
the real world, only culturally shaped formulations of it, so ‘textual’ even as 
we perceive it.     
        (Counsell 1996: 207)  
 
Though postmodern philosophy poses us as relational – especially within 
psychological accounts – it contrastingly poses us as isolated and fragmented, this 
resonates with existentialism. As Sartre pointed out in his work, Existentialism and 
Humanism, first published in 1946, existentialism ‘is a doctrine ... which affirms 
that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human 
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subjectivity’ (in Mairet trans. 2007: 24-25).  
 
The marginalized and vulnerable 
Theatre practice can be said to be ‘actively’ engaged in shaping persons they 
target. The shaping needs to be informed by seriously considering who it is they 
shape. Importantly, individuals from marginalized and vulnerable populations are 
liable to be acted upon in a manner that is different from individuals from 
populations seen as efficacious, possessing personal agency, and who come 
informed and elect to interact within theatre play or therapy. That has been my 
experience, anyway. The marginalized and vulnerable can be seen as needy 
receivers of interventions rather than as active, informed, discriminating and 
autonomous receivers. They can be seen as needing their subjective world 
reformulated psychologically. They are not be understood as having the capacity 
to emancipate themselves from self-defeating behaviours, even under the right 
conditions, or to transform themselves into the constructions that mirror the 
participatory ideology that provides the raw materials of who they should be. This 
is a hierarchical representation of their status (Foucault in White 2007: 25). Before 
the theatre play or therapy has begun, these people have been disempowered by 
a system said to represent their best interests. 
 
Such strong minimization begs a question: Are there ‘conditions’ within play that 
can be said to self-empower persons who are a participatory body politic of an 
ensemble, so that they can experience themselves as competent, good, non-
pathologised and as having self-agency? Can these conditions lessen the effects 
of shaping? Both Carl Rogers, a clinical psychologist, and Joseph Chaikin, an 
experimental theatre practitioner of the Open Theatre, understood themselves as 
formulating conditions within their respective practices that managed questions of 
autonomy without negating the importance of interconnection. Chapters Two and 
Three will be concerned with flushing out what exactly those conditions amount to. 
Both practitioners offered positive introjects from which I could build the ethics of 
my practice. Both are central to the interrogation of this research. I was trained in 
Rogerian therapy, and by way of this, steeped in Rogers’s practice ethics. The 
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brand of experimental theatre practiced at my former drama school in the UK 
echoes Chaikin’s practice ethics. 
 
What I have learned from this research, and what I did not understand when 
practicing as a therapist, is that if our psyche or psychological makeup is 
understood as constructed then a solely therapeutic treatment of the individual by 
the counselor or dual practitioner is insufficient. The counselor needs to be 
concerned with the social or cultural factors that directly shaped the client. The 
minimized and vulnerable other needs to be exposed to an environment that can 
at least approximate or offer a representation of the social and cultural factors that 




Safety is a huge concern to therapists. To practice safely requires that I 
understand my synthesized practice ethics in depth, since as a Rogerian, I do not 
wish to apply behaviours and attitudes within my practice in an unsafe, inauthentic, 
overpowering or disrespectful manner. Safety is also a concern in applied theatre 
(Adams and Grieder 2005: 77; Thompson 2008: 30-31; Prendergast and Saxton 
2009: 24; Nicholson in Prentki and Preston 2009: 272).  
 
I desire to establish a ground whereby I can evaluate if my dual practice can 
tolerate the standards of practice devised by the American Counseling Association 
or the British Association of Counsellors and Psychotherapists (BACP). In my 
country, no matter how I label or affiliate myself, I will most likely be considered as 
providing therapeutic measures by regulating or funding boards. A driving 
assumption of this research, when taking account of the divergent ideologies 
within my practice, is that a standard of practice for one specialization within a dual 
practice will exert its influence on the other specialization. This influence may limit 
practice measures and subordinate one practice ideology in favour of another, 
especially if one ideology has more political clout than the other through a 
politically strong, mandating organization. The mandating organization in my case 
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is the ACA, which works on both national and state levels through licensing boards 
within the U.S. Chapter Four will be concerned with this issue. A main motivator 
for building standards of practice is to provide safety and fair play. However, what 
is safe practice is determined by ideology, to a huge degree. 
 
Models of care promote values 
As a Licensed Professional Counsellor (LPC) and RN, I practice from a 
behavioural science background shaped by medical and scientific models of 
research. The care systems that I generally work within are shaped according to 
these models. I do not disown them because I respect the science behind them 
some of the time. However, as previously stated, there is an aspect to these 
models that I take issue with. They create impenetrable feedback loops. Also, they 
easily break down into an industrial model of care, which aspires to do good from 
measures it understands as biasless. Such science, when applied to the human 
self, easily disintegrates into providing a technological solution to clients’ problems 
rather than ones based on relationship. As this ideological, cultural shaper’s 
influence has widened, it has become a determiner of how to view the self, what it 
is to shape the individual’s psychology, what constitutes good therapy or care, and 
what policies and procedures within institutions should drive care. This is a huge 
concern for humanistic practitioners within the fields of psychology and 
counselling. It will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
  
Hannah Arendt and many other philosophers in the mid-twentieth century warned 
of the dangers of not 
  
 adjust[ing] [the] cultural attitudes [within the group] to the present status  
 of scientific achievement [...] [f]or the sciences today have been forced to  
 adopt a ‘language’ of mathematical symbols which, though it was   
 originally meant only as an abbreviation for spoken statements, now  
 contains statements that in no way can translate back into speech [...]  
 where [one] moves[s] in a world where speech has lost its power. And  
 whatever men do or know or experience can make sense only to the 
 extent that it can be spoken about. 
            (Arendt 1958:4) 
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Institutional control robs the practitioner of their voice and the opportunity to 
dialogue as previously stated. There are additional problems associated with the 
loss of voice. 
 
Technological care loses the language that makes it a humanizing effort for both 
those who receive the care as well as for those who provide it. Rogers understood 
this as he moved from calling the patient, a client, and then a person, a concern 
that can be linked with a clinical interest in unveiling ‘facades.’ (Rogers in Bugental 
ed. 1967: 268) Technological care attempts to lose language that embeds values. 
My understanding is that this occurs, in part, because care gets reduced to 
methods rather than the building of relationships – as though methods are 
valueless? And, of course, this statement leads me to ask the question: 
Relationship building, according to which ideology? As a Rogerian and 
experimental practitioner, I would mean an ideology that can make sense of a 
relationship whose construction maintains both autonomy and interconnectivity. 
This concern pervades all the chapters of this research. Care that does not embed 
this criterion, for me as a humanist, is not care. 
 
Michael Bennett in his work The Purpose of Counselling and Psychotherapy 
(2005) raises an important challenge to treatment that claims to preserve 
‘autonomy’ or the clients’ ‘choice’. It steers clinician concern about ‘therapeutic 
purpose’ that ‘must eventually bring us face-to-face with the issues of value free 
and nonjudgmental therapeutic interventions.’ (6) He states that there can be no 
such thing.  
 
Can I suspend judgement? 
As a Rogerian, I do not argue that I can assume total neutrality when interfacing 
with my other within practice. I need to always be aware of this fact when 
practicing. I will have ideological biases and I will try to operationalize those to 
some degree within practice. However, I do assume that I can suspend 
judgement, concerning my other and what’s best for her/him, in order to 
understand the client’s perspective. Without the ability to suspend judgement, I 
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cannot legitimately claim that my interrogation within this research is critical. 
Another point: without this function, interconnection would be a form of symbiosis 
and we could not legitimately speak of judgement. Even more, we could not speak 
of ethics. 
 
I find that Bennett is implicitly speaking about shaping. To function in our world we 
need shapers, which is to say, ideologies that shape through the operationalization 
of their exemplars, ideals, principles or premises. Without shaping, through the 
introjecting of ideological or philosophical principles into the self, we would be 
unintelligible masses of matter, energy and circuitry, and incapable of relationships 





 What will take place in this setting? Well, of course, order reigns, the law,  
 and power reigns. Here, in this castle protected by this romantic, alpine  
 setting, which is only assessable by means of complicated machines,  
 and whose very appearance must amaze the common man, an order  
 reigns in the simple sense of never ending, permanent regulation of time, 
 activities, and actions; an order which surrounds, penetrates, and works  
 on bodies, applies itself to their surfaces, but which equally  
 imprints itself on the nerves and what someone called ‘the soft fibers of  
 the brain.’ An order, therefore, for which bodies are only surfaces to be   
 penetrated and volumes to be worked on, an order which is like a great   
 nervure of prescriptions, such that bodies are invaded and run through   
 by order. 
                (Foucault in Lagrange, eds. & Burchell, trans. 2006: 2)  
 
 
Ominous settings, which work on bodies through laws or power structures, in 
conjunction with these power structures, build outlooks for seeing what it is to be 
the other and what it is to be the power broker. A view, a created perception, in 
effect, becomes understood as a reality. Realities become self-justifying. If caught 
within the culture of the ominous setting, whether client, patient or caregiver, one 
can lose sight of the understanding that the ominous setting is a fabricated, self-
perpetuating culture and not a thing-in-itself reality.  
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That mental illness is a rare condition has been argued as early as the mid 
twentieth century. That it is a real condition at all has been contested. Whether 
real or not, however, mental illness is linked to having rights; this was recognised 
more than half a century ago. As Farber (1993) stated of Thomas Szasz’s 1961 
The Myth of Mental Illness: 
 
 Szasz argued that the concept of ‘mental illness’ is a metaphor, and that  
 as a metaphor it does not illuminate the experience or behaviour of the  
 individual to whom it is applied, but on the contrary it obscures 
  essential features of the individual’s behaviour and of the human situation  
 in general. Szasz’s argued that the term was used to stigmatize deviants 
  from social norms and to deprive them of their democratic rights and  
 responsibilities. 
            (117) 
 
 Any attempt to survey the pursuit in America of what is variously called  
 mental or emotional health runs up immediately against the sheer size of  
 the territory and the ill-defined nature of its landscape. [...] Surely no  
 nation in the Western world – much less the remainder of the earth,  
 where considerations of ‘mental health’ scarcely figure in social    
 existence – can present the same panoply: a massive medical-psychiatric  
 establishment; the lion’s share of the world’s psychoanalysts; great  
 hosts of ancillary professionals, such as psychologists, family    
 counselors, social workers, etc.; an interminable proliferation of    
 alternate approaches to emotional well-being drawing on virtually every  
 aspect of contemporary culture – in short an entire industry of sorts,  
 whose business is the production and distribution of emotional order and 
 well being; an industry, moreover [...] subject to neither reliable objective  
 analysis nor methodological unity, one whose separate enterprises  
 seem to speak different languages entirely[.] 
              (Kovel in Ingleby ed. 1980: 72)  
 
Mental health is a treatment ‘industry’, and not one where all the actors have equal 
roles, especially the clients, or rather, patients. The clients inhabit the system as 
minor players to the psychiatrists, psychologists, clinicians and social workers. 
Mental health is an ‘industry’ because it is a support system, not only for the 
population it purports to serve, but for a population that builds professional ranking 
as well as provides a living for its practicing professionals. If this is the case, 
questioning why the over-institutionalised individuals show resistance to treatment 
is like shooting oneself in the foot if you are one of those professionals. 
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Maybe it is time to return to earlier modes of communicating about mental health 
or personal welfare through 'myth, legend, superstition and the demonic (Ibid)’, as 
Kovel suggests – a mode of communication that may inspire the client. Mental 
wellness may be found within the sites where story, narratives, myth and creativity 
are explored, where the marginalized can build their own introjects that connect 
them to their other or culture. It may be within these sites that having a sense of 
self-efficacy is built. Within these creative sites of storytelling and taking on roles, 
the client may gain a sense of political self-efficacy. As John McCumber points out 
through out his work Time and History: A History of Continental Thought (2011), ‘it 
is through myth that the reversal of the values that have direct bearing upon how 
we view ourselves as a culture are expressed, and by which we ultimately come to 
know ourselves as individuals.’ (201-224) These sites of exploration impact – they 
build positive introjects that can be immediately experienced through the clients 
sense of being opened up to new possibilities of viewing themselves. These sites 
can also provide them with the opportunity to be relational as well as self-
differentiating and self-directional.  
 
 Prototypical classifications of mental illness are generally, and perhaps  
 even universally, rooted in extreme deviations from normal psychological 
 functioning. Throughout history, social groups have judged that certain  
 kinds of phenomena lie outside the boundaries of sanity and have    
 labelled these conditions ‘mental illness’ regardless of the particular  
 names they call them or the particular frameworks they use to classify  
 them (Horowitz 1982a; Jackson 1986). Historically, however, these  
 classifications have been applied to only a small number of severely  
 disturbed conditions. This limited use of mental illness labels has now  
 changed beyond recognition. 
                     (Horowitz 2002: 208) 
 
As a therapist or counsellor, I have personally witnessed the proliferation of 
‘mental illness,’ which I believe is more an outcome of the regulating institutions 
that manage illness then an actual proliferation of mental health disease. For 
example, presently, in order for some individuals – abused women and children, 
persons with disabilities, or persons emotionally scarred by environmental factors 
– to get benefits there has to be a mental health diagnosis. This is true in the State 
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of Idaho and twenty-seven other states within the U.S. Professionals are 
pressured to make diagnoses, and if they don’t conform to state regulations, the 
persons they are meant to safely and fairly serve, don’t get needed benefits. This 
affects their quality of life and their sense of well-being.  
 
 Clinicians who take a pathological orientation are biased by what  
 Kenneth Gergen (1990) calls a language of deficit. Focusing exclusively 
  on pathogenic factors leads therapists to take a narrow approach towards 
  clients, in which the emphasis is on diagnosing a disorder and  
 attempting to provide treatment. 
                  (Kleinke 1994: 250) 
 
I originally turned to theatre to address the issue of resistance towards therapy 
when working with marginalized and vulnerable clients that had been over 
institutionalised, usually in health, penal and welfare systems, or programs that 
were regulated by the Idaho State Health and Welfare. By over-institutionalised, I 
mean that the clients had been receiving services in these systems of care for long 
periods of time and, as a result, had become shut off to any benefits that 
counselling might provide. By marginalized, I mean that they had no authentic 
voice, and that was evidenced by their resistance. By vulnerable, I mean that they 
were aggressively shaped by a system rather than vitally and critically engaged 
within it. 
 
Another complicating factor was, that much of the time, counselling was something 
the client engaged in because they received needed benefits, which were attached 
to going to therapy, or because they were court ordered to attend. Counselling 
was something many of its receivers understood as a service they could do 
without. Some did not see themselves as having mental illness, but the diagnosis 
had been attached to them regardless. 
  
Situating the ethics 
 
 The point of knowledge is always open to refinement. 
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                    (Kershaw in Davis ed., 2008: 23) 
 
 
The goals of this research are not to ‘dramatize ethical questions’ but rather to 
address ethical considerations provoked by a practice that synthesizes two fields: 
Rogerian therapy and experimental theatre. The research does not concern what 
is witnessed on stage as ‘ethical questions’ being ‘dramatized,' but rather, it 
concerns addressing ethical considerations that precede and underpin processes 
in two practices and in synthesizing those practices. It also concerns actions or 
attitudes taken by the practitioner which are considered good practice so that ‘[t]o 
act is to take some consideration as a normative reason to act and to act for that 
reason.’ (Darwall 1998: 45)  
 
Darwall states that ‘ethical convictions purport to reflect something objective’ (21). 
However, this research proposes that, although creating or identifying something 
objective can be an aim of constructing a synthesized practice ethics, it cannot be 
the initial first step, at least not in this particular research’s approach. The first step 
in my case, since this research is auto ethnocentric or self-reflexive by design, is 
to interrogate my own subjective understanding of the two practices and of their 
synthesis. Yet, it is from my subjective account that it is possible to perceive the 
objectivity that underlies other practices, and that is needed in order to understand 
my own brand of synthesized practice ethics prior to engaging my other within 
play. Within his article, Drama as Ethical Education (2000: 63-84), Edmiston 
states: ‘Values are not acquired from outside us, but rather, they are forged in 
dialogue amongst people and texts.’ The texts that I will be in dialogue with in this 
research project come out of Carl Rogers’ canon and Joseph Chaikin’s, The 
Presence of the Actor (1972).  
 
Stephen Darwall, in his work Philosophical Ethics (1998), states that normative 
ethics ‘concerns what a person should or ought to desire, feel, be or do.’(5) The 
statement implicitly asks the question: What is the person responding to in order to 
be so compelled? It can be a set of standards and the ideology that is embedded 
in them. The standards, in turn, can be claimed to have been built through 
29 
 
objective or subjective research, agreement, inheritance, or critical examination 
and evaluation. Within Chapter Four of this dissertation, the American Counseling 
Association (ACA) and the British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy’s 
(BACP) standards of ethical practice will be at issue. The interrogation of Chapters 
Two and Three will provide the material from which to understand this 
engagement with the codes of ethics. Finally, I will build my ‘bridged’ ethical 
practice that spans the world of counselling and the field of applied theatre, and 
this personal, bridging ethics will then be contrasted with the two ethical standards 
from these two institutions, the ACA and BACP, to determine it’s fit or compatible. 
The universal applicability of practice standards will be challenged. 
 
My other: marginalized and vulnerable populations 
This research addresses specific populations in the U.S. when referencing the 
‘engaged other’. They are populations who have been ideologically conditioned to 
value the exemplars or principles of emancipatory and participatory democracy. 
This is not to say that similar populations do not exist. 
 
However, there is a further narrowing that needs to be taken into consideration 
when clarifying or defining who the other is. Although a democratic ideology 
influences the populations that I engage within my practice that does not 
necessarily mean that its exemplars, ideals, principles or values have been 
equitably, fairly or uniformly applied across persons or groups. This is a problem 
for people identified as mental health patients, especially ones who have 
experienced a protracted or enforced encounter with mental health institutions. 
Their rights to exercise the exemplars of emancipatory and participatory 
democracy have been attenuated. Importantly, as I understand it, my other will 
introject internally the exemplars, rights or principles of democracy to a lesser 
degree than a person who is understood and treated as mentally healthy by the 
larger society. 
My specific others may have been shaped by principles embedded within the 
rhetoric of emancipatory and participatory forms of democracy, however, as 
persons within a mental health context, they have been shaped by powerful, 
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mental health institutions. These institutions determine the extent of what their 
rights should be – rights considered as naturalized in the person when speaking of 
American democracy. In light of this, I need always keep in mind that my other 
needs to be understood as vulnerable; as potentially having less of a share in the 
exemplars, rights, standards, values or principles offered by emancipatory and 
participatory forms of democracy. 
 
If the other views herself or himself as participating less fully, or in an attenuated 
or limited manner, within the democratic realm, it becomes an affront to who they 
see themselves to authentically be. In other words, their judgement of their 
authenticity is predicated on the ideals of democracy being in place within practice 
and their equal distribution. Importantly, my other frequently reacted with 
resistance to doing therapy. As I understand it, the resistance had to do with 
democratic ideals not being applied equally. Within my experience as a counsellor, 
resistance is usually attributed to a person being oppositionally put together – 
oppositionally defiant, as the diagnosis goes. The person can also be designated 
as controlling. My view departs from conventional wisdom.  
  
The goals of this research, if brought to fruition, would build an ethical base 
whereby a practitioner of my brand of counselling practice can become an 
advocate for their marginalized other. In this context, I use advocacy as defined by 
the American Counseling Association: as the ‘promotion of the well being of 
individuals and groups and the counseling profession within systems and 
organizations. Advocacy seeks to remove barriers and obstacles that inhibit 
access, growth, and development.’ (ACA Code of Ethics, 20) An assumption 
underlying this research is that the formation of this ethical base can be done by 
setting up specific conditions within practice that address the problem of 
resistance, but not by doing conventional therapy. Specifically, it would mean 
turning the client into actor and therapy into performance, though both 
reconstructions should not be understood as a proxy for therapy.  
 
Within my practice as a therapist, theatre was a proxy. Within the undertaking of 
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this research, since I am in the act of jumping ship, the research is a transitional 
field. This means that my future practice will first be about doing theatre, and that 
any therapeutic value gleaned will be determined by the actor.  
 
Resistance is understood, within this research, as a legitimate and reasonable 
defensive maneuver by persons or populations that have endured long-term 
exposure to therapeutic methods. These methods are understood to strongly 
shape and limit how the resistant individuals view themselves. An assumption of 
this research is that the prolonged use of therapeutic ‘shaping’ contributes to a 
formulation of a self-understood as pathological rather than as self-determining 
and self-directional. Pathology, in this sense, comes to mean a loss of agency and 
freedom – both elements that are directly associated with possessing worth and 
dignity and which are key elements for defining oneself as a citizen within 
participatory and emancipatory forms of democratic governance. If that is the 
case, my humanistic applied theatre practice, like my counselling practice, will 
need to concern itself with facilitating personal agency and voice – a voice that 
expresses itself as self-directional and self-determining.   
 
I understand my other as in need of ridding her- or himself of the negative 
introjects imposed by diagnoses. I understand my other to be in need of an 
engagement that appeals to immediacy, by which I mean the immediate 
circumstances and reality at hand within practice, which is to say, the existential, 
living present. From the humanist standpoint, immediacy, in conjunction with being 
open to possibility, sets up a ground whereby others can operationalize behaviour 
that represents who they see themselves to authentically be.  
 
There is a caveat; In rural Idaho my practice is looked upon as therapeutic – 
whether I term myself a therapist, dual practitioner or theatre practitioner. Licensed 
counsellors are under the regulations of the American Counseling Association 
(ACA) and its standards of practice. Empiricism is the ideology that underpins the 
standards of the ACA and its assumptions of what it is ethically normative. 
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Operationalizing immediacy within practice means to lessen the degree to which 
normative ‘shaping’ might affect the other within play.  
 
The identification of my specific other exposes a power differential that impacts my 
other’s sense of self in a negative manner. This means that advocacy is inherently 
at issue within my practice. Advocacy is a contested topic amongst counselling 
practitioners. Many counsellors view taking on the role of social advocate as a 
poor choice because it is based on the assumption that counsellors are able to be 
politically or socially neutral. Where a strong power differential imposes a limitation 
to the degree overarching values, principles, exemplars or the rights of democracy 
can be introjected within a sense of self meant to function within a democratic 
society, advocacy is at issue. The practitioner, at the very least, needs to provide 
an antidote to the limited distribution of the rights, exemplars or ideals of 
democracy.  
 
Applied theatre addresses the problems of marginalization and imposition (Weaver 
in Prentki and Preston 2009: 57; Hooks in Prentki and Preston 2009: 83; Kuftinec 
2009: 106), and within its canon, does not shy away from addressing social 
justice. Its practitioners actively engage, through practice, the concerns that can 
surround the limited distribution of rights, or the operationalized principles, values 
or ideals of democracy. This will be at issue within the interrogation of Chapter 
Four. 
  
Ridout, in his Theatre and Ethics (2009) states that ethics concerns the question: 
‘How shall I act?’ (25) and that the question ‘begins from the assumption that there 
is no someone or somewhere else to provide [...] an answer.' The locus of ethical 
behaviour is within the self of the practitioner in other words. Prendergast and 
Saxton concur:  
 
Even before you begin this work, you need to be clear about your own 
understanding of what is important to you, what it is that you value and see 
as fair, what it is that you are prepared to give up. You need to create a 








Carl Rogers is perhaps best known by those outside the profession of counselling 
for his work with encounter groups during the 1960s and ’70s. He was part of the 
humanistic movement within the field of psychology, which under his influence was 
inflected by threads of philosophy found in modernism, phenomenology, and 
existentialism. Though considering himself a scientist-practitioner/researcher 
within the subfield of clinical psychology, Rogers also considered himself a 
philosophical psychologist. This distinction is important because it marked out an 
estrangement between behaviourism, psychoanalysis and psychology as 
philosophy.  
 
Thematic within Rogers’s humanism, non-directive therapy, or client-centred 
therapy, were issues of authenticity, self-worth, freedom, choice, personal 
responsibility, receptivity (or attunement), and respect for the other. Engaging the 
other required unconditional acceptance and came out of I/Thou ethics, a branch 
of phenomenology. Surrounding the listed terms were issues of interrelational 
activity: what it was to be a self, non-hierarchical systems, development, 
universalism, relativism, determinism, individualism, identity, personalism, 
subjectivism, the creation of contexts and conditions, or phenomenological fields 
and transpersonal models of communication.  
 
In the late 1950s, Rogers published a theory of practicing therapy that has been 
called self-psychology, interpersonal psychology, or existential-phenomenological 
psychology. This terminological reduction has posed a problem: his theory of 
practice and its ethics has been traditionally limited through a narrow focus when 
looked at in scholarship or critical accounts.  
 
Rogers’s focus on the client was concerned with facilitating the development of an 
authentic person who was well integrated in his or her social sphere and open to 
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experience and the possibilities it offered, who was self-directing and strongly 
actualized, which meant that they had realized their potential – and of course, had 
become the perfect citizen (1995: 335). An emancipatory and participatory form of 
democracy was at stake in Rogers’s counselling praxis. Creating favourable 
climates or conditions within therapy through the relationship of therapist to client 
was of special interest.  
 
For Rogers, there needed to be a focus within therapy on affective, experiential, 
and sensory responsiveness, rather than on diagnostics, interpretation, or rigid 
technique. The therapy session was understood as client driven through the 
relating of a personal and affect-laden narrative, and as a consequence of 
Rogers’s limited use of techniques. Rogers’s understanding was that the therapist 
drove therapy though internalized attitudes that were universal amongst 
individuals, rather than through pre-determined techniques. The attitudes were 
being authentic, being empathically attuned to one’s other, and being 
unconditionally accepting – or as Rogers framed it, having unconditional positive 
regard for one’s other.  
 
Rogers has described his own practice variously. In Client-Centered Therapy 
(Kirschenbaum and Henderson 1990: 9), he states: 
 
 From its inception, the orientation that has come to be called client- 
 centred psychotherapy has been noted for its growing, changing;  
 changes have emerged as a result of the increasing experience of a  
 group of therapists and out of the findings of a continuing and    
 multifaceted program of research.  
           (Ibid) 
 
A point conveyed in the description was that his theory was more a process that 
was driven by continual new findings than anything set in stone. In his final work, A 
Way of Being, first published in 1985, Rogers’s built an argument that what was 
called a theory by some, but he considered a way of being. Both accounts posed 
that the way to be, is achieved through one’s actions or attitudes, facilitating 
movement towards and ending in possibility. Rogers’s authentic person was one 
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involved with the process of continual change in order to meet the circumstances 




Joseph Chaikin was an actor-director associated with the off-off Broadway groups 
that were ‘concerned with innovation’ (Brockett and Hildy 2003: 537). Chaikin was 
a founding member of The Open Theatre, which can be characterized as a 
workshop and ensemble theatre. It built its productions out of work done in labs 
meant to develop the individual actor as well as the ensemble. Narratives built 
around negative social introjects drove the experimentation that took place in the 
lab work that resulted in productions for the public.  
 
An aspect of Chaikin’s perspective, which was a ‘refutation of the Freudian idea of 
the unalterability of human nature’ (Carlson 1993: 420), influenced the thematic 
content explored in the lab. As a result, his work became closely allied to the 
theories of the existential psychoanalysts of the 1960s such as David Copperfield 
and R.D. Laing, who rejected Freud’s positing of society as a norm to which the 
patient should be ‘adjusted’ ( 420-421). This thematic content was explored 
through a theatricality that was reducible to ‘stage action’ (Blumenthal 1984: 150). 
Such ‘action’ took the form of improvisation, theatre games, and the exploration of 
personal identity vs. social identity though the creation of images. A characteristic 
theme that drove the labs, as well as the theatrical performances, was that of 
‘transformation’ (Hulton 2000: 151).  
 
The thematic content studied in the labs resonated with Rogers, creating 
favourable climates or conditions within the play of the lab through the relationship 
of director, playwright, and actors to each other in interrelational or ensemble 
playing. Negative and positive introjects, which could be internalized within the self 
of the actor and which could expose violations of rights by governing institutions 




Chaikin became a social activist. Strong traces of Chaikin’s budding activism 
began to emerge when he took on the role of Galey Gay in Brecht’s Man Is Man. 
This was at a time when he was working at The Living Theatre as an actor, and 
running an acting workshop (Carlson 1993: 420) before he had moved on to help 
build The Open Theatre. 
In his only written book, Chaikin downplayed his activism, a part of his identity that 
had contributed to the formation of The Open Theatre. In his The Presence of the 
Actor, he spoke of his activism in a description that belied the seriousness and 
extent of his involvement. There was little stated about actual circumstances 
except for an arrest and jailing. The extent of his activist involvement, however, 
rang through in an account that spoke of an epiphany. The level of risk and 
commitment he undertook was vivified was described in his obituary in the Village 
Voice in a short paragraph by Judith Malina. Malina put a very human face to the 
level of commitment evidenced in his activism. She stated: 
 
In William Carlos William's Many Loves, Joe sold me a house . . . and in 
Brecht's Man Is Man, I sold him an elephant . . . and his intense 
commitment to the moment – that was it – made these transactions an 
emblem of the whole terrible dilemma of the human race. For Chaikin 
always played the moment in which he was as the true moment – the only 
true moment – and brought to these transactions the momentous presence 
of the present. In this way he made all that happened to him onstage a 
transcendent experience. [ ... ] When the Vietnam War led the theater into 
the streets and we sat down in protest together in the middle of the Times 
Square traffic, the police rode in with clubs. A glancing blow caught the side 
of my head. I saw a flash of red and pain and then I felt Joe's body covering 
me, and I took shelter under his protection and felt no more blows. [ ... ] But 
Joe's persistent innocence rises above it all and has protected us all these 
years without our even knowing it. The courage of his unmasking of the 
unashamed self and his laying bare the secret recesses of the soul make it 
clear that Open was the right name for his theater. We see more now, and 
the light is his.          
           (New York Village Voice, 8 July 2003) 
The liminal 
Through the influence of theatre groups such as The Living Theatre and The Open 
Theatre, experimental techniques began to be more regularly used within theatre 
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training. They are foundational to applied theatre practices and are understood as 
catalysts for social and individual change. Sonja Kuftinec’s work articulates this at 
the level of community work in her work Staging America, (2005), as does Leonard 
and Kilkelly’s, Performing Communities (2006). Additionally, Cecily O’Neill’s 
Structure and Spontaneity (2006) and Wilhelm and Edmiston’s Imaging To Learn 
(1998) capture the techniques used in educational settings. Experimental theatre 
and its techniques have been a launch into addressing ethics of practice. My 
research is an example of this. Other examples are Process Drama and Multiple 
Literacies (2006) by Schneider, Crumpler, and Rogers, the techniques of which 
have been used in grassroots theatre, and Bruce McConachie’s “Approaching the 
‘Structure of Feeling’ in Grassroots Theatre” (in Haedicke and Nellhaus, eds, 
2001: 29-57). All of these speak to the need to offer a ground of play that 
maintains openness to possibility and a continual disruption in the understanding 
of what theatre amounts to as well as the actions it takes to disrupt conventional 
theatre. Experimental theatre has become status quo, but one that continues to 
resist boundaries. That means that the actor self needs a means of resisting 
boundaries in order to forge their on-going building of an actor-identity. 
 
All these examples of experimental techniques find an origin that is traceable back 
to a form of experimental theatre that attempted to define the ‘liminal’. By liminal I 
mean a space that ‘transports’ and ‘transforms’: a site or condition of ‘entities’ that 
are understood to be ‘neither here nor there, which is betwixt and between 
positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention and ceremony’ (Turner 
in Schechner 2006: 66). As Schechner states: ‘Liminal rituals are transformations, 
permanently changing who people are’ (72). He makes a distinction between 
terms, and states that there are also ‘liminoid’ rituals. Liminoid rituals are to be 
understood as something ‘effecting a temporary change – something nothing more 
than a brief communitas experience or a several-hours-long playing of a role’. 
They ‘are transportations. In a transportation, one enters into the experience, is 
“moved” or “touched” ... and is dropped off where she or he entered’ (Ibid).  
 
Schechner’s assumption is that ‘the drop off point where one entered’ is a terminal 
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point. I would argue against that interpretation. I suggest that the feeling of 
communitas, or belonging within the condition of interrelationship that is 
constructed through actions taken (experimental techniques), are the materials for 
building a sense of interconnectedness. Through the support offered by this 
condition, the ground is set for the actor-self to become open – which is a 
prerequisite of entering the liminal space.  
 
Why my practice is not drama therapy 
 
  Some claim that all dramatic experience is therapeutic. It is axiomatic  
 that workshop leaders, teachers and educational and community theatre  
 companies generally expect some change for the better will take place  
 as a result of their work. At the very least, there is an expectation of 
 ‘doing good’. More specifically, certain drama activities aim at achieving  
 potentially complex psychological and emotional shifts – the work of  
 dramatherapists and psychodramatists, for example. 
        (Somers in Jennings 2009: 193) 
 
This thesis in interested in pursuing the philosophical links between therapeutic 
practice and experimental practice, but it is not interested in that aspect of 
combined practice that has emerged as drama therapy. An argument of this 
research, and a catalyst for conducting it, is the insight that client groups or 
populations that are resistant to therapeutic modes find new possibilities in the 
theatrical, where they can be liberated from the understanding that they are 
pathological.  
 
As previously stated, my work  concerns clients and groups that have been over 
institutionalised. These clients or groups have been worked on by the culture of 
state social welfare agencies though therapy and therapeutic measures on a long-
term basis. What is affected by this continual exposure is resistance – and, not 
simply because of the dulling effect of long-term repetition. It is because of the 
hazard of being worked on labeled in a pathologising manner. As a therapist, what 
I have found is that client perception of the type of discipline employed in their 
treatment matters. Using theatre as theatre, clients are able to build introjects by 
which to view themselves as skilled and functional actors, rather than build 
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introjects that affirm they are broken.   
 
Autonomy and a common ground of practice  
 
 Embedded in selfhood are cultural assumptions about roles,   
 relationships, and self worth that underpin morality. The (male) Western  
 model of the self gives enormous weight to an individual’s personal  
 autonomy and freedom, purely because they are persons [...] It focuses  
 on the self as the agent relating to others, rather than on the  
 interconnection of persons. Self worth is therefore seen in terms of    
 individual being able to freely act and responsibly vis-à-vis others, who 
  are free, separate selves. 
        (Haste in Woodhead et. al. eds. 1999: 187) 
 
That persons were autonomous when at their best was an understanding of both 
Rogers and Chaikin. Aso, both attempted to achieve within their respective 
practices, a common ground whereby self-determination and self-direction could 
be operationalized, strengthening the whole group. Despite valuing personal 
autonomy, neither dismissed the importance of interconnection within practice; 
Rogers, through the interconnection of the therapist-client dyad, and Chaikin 
through building an ensemble gestalt, created through the interactivity between 
actors, director and playwright. This presents a shift from the account given by 
Haste above. 
 
An ideology that contributed to how an individual developed as a self but in 
relation within a group is compatible with what it means to be self-constructed from 
forms of participatory and emancipatory democracy. Participation assumes that we 
can act as individuals. 
 
However one attribute may be operationalized more strongly than the other. 
American democracy usually shifts towards emancipation, evidenced by the strong 
valuing of individualism. Still, participation does matter. Both Rogers and Chaikin 
sought to achieve a degree of interrelatedness that required deep commitment 
bonds between strongly connected members in their work environment. This 
breaks with the emancipatory side of the dynamic. And it was a shift out of the 
stark individualism that was understood as characteristic of Americans in general. 
40 
 
Within each practice, a disposition or attitude started to emerge that emphasized 
that strong interrelationships are an important compositional force when creating 
the person, not just the concern for autonomy.  
 
Facilitating the self-perception of having worth and dignity 
 
 The discipline comes through creating exercises which bring up a    
 common ground.  
         (Chaikin 1972: 15) 
 
 
When synthesizing practices, my assumption was that through experiencing 
themselves as actors and not patients, my clients would gain a sense of worth and 
dignity that had gone missing through repeated years of doing and dodging 
therapy. As marginalized, they had grown to visualize themselves as pathologised 
rather than as self-determining and self-directing. Since I personally had 
experienced, as a drama student, that there was something about active 
engagement within theatre practice that was liberating yet capable of building a 
common ground of values, I choose to apply what I had learnt in my theatre 
training with the populations that I served. The embracing of the switch out by my 
clients was evident on a scale that I did not expect – and across specific and very 
different populations. The energy generated by the now actors when tackling 
performance pieces was amazing. They had fun, they challenged themselves, and 
their heightened concentration and engagement was evident. Personal insights 
flourished: testimony of the relief experienced from being continuously worked on 
by a strongly imposing system of power. As I saw it, my clients experienced 
themselves as efficacious, important, valuable and worthy.  
 
A practice ethic built from evidence gained through criticality 
 
As previously stated, what this research may accomplish is provide a ground 
where practitioners, like myself, can prove due diligence; meaning a strongly 
comprehensive understanding of one’s personal practice ethics gained through 
criticality. Although, not providing empirical evidence, the ethic can pose contrasts 
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to build a critical ground by which to judge how to act towards the other. This 
critical ground is not one concerned with proof, but rather, critical understanding.  
Cases that support this approach can be found in applied theatre practices. For 
example, Sonja Kuftinec, accounting for her practice in the Balkans, suggests that 
critical understanding is imperative for client safety (2009: 68-69). Thompson, in 
his work in Sri Lanka, makes the same case (2009: 22-25). Assessing for safety 
means assessing according to one’s practice ideology what safety means. 
 
My own practice, as a counsellor doing therapy, resulted in failure when I did not 
properly exercise due diligence. I was using accepted methods of practice (not 
strictly Rogerian) to assess for the clients’ willingness to change behaviours like 
truancy, poor classroom engagement and performance and social substance use. 
Using what is termed Motivational Interviewing, which relies heavily on Rogerian 
relationship-building skills and Prochaska’s model, I applied the Rogerian 
approach a little more heavy handedly than usual. The client was enjoying herself 
in therapy and importantly, avoiding her problems. She was not processing them 
out along with the affective experience associated with them. From a counsellor’s 
point of view, I was not doing my job. When I became more empathetic, she 
started to process her problems and became more aware of her feelings. The 
language of change was identifiable. The session ended and I felt somewhat 
satisfied over the encounter. The client booked her next appointment and then did 
not show up. She was court ordered to see me. Eventually, she came back to 
therapy just to let me know that she was not coming to see me again. I was just 
one more person in a long line of relational failures. As she understood it, when 
she had come to therapy, before ‘crying, I had fun‘ – she felt that she could no 
longer trust me to allow her to try out the happy self she wanted to be. She stated, 
‘Therapy was the only time during the week that I felt good about myself.’ My client 
had read ‘crying’ as another round of humiliation to suffer. The shame-humiliation 
response, when it appears, represents the failure or absence of warmth of contact, 
a reaction to the loss of feedback from others, indicating social isolation and 




 [P]erformance calls attention [...] in a way that lifts everyone slightly  
 above the present, into a hopeful feeling of what the world might be like if 
 every moment of our lives were as emotionally voluminous, generous [...]  
 and intersubjectively intense. 
          (Dolan 2005: 5) 
 
 Working to keep people alive, to value their and others’ lives, and to  
 announce proudly that they are worthy of living and being valued for  
 being alive, is then central to the politics proposed here. And happiness,  
 joy and celebration are indispensable sensations in this act. 
        (Thompson 2009: 179) 
 
The cogent point brought out by the two applied-theatre practitioners quoted 
above is that I should have followed my gut (intuition) and let her have fun. The 
relationship building aspects of joyful or uplifting experiences is vital in the 
literature of theatre practice, as the quotes above attest. Also, before this failure, I 
had started to wonder if change didn’t involve experiencing joy while in relationship 
with the other. This was the driving influence behind the use of theatre with young 
kids who have been over-institutionalised. As a practitioner, I had turned myself 
into an advocate for bringing out negative feelings rather than building a context 
that could support and develop more positive emotions. 
 
 To be made happy by this or that is to recognise that happiness starts  
 from somewhere other than the subject who may use the word to    
 describe a situation. 
     (Ahmed, Happy Objects in Gregg & Seigworth, eds. 2010: 29)   
    
 
Shifting into a critical understanding of humanity  
 
 Since the origins of modern social theory in the Enlightenment, there has 
  been a tension between, on the one hand, the received model of   
 objective (scientific) knowledge and, on the other, the recognition of the 
  historical and cultural variability of patterns of belief. The paradigm of 
  mechanical science, associated with Galileo and Newton, dealing with 
  objectively measurable phenomena, and disclosing a world governed by 
 mathematically specifiable laws, was widely adopted as the model for 
 ‘scientific’ morality, law and government. Although the advocates of rival 
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  epistemologies – empiricists, rationalists and Kantians – differed from 
  each other on many issues they still shared important thematic 
 commitments, most especially their belief in the objectivity and    
 universality of scientific knowledge and method. 
          (Benton and Craib 2011: 142) 
 
Empiricism assumes that science can capture reality, which is a topic discussed in 
Chapter Four of the research. The ideology of science is at issue, since the ACA’s 
standard of practice makes the basic assumption that there is truth in science and 
that ethical conduct by the practitioner is an extension of not only truth but also its 
methods. Such practice is thought to prove something real or actual. The term 
‘real’ implies that there can be certitude in knowledge. Central to this concept, 
when applied to human understanding, is that our mind directly and clearly 
apprehends what is really there. In this case, science, when applied to humans, 
easily reduces human conduct to technology. This reduction separates the 
concerns of science from the ones of ethics. Chapter Four will address this.  
 
In contrast my particular understanding of what practice should be is shaped by 
both Rogerian and experimental theatre practice – and the practice ideologies 
shape what I understand to be applicable knowledge for practicing. Further, 
through the efforts of my current research, I am being shaped by social 
construction, a philosophical view that underpins applied theatre, a practice I have 
inadvertently used with clients and groups that were resistant to therapy. Social 
construction now shapes the fundamentals of my knowledge and will shape how I 
understand my limits regarding the shaping of the other within practice. My view of 
what my practice amounts to is based in philosophy, not in science as reality.  
 
Rogers preserved modernist values in his brand of therapy. Those values or 
principles conditioned how he regarded the self at its best. Modernism determines 
how I regard the extent to which ‘shaping’ should be carried out within my practice. 
The brand of modernism that influences shaping appeals to emancipatory and 
participatory forms of democracy. Emancipation suggests that there needs to be 
conditions built within therapy that operationalize personal freedom. Participation 
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suggests that conditions need to be built that foster interconnection.  
 
The self is a process 
Both Rogers and Chaikin understood that to some degree the self was a 
construction. The understanding that selves are constructed parallels Chaikin’s 
view of the actor-self. He understood that actors are formulated through dynamic 
processes. From a critical perspective, this understanding means that my practice 
contests that there can be knowledge that qualifies a person or self exclusively in 
absolute terms. And this leads to the question, what is left? What supplies the stuff 
that makes the person or self? Chaikin (1972: 100) suggested it was building 
conditions that offered choices. Rogers (1995a: 115) understood that the 
conditions were forged by the attitudes of the practitioner so that the client could 
make choices. Both outlooks suggest that the self signifies a process, not an 
absolute thing-in-itself.  
 
A Dynamic 
Critics of social construction take the position that the self, understood through a 
social constructionist lens, can’t articulately be understood as self-differentiated 
since it is understood as ideologically constructed. It becomes too self-referencing 
as an entity constructed solely related to cultural input. However, Burr addresses 
this problem suggesting that the person is created dynamically between their 
personal narratives concerning who they are in relation to others’ narratives 
concerning them (Burr 1995: 140-142).  
 
The critics also read social construction as eliminating the possibility of having 
distinct features or functions to our perceptual capacities – features which provide 
an unadulterated, objective understanding of our self and the world around us 
(Bishop 2007: 63). Social construction is understood as privileging subjectivity as 
the main means by which we understand the world. In other words, social 
constructionists have basically painted themselves into a corner where the self 
necessarily has to be understood as radically shaped as well as solipsistic.  
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My response to this criticism is that we can build positive oppositions. As a 
dialectic the coupling suggests that we are wired to turn inward and self-reflect, 
isolating our understandings from strong outside influences, as well as able to be 
conditioned by an environment so that we can live and function within it. In other 
words, we have the capacity to suspend each manner of viewing the other, our 
world and ourselves.  
 
Experiences that bind suggest that a humanity is at stake 
Chaikin (1972: 16) speaks of a ’common human condition’ that is recognizable 
within some performances. He also speaks of a ‘recognition scene’ between the 
performer and the audience’ (17) that ‘help[s] both proceed with the shared 
experience of living.' Considered in conjunction, the ‘recognition’ and the ‘common 
condition’ suggests an experience or understanding that binds. Also suggested, is 
that the condition has a universal purpose, that the experience of it is sought out 
and that it creates bonds through ‘shared’ living – or interrelationship building. As a 
drama student, I understood this, implicitly, through exposure to experimental 
techniques. 
 
It is suggested that Chaikin relied on there being some universal reality expressed 
when engaged within theatre. Core conditions of existence suggest collectively 
that we are bonded or interrelated. Rogers’s humanistic practice relied on such an 
assumption, which is a modernist assumption. My dual practice, as an extension 
of this understanding, puts me in the position of being conservationist as well as 
constructionist. Within my practice, despite the constructionist outlook, I preserve a 
thread of understanding associated with modernism. However, the concept of 
humanity, when posed as a fabrication of interrelationship, is compatible with the 
idea of social construction, which posits that we are inter-relationally constructed.   
 
 
 We can and do destroy the humanity of other men, and the condition of  
 this possibility is that we are interdependent. We are not self-contained  
 monads producing no effects on each other except our reflections. We  
 are acted upon, changed for good or ill, by other men; and we are agents 
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 who act upon others to affect them in different ways. Each of us is the  
 other to the others. 
                         (Laing quoted by Chaikin 1972: 41) 
 
Central to the understanding that we are an interconnected humanity is that as a 
collective, we are responsible for one another. This poses the question; 
responsible according to what terms?  
 
A technological reduction? 
Rogers, a scientist-practitioner, insisted along with other humanist practitioners, 
that psychology and counselling needed to be approached from a philosophical or 
rather ethical, angle of understanding. The term humanity, as used by Rogers, 
concerned the treatment of people as characteristically of worth and dignity, and 
therefore, as naturally meritorious of conditions that allow them to experience 
themselves in this manner. 
 
In humanistic understanding, science is always conjoined with ethics; one 
suggests the other. This means that to remove the ethical consideration science is 
reduced to technology. Through the separation of ethics and science, the 
consideration that we are a collective humanity is lost. Science can then justify any 
kind of behaviour directed towards individuals or populations.  
  
The term humanity, when it expresses American democratic ideology, suggests 
that every individual is important to the whole. From this position, humanity 
suggests both wholeness and its dialectical opposite; separateness. The dialectic 
further suggests that each and every one of us needs to be perceived as a part of 
the collective as well as apart from it. This rationale, when applied to humanistic 
practice, means that any method devised needs to respect the dialectal 
relationship of the individual person or collective to the whole  
 
The value of lived experience 
Living experience that is witnessed as vital, creative, rare, contributing to one’s 
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identity or challenging it, and emblematic of honored values – shapes. Speaking 
about an actor he admired, Chaikin states that the actor’s performance 
 
 reflects the contradiction and levels which I have admired – contradictions 
 with reference to the actor playing the character – the character that  
 isn’t but which is contained in him. These levels weave in and out are  
 sometimes present in combination. As I watch him, I consider my own  
 identity in relation to my actions and my actions in relation to his    
 character.        
           (1972: 21)  
 
What is revealed is that the construction of the self occurs because of an 
immediately lived experience that suggests who one can be. Also if I experience 
myself as creative, efficacious, rare and valuable, I am more likely to view myself 
as possessing any one of those qualities. I am also more likely to extend this 
understanding to my others and act accordingly towards them. Through exposure 
to these lived experiences, positive introjects are built. Like Chaikin’s expression of 
the idealized actor, these introjects are built through witnessing actions in the 




 Immediacy: a counselor’s addressing an issue, an observation, or an  
 impression at the very moment it occurs in the session; the term for the  
 ability to explore with the client what is occurring in the counselor-client  
 relationship immediately; the counselor’s awareness of not only what the  
 client is communicating in the moment but also what the counselor is  
 communicating[.] 
          (Austin 1999: 290)  
 
Chaikin’s Open Theatre labs were meant to set up conditions where the actor 
experienced their self-affecting and being affected by what was happening in the 
environment. In other words the actor could shape others and be shaped by them. 




Chaikin (1972: 14) stated that ‘[i]t’s within the structure of the human character to 
want. It’s the government’s and society’s malfunction to determine what it is we 
want’. Implied within this statement is an acknowledgement that we are shapeable 
if the technology is right, and such shaping is not always in our best interest. 
Rogers (Rogers 1995a: 58) rejected the idea that we are shaped to a strong 
extent, because he understood us as characteristically free and able to make 
choices. Chaikin (1972: 70-75) also understood that we are shapeable and can be 
‘set up’ yet also have the discretion to make meaningful choices and change (39). 
 
Rights 
From a humanistic perspective, embedded in the term ‘set-up’ is the assumption 
that we should, by right, be self-determining and self-directing. Having rights 
assumes that we can make choices that run counter to programmability and that 
choice-making is a part of who we are ontologically; if we are understood as 
inherently self-determining and self-directing. Contrastingly, for social construction, 
rights can only be derived from ideology and not from pre-determined rights. 
 
Self 
 Rogers started from the premise that there was a self, person or identity that has 
to be addressed. This self, person or identity expresses our beingness, or rather, 
certain qualities that make us of humanity. He attributed three qualities to our 
ontological makeup: being adaptable and open (1995a: 127) and creative (160). 
These qualities suggest a self that self-creates to a strong degree, and that can 
make independent decisions according to who they want to be or become. Chaikin 
(1972: 35, 155, vii) understood the same.  
 
However both Rogers and Chaikin captured a different understanding what it was 
to be a self. This self is created through material existence. Chaikin brought this 





 Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views and 
 conceptions, in one word, man’s consciousness, changes with every  
 change in the condition of his material existence, in his social relations  
 and in his social life? 
         (Marx and Engels quoted by Chaikin 1972: 68) 
 
Rogers, despite his modernist understandings regarding what it means to be a 
human being, also understood that we are culturally constructed. Within Chaikins 




 In order to study character, the actor usually separates himself from  
 others. This is the first mistake. 
          (Chaikin 1972: 11) 
 
The construction of character (I mean this in a theatrical sense) as a psychological 
enterprise was not an ambition of the Open Theatre. What was important was an 
‘assumption of partnership’, or rather, relationship; whether actor to director, actor 
to actor, actor to script or actor to audience. His practice especially attempted to 
understand the relationship of the practitioner-actor to the engaged other-audience 
within the performance event. Chaikin that 
 
 Moment to moment, the play is between actor and audience, as the  
 actor’s attitude changes about the character and his circumstances. The  
 audience is the actor’s partner as he plays the role of his character with  
 the other characters. The actor does not have to wink, woo, or pander to  
 win the audience’s partnership; he begins with the assumption of    
 partnership. 
           (37) 
 
Experimental theatre practice, as well as Rogerian practice, operates from the 
understanding that we are interrelationally put together as people (Chaikin 1972: 
37; Rogers 1995a: 27-45). This is a key understanding that sets up a particular, 
social constructionist view. The view posits that our self-understanding concerns 
the lived performance of cultural events within the immediacy of the moment, 
rather than understanding it as a system of ‘memories’, ‘attitudes’ and ‘affective 
responsiveness’. (Burr 2003: 16-17) 
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 The DSM-IV  
The Health and Welfare system of which I was sometimes a part, either directly or 
indirectly, while working with marginalized and vulnerable groups, uses as a core 
instrument the categorical diagnostic tool called the The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (1999). Treatment models used to treat 
‘patients’ within the Health and Welfare system (and most independent 
rehabilitation systems) need to be compatible with this tool. Use of the DSM can in 
effect, reduce a person to a collection of diagnosable features, which can then 
become self-referential, and therefore, self-reinforcing when backgrounding 
therapy. Because of this inherently limiting dynamic, the DSM, when used 
reductively, leads to a therapeutic environment that does not strongly tolerate 
treatment options that regard persons as capable of having an authentic and 
mature voice.  
 
As a practitioner, I find that the DSM can be a useful tool. As an RN, I rely on it. It 
can assist in making a differential diagnosis possible so, for example, the right 
drugs are used to treat bipolar conditions. However, it can be a reductionist tool if 
the client or patient is viewed only as a compilation of features. A reductionist 
approach can bleed into the way in which the client views him or her-self. The 
client can absorb or internalize the collection of features, and can come to see 
themselves as primarily that reduction. In other words, the features become 
introjects. Ultimately, the client or patient is set up to see his or her self as 
pathological and fixedly put together. They see themselves as severely limited and 
helpless in the face of the institutions that house or govern them as well as their 
life circumstances. They experience learned helplessness, which is contrary to 
being self-directional and self-constructing, both crucial characteristics necessary 
for a perception of the self-constructed through democratic ideology. When in 
therapy, it is possible that they will act out this internalization of identified negative 
features. And patients who do not picture their self as efficacious when controlling 
their life will have compliance issues that complicate the medication regime. 
  
Once the patient or clients come to see their selves as intrinsically put together in 
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a fixed and inflexible manner, they do not self-express through actions that are 
autonomous, creative, or perceivable as good. I have observed that the more one 
views one’s self as open, adaptable, sensitive, creative, and conscientious, the 
more personal expectations for empowerment, self-agency, and transformation will 
likely be rewarded. And, unless persons see their self as possessing these 
positive qualities, as well as being capable of conducting themselves in a manner 
that exhibits these qualities, they will not see themselves as authentically or as 
characterologically good and able to self-express in such a manner. 
  
 E]thics [is] the thought and practice of acting in keeping with who we  
 think we are. Ethics is about acting in character. There are things we do  
 and things we don’t do, and if we wish to think ourselves in positive  
 terms, from an ethical point of view, the things we do are good, and  
 the things we don’t do are not. Ethics is about being good and   
 staying good by acting well.  
          (Ridout 2009: 10) 
 
To do good, one must have incorporated images of oneself as good. These 
images originate within our culture and the different paradigms and pre-paradigms 
of valuing that comprise it. Additionally, in discursive terms, we must perform these 
images through actions and dialogue and let them shape us. Chaikin understood 
this, and, borrowing from Brecht, built his practice by applying this understanding. 
For Chaikin, through the building and inhabiting of images, there might occur a 
challenge of the status quo (1972: 12-13). Rogers (1995a: 353.), in his utopic 
desire to set up conditions that built an ideal culture with ideal participants that 
internalized emancipatory and participatory attitudes, also understood that a status 
quo not only limits, it oppresses. He also understood that it takes internalized 
positive self-images to stand up to negative status quos.  
 
My over-institutionalised other 
I have observed that over-institutionalised clients become therapy savvy and 
express marginal spontaneity in their response to life, except through the negative 
emotions of hurt, fear, and anger. Otherwise, they can be shut down and blunted 
to their own affect. For my over-institutionalised clients, there was little 
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internalization of what their verbalizations attested to when in therapy. There were 
no positive actions ‘taken’ to demonstrate that change in their conditions had 
occurred. Many were unable to demonstrate an ‘empathic’ understanding of 
others. By empathic I mean ‘the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life 
of another person’ (Kohut 1984: 82 in Rowe and Isaac eds. 1989: 15), which is an 
important aspect of existing within a culture interrelatedly with other individuals. 
Their understanding of the other boiled down to a series of projections, since many 
were narcissistically self-absorbed in an unhealthy way, and unable to negotiate 
between the idea of ‘the self’ and ‘the other.’ Did these projections take on the 
features of pathology co-sympathetic with those described in the DSM? Healthy 
narcissism, the taking care of the self that would open them up to the world of 
possibility or transformation, was missing. They needed positive introjects that 
would allow them to function in a healthy manner. To provide those introjects I 
turned to theatre. It was the beginning of the leap. 
 
The imposition of values and shaping 
 
 [T]here is always the need to be vigilant about whether the practice is  
 accepted as a generous exercise of care or whether, however well  
 intentioned, it is regarded as an unwelcome intrusion. It is easy for trust  
 to become dependence, for generosity to be interpreted as    
 patronage, for interest in others, to be experienced as the gaze of   
 surveillance. 
       (Nicholson in Pendergast and Saxton 2009: 193) 
 
 
Prior to becoming a therapist and RN, I worked in London in the1970s doing 
children’s theatre', a generic catch term for many forms of theatre targeting 
children and youth. The children’s theatre of which I was a part consisted primarily 
of what can be termed ‘message’ work. It was ideologically determined, calling 
attention to stereotypes that, when combined within play, signified a stratified class 
system. The themes of the performances were usually about the empowerment 
and transformation that were acceptable to the ‘Left.' My family of origin has ties to 




It was the assumption of the theatre ensemble that visual representations of 
empowerment and transformation set the conditions for change or growth for the 
individual spectator. We of course didn’t articulate this goal directly. It was simply a 
driving, core assumption: that a visual representation became incorporated 
internally within the viewer as the children witnessed the event before them. In 
other words, playing accessed an interior and contextual world of meaning-making 
that could be shaped. In therapist discourse, playing was a means of imaginatively 
trying something new and, therefore, the start of integrating new possibilities with 
which to view their world. It was the starting of an activation process that was 
indelible; one which offered values for consideration and implementation. Chaikin 
understood this, and offering imagery that challenged the status quo was 
emblematic of his practice. The accounts (1972: 67, 76, 97) he gives of his lab 
work and productions characterise this. Rogers (1995a: 339-356) offered the same 
sort of perspective in his use of imaginative imagery in his accounts of an ideal, 
future person and an ideal state of being. As young players trained in the London 
of the 1970s, we had been exposed to this form of advocacy within our training 
and we used it freely. 
 
 Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to  
 come  along. A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not  
 have done to the Other whatever acts I may or may not have    
 committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted  
 to myself. Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the other’s death  
 even before being. (Levinas in Ridout 2009: 53) 
 
 
Ridout reminds, in his work Theatre and Ethics (2009), that our personal ‘goals’ 
cannot be at the expense of the other. To be in relationship in an ethical manner, 
‘we ought to live eternally in relation to the ‘other’. (52) This resonates with 
Rogers’s I/Thou ethics. 
 
When making theatre, do practitioners ‘necessarily’ start from a host of 
assumptions about the other? Those assumptions color how we regard or 
disregard the other and her or his internal territory – as privileged and private, or 
as a site on which to impose values. The questions for the experimental, Rogerian 
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practitioner is: Do I want to regard the other as pathologically put together, or 
creatively put together? What best works for a client who has been raised in a 
democratic society that champions participation, strong individualism and 
emancipatory behaviour? Do I want to strongly shape or minimally shape the 
other? Do I want to set up conditions where the other can creatively self-shape? 
 
Considering this research, another question surfaces: Was my children’s theatre 
work an ethical practice? I was acting on the interior of another, the most private of 
private territories. If one does ‘message’ work and is trying to structure the internal 
world of the observer with the images the practice conveys, should I not 
understand that images, theatrical interventions and methods imprint, and that 
there are ethical considerations that need to be in place because of the imprinting 
or shaping? Is there a manner in which I could practice so that I am not 
conditioning or shaping without consent? Are there considerations that can be put 
in place, within practice, that guard against what could be viewed as indoctrination 
closeted by good intentions?  
 
We, as a group of actors, traveled from school to school, or rehab centre to rehab 
centre, to ‘entertain’ children. Plays, which have contrasting characters such as 
queens and kings and woodsmen and wenches, do not passively entertain; they 
provoke the development of bias and the internalizing of that bias within a system 
of understanding that makes up the self. This is a choice they might not embrace if 
the bias were presented in another manner than as simple entertainment. And 
certainly, the family the children went home to might not have embraced the 
values from whence these images came. We as a company basically assumed 
that our values were the audience’s values because we were all constructed as 
selves within a democratic culture. And, to a degree, the assumption held. 
However, central to this understanding is that the degree of shaping matters and 
asks the question, to what extent did the plays produce a strong impact?  
 
As brought out in the beginning of this chapter, there are assessment means by 
which to account for ethical action when approaching the vulnerable other; they 
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include identifying the cultural ideologies that shape them, their political 
placement, their share in the positive exemplars that construct their ideology and 
their reaction to their understanding of the degree to which they have a positive 
share of social worth. Is education your primary intent, or are the means by which 
you hope to achieve this educative effect the most significant consideration within 
practice? And, underpinning both aspects of such critical management, 
assessment and education is the requirement for a particular kind of attitude to be 
expressed by the practitioner; that they are engaging persons who can potentially 
suspend their own ideological bias, understandings, and values in order to engage 
you. Ethically, this means that I always have to keep in mind that any positive 
attributes I attribute to my self, I need attribute to my other, unless confirmed 
otherwise.   
 
As a Rogerian working with the over-institutionalised, I need to be able to justify 
my methods as not just more of the same, since I have identified a problem of the 
over-application of counselling methods. Consent to treat will be at issue, and 
mandates that the client be informed of what they can expect from play. The ACA 
standards do handle this issue well in some respects. The ACA does not, 
however, address the harmful effect of prescriptive measures repeatedly utilized 
across lengthy amounts of time, and the shut off or resistance it can inculcate 
within the other.  
 
In other words, consent within the ACA’s code targets pedagogical and 
methodological issues. However, consent for treatment, which is the part of the 
problem of cumulative and long-term effects, is not addressed. There is a 
population, out there at this time, that has been raised in health and welfare 
systems that might, at least quasi experimentally, demonstrate that long-term 
exposure to counselling strongly correlates with resistance. The ACA’s code does 
not consider that there may be more adequate fields of practices by which to 
address this issue, and which do not put the client at risk for resistance. It may 
give them the opportunity for transformation on their own terms and conditions. 
And this is relevant to the problem of theatre groups that attempt to undertake 
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shaping without explicit acknowledgment. Ultimately, the challenge is to offer up 
methods that promote conditions where the other can make their own choices 
regarding personal and group change. 
 
There are multiple but related aims within this research. The research is an auto 
ethnocentric address that interrogates like and contrasting valuing between the 
ethics of Chaikin’s experimental theatre, as evidenced in The Presence of the 
Actor, and humanistic counseling practice as evidenced in the work of Carl 
Rogers. As stated, the fields of counselling and theatre have informed my practice 
ethics as a dual practitioner, fitting with what is termed applied theatre practice, a 
branch of theatre with many sub groupings (Prentki and Preston 2009: 9; 
Pendergast and Saxton 2009: 3; Thompson 2008: 13) that I was not aware existed 
prior to beginning my research.  
 
This research concerns contexts that diverge and resonate between Rogers’s 
work and Chaikin’s book. They affect how I justify my actions towards my other. 
And despite the divergences, many of the contexts embed received values that, 
when viewed, appear strongly co-sympathetic. Practice points that have been part 
of my dual practice in the past will hopefully be made more explicit, and make 
sense of how I understand the question of how to act towards the other. This is in 
keeping with Pendergast and Saxton’s challenging statement, and not used simply 
as a rhetorical device, but as a point of departure for a Rogerian practitioner 
bridging practices, and hopefully in an ethical manner by not taking a set of 
assumptions from one piece of a past, dual practice as equivocally applicable to 
the other. In this, I hope to prove due diligence, creating an ethical base from 











 Carl Rogers’s Humanistic Counselling: 
 Identifying a Practice-based Ethics that Shapes My Personal 
Practice 
 
Rogerian therapy and the therapist 
 
 [S]ome practitioners are reluctant to consider the relationship of   
 philosophical views to scientific professional work.     
        (Rogers 1995b: 20) 
 
The opening sections of this chapter will establish an understanding of Carl 
Rogers’s practice and philosophy regarding the self of the individual, and through 
providing examples of Rogerian therapy, illustrate the philosophy at work. The 
goal is to make explicit the philosophical ground that determines my practice 
ethics. In Chapter Four, the practice ethics will be explored in relation to my 
theatrical training at drama school in the UK. Joseph Chaikin’s, The Presence of 
the Actor, exemplifies the practice ethics derived from my training as an 
actor/actress. Each of these philosophies of practice have contributed to my 
personal practice ethics, and constitute the basis from which I have, in the past, 
practiced as a dual-practitioner of counselling and theatre. Trained and practicing 
as a Rogerian therapist, I came to the understanding that I could affect 
relationships with my client groups or ‘others’ through theatrical means, while 
preserving the principles of an ethical Rogerian. Ultimately, the interrogation 
establishes why I am choosing, for the future, to practice as a humanistic, or 
Rogerian, applied-theatre practitioner.    
 
Carl Rogers: Philosopher-Psychologist 
Carl Rogers was a clinical psychologist whose mode of practice has been termed 
humanistic, client-centred, non-directive, or Rogerian. Carl Rogers shifted therapy 
away from psychodynamic treatment models (Rogers 1995a: 33-36) and reacted 
strongly against behaviourist ones (Rogers 1995a: 55; 1995b: 363-381). He was 
very prominent within the profession of psychology during the 1960s and 1970s 
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and within popular culture. Therapy, as he visualized it, needed to become less 
treatment driven and more about intimate, human interaction involving 
autonomous selves (Rogers in Anderson and Cissna, The Martin Buber–Carl 
Rogers Dialogue 1997; Rogers 1995a: 19). He proposed three conditions or 
attitudes to employ within therapy to accommodate the proposed shift: 
authenticity, empathic attunement and unconditional positive regard. This trinity of 
attitudes was first expressed by Rogers as a series of terms in 1957 (Kleinke 
1994: 83). Within a matter of a few years, he claimed that these attitudes were not 
only cogent to the needs of personal therapy, but were cogent to interpersonal 
relationship in general (Rogers in May, ed.1961: 32), including across very 
different cultures (Rogers 1995a: 45).  
 
Rogers grew up in Oak Park, a wealthy suburb of Chicago. He was raised within a 
devoutly Protestant American family, which assumed a reserved relational ethic 
that governed home life (Kirschenbaum 2009: 8; Rogers 1995b: 5). He personally 
admitted having had a strong desire for intimate attachment when young, which 
was never quite satisfied (Kirschenbaum 2009: 9).  Rogers’s corpus reveals that 
interrogating the key attitudes he understood as building intimacy (Rogers 1995a: 
84) remained a core element of his practice philosophy throughout his professional 
life.  
 
His initial education at the university level was in the pursuit of a ministerial 
degree. Through exposure to new social and cultural experiences while at 
university, Rogers gradually began to question his received, religious convictions 
and found himself aligned with atheism, although towards the end of his life that 
changed. We can sense this in his last written work as a psychologist, where his 
articulation of self-actualization became the ‘actualizing tendency’ (Rogers 1995a: 
124-126), much in the vein of Aristotle’s unmoved mover (Aristotle in Creed and 
Hardman, trans. 2003: 124) who exhibited a recognizable god-like function, one 
that furnished an end point for ethical development.  
 
After taking his baccalaureate, Rogers moved on to Columbia Teachers College 
and eventually took his doctoral training in clinical psychology under what would 
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be called today, the ‘medical model’. During his internship, he also encountered 
the psychodynamic model (Rogers 1995b: 9). However, he found both divisions of 
psychology lacking in the relational elements of practice that he thought so central 
to the therapeutic relationship. His emerging concern was with the idea of ‘a self in 
relationship to the other’ (Rogers in May, ed. 1961: 88) – an ‘I’ to a ‘Thou’. Rogers 
sought a more relational and less ‘coercive’ approach to therapeutic practice ‘not 
for philosophical reasons, but because [his received models] were never more 
than superficially effective’ (Rogers 1995b 11). By his later career, Rogers 
understood his person-centred ‘approach’ to therapy and community building as a 
‘philosophical approach (1995a: 183)’. The link between psychology and 
philosophy was echoed in his statement that his work grew out of what he termed 
a philosophy of ‘trust’ (38).  
 
An ambition of Rogers was to articulate a method that caused personal change at 
a deep level (1995a: 83-85). By the early 1960s, Rogers’s shift of emphasis was 
striking. In his essay: Two Divergent Trends (in May, ed. 1961: 85-93) he 
acknowledged the beginning of his move away from a scientist-practitioner model. 
By the time he wrote his last work, A Way Of Being (posthumously published 
1980), he saw the task of psychology as overtly concerned with the ‘Big 
Questions’ of existence, or philosophy:  the meaning of day-to-day life, 
interconnectivity, individuality and universal needs. These larger questions were 
also being addressed in psychoanalysis during the same period: Melanie Klein’s, 
object-relations theory is one such example, as is Heinz Kohut’s psychoanalytic, 
humanistic driven praxis. However, unlike these contemporaries, Rogers was not 
concerned with understanding pathology, but rather with the liberation of the self 
from negative introjects – negative because they did not reflect the ‘self’ that the 
client experienced as his or her own. Importantly, Rogers understood that an 
incongruent or inauthentic self robbed the person of a sense of worth and dignity, 
basic and natural attributes for a person understood as of humanity. Rogers 
understood being of humanity as a universal condition. In this regard, humans 
don’t belong to a specific, collective humanity, creatively devised by its 
participants; they belong instead to something that is natural to them. Being of 
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humanity, as in the modernist sense, means belonging to something that is a 
natural condition of one’s being, or ontological make-up. 
 
Rogers has been claimed by several philosophical camps and branches of 
psychology. For example, Cory calls him ‘person-centred’ and states that he is 
‘existential’ (Cory 1996: 198); Nye posits Rogers as practicing ‘humanistic 
phenomenology’ (Nye 1996: 86); Austin calls him basically ‘humanistic’ as a 
person-centred therapist (Austin1999: 20); Evans puts him in the ‘personality 
psychology’ (Evens 1975: xx) camp. More recently, Wyatt claimed that he is 
person-centred, but that the term embeds a ‘full diversity’ that she lists as client-
centred, experientially and process directed (in Wyatt and Sanders, 2002: i). 
Prouty, though speaking of person-centred therapy, categorizes Rogers’s therapy 
as ‘person-centred gestalt’ or ‘experiential psychotherapy’. Prouty’s article Pre-
Therapy: An essay in philosophical psychology also describes Rogers’s practice 
as ‘philosophical psychology’ (in Wyatt and Sanders, 2002: 51).’ Interestingly, 
today psychology as philosophy is an established subfield, one that Rogers’s work 
helped develop.  
 
Early in his career Rogers stated that a major concern within the field of therapy 
are ‘the attitudes held by the counsellor towards the worth and the significance of 
the individual ... Do we see each person as having worth and dignity in his own 
right?’ Rogers’s practice was built on an easily recognizable and principled 
argument: An individual holds intrinsic worth and should be treated accordingly, 
with the treatment preserving their sense of dignity. What is at stake is personal 
integrity.  
 
Rogers understood the self in relation to humanity – as a part to a whole. Another 
kind of holism affected his understanding of the self of the individual. He 
understood the self to be a composite of interrelated parts and processes, 
biological as well as psychological. For Rogers, the self was an organizational 
process (Rogers 1995a: 57-59). Rogers’s use of the term ‘self’ relates to an 
organism that perceives, makes meaning, creates, expresses, feels sensations, 
makes judgments, has physical attributes, possesses criticality, reacts, feels 
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emotions, internalizes values and experiences itself uniquely. In other words, the 
self has the capacity to build self-consciousness and self-reflection. It needs to be 
respected as such. The physical body – its nervous system, circulatory system, 
sensations, affective responses, and skeletal system – are in integrated service to 
one another, creating the organism as well. However, there is a contrasting view 
embedded in Rogers’s philosophy. 
 
Rogers’s received view of the self is typically thought of as interiorly placed within 
a physical body. This understanding can be traced to Descartes as well as Jung.  
Rogers, in some of his framing, sees the person as a ‘fountain’ of consciousness 
trapped within a body. (127) Within that consciousness, the self is thought to 
exclusively create its own subjective world and self-interpretation. (18) Both the 
holistic and Cartesian view suggest that Rogers understood the self as a 
subjectively fabricated entity, even to a solipsistic degree. However, that was not 
the case. He understood the self as created and affected by cultural exposure. He 
saw it as able to internalize positive and negative introjects created within the lived 
experience of one’s culture and relationships. He also understood that the self can 
self-observe, which is to say it can have objective awareness of what it is, what it 
is not (Rogers in May, ed. 87-88) and what it hopes to become. 
 
The therapeutic relationship 
Importantly for Rogers, therapeutic treatment centred on the attitudes held by the 
therapist – especially those of being authentic, empathically attuned and 
unconditionally respectful.  
I started from a thoroughly objective point of view. Psychotherapeutic 
treatment involved the diagnosis and analysis of the clients’ difficulties, the 
cautious interpretation and explanation to the client of the causes of his 
difficulties, and a re-educative process focused by the clinician upon the 
specific causal elements. Gradually I observed that I was more effective if I 
could create a psychological climate in which the client could undertake 
these functions himself – exploring, analysing, understanding, and trying 
new solutions to his problems. During more recent years, I have been 
forced to recognise that the most important ingredient in creating this 
climate is that I should be real. I have come to realize that only when I am 
able to be a transparently real person, and am so perceived by my client, 
can he discover what is real in him. 
               (Rogers in May, ed. 1961: 87-88) 
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As a humanistic, or rather Rogerian therapist, my objective is to build a therapeutic 
relationship with the client. However, I explicitly do not want to build dependence. 
My goal is to facilitate the client’s movement towards what Rogers termed self-
actualization. This means making operational the client’s right to be self-directing 
and self-formulating. The goal is to help the client disown familial, cultural, or 
social introjects that keep her or him from feeling authentic. The therapist’s job, as 
I see it, is to help the client out from behind a facade of expectations and from the 
disowning of who they interiorly find themselves to be. This is not accomplished 
through advice giving, reprimands, or building a hierarchical relationship; the client 
is understood as the steward of their own self-development. They are understood 
to be the only person who can paint the picture of who they know their ‘self’ to be.  
 
A Rogerian practice example: a dialogue between an eleven-year-old male 
client and a therapist  
Client: Everyday they get me after school. Everyday! They make fun of me. And, 
so does everyone else. It happens all day long. It never stops. I hide. 
 
Therapist: Everyday it’s the same painful world that you have to live in. 
 
Client: I don’t want to talk about it. 
 
Therapist: You want to hide – right now. 
 
Client: No one does anything. 
 
Therapist: You feel alone in all this. Ignored. You feel lonely right now. 
 








Therapist: Jess, your face is so tense, your fists are tight, and you just moved 
closer to the door. You can’t stand it anymore. You hurt right now, and I might not 
understand you or really care. It’s a risk for you even being here. And, you can’t 
decide if you want to talk to me. I might reject you or not understand you. You’re 
feeling scared, right now. 
 
Client: When I stick needles or pins in my arms or beat my head against the wall, I 
don’t feel anything anymore.  
 
Therapist: You can hide from your feelings when you hurt yourself. It all goes away 
for a minute. 
 
Client: Today was the worst. I want them to die. I want them to bleed. I do. They 
should have to hide. I want everyone to hate them. I hate them. 
  
Therapist: You want them to hurt like you do. You wouldn’t feel so ashamed. Jess, 
your eyes are turned away from me. You feel ashamed, right now, and the feeling 
is eating you up. 
 
Client: I do feel ashamed. And I didn’t do anything. 
 
Therapist: You don’t understand their anger. But you feel it. 
 
Client: The art teacher lets me draw during lunch sometimes. Last week she came 
out and sat with me in study hall. 
 
Therapist: She treats you special and you like that. Your face started to brighten 
up for a couple seconds when you spoke of study hall. 
 
Client: She is my friend – She is like my aunt – I don’t get to see her much. She 
phones me once in a while. She moved.  
 




Client: Yep. Can I come tomorrow? 
 




Therapist: Tomorrow then! I’ll be happy to see you, Jess. High Five! 
 
This short conversation may have taken fifteen minutes to complete. The therapist 
uses a good deal of silence so that the client can respond verbally, physically and 
affectively.  One of the goals is to slow the client down so that she or he can 
experience her or his feelings in a safe place. This way, the client isn’t simply 
telling, they are living the conversation and reflecting upon it in the here and now. 
The goal of the therapist is to say nothing that the client does not verbalize. 
Another goal is to bring out the feeling content behind what is being stated by the 
client. Affect identification is the beginning of uncovering negative introjects. In this 
child’s case, the negative introject is ‘I am not worthy.’  Attending to the feelings in 
the present is called staying-with-the-client, or immediacy.  
 
Skills that are important for the therapist include being able to honestly identify the 
client’s feeling state and not attempt to soften or fix it, staying in the moment and 
respecting the lived processing of the client, and therapeutic listening; meaning 
fixing one’s focused attention on what the client is saying, rather using 
interventions, diagnosis, or outcome goals as the basis of interaction. Offering 
reflections, however, reframes and moves the therapy along. 
 
It needs to be noted that Rogerians only reflect back what the client has said. They 
don’t give advice, elaborate, question or nudge the client towards any solution. 
They attempt to stay agenda free and concentrate on bringing the client’s feelings, 
which undergird the comments or actions, to the surface. The goal is to allow the 
client to feel accepted and understood through these resources. As a 
consequence, the client can begin to feel self-worth in the presence of the 
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therapist. What becomes operational are attitudes of authenticity, empathic 
attunement, and unconditional positive regard. 
 
It has been my experience as a counsellor that, once a climate of trust is built as 
the clients experience their self as accepted and understood, they start to problem 
solve. An added benefit is that they experience feelings of competency when they 
direct the therapy. These feelings contribute to a growing sense of positive self-
esteem. When experiencing themselves in an esteemed manner, or rather, as 
good, they are more likely to internalize positive introjects.  
 
My behaviour as a therapist, in other words, respects the need to privilege the 
ideals of self-determination and self-direction that are part of my client’s political 
heritage. Having self-direction and self-determination are understood as positive 
attributes of character in this particular rural region. I hear the phrase, ‘I need to 
pony up,’ on a regular basis when working with female and male, young and old 
clients. In promoting these positive attributes, the therapeutic encounter also 
promotes the client taking personal responsibility when dealing with their 
problems. These attributes are especially of concern for the Latter Day Saints 
(LDS or Mormon) population that I sometimes serve.  
 
Self-actualization in the Rogerian model  
I see him [Rogers] in his context, as an American phenomenon, reflecting 
American values from the Midwestern farm culture in which he grew up and 
reflecting the American pragmatist philosopher-psychologists before him, 
especially William James and John Dewey. The values of self reliance, 
respect for the uniqueness of the individual, and the struggle for the 
development of new visions of democracy expressed this influence at the 
those great American philosopher-psychologists, and he became one of 
them in the course of his life [.]  
            (Klein in Kirschenbaum, 2009: 256)  
 
 In Western culture ... there has been ... a stress on the importance of 
 the individual. The philosophy of democracy, of human rights, the right to 
 self-determination – these are the elements that have come to be 
 stressed. Out of such a soil has developed a particular philosophical way 
 of being. 
        (Rogers 1995a: 183-184) 
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 One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical 
 experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man’s 
 nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his “animal 
 nature,” is positive in nature – is basically socialized, forward-moving, 
 rational and realistic. 
                           (90-91) 
 
As the statements above bring out, Rogers credited the self as fundamentally 
‘rational’, future-oriented, good and sensibly organized as a coherent and 
meaningful structure or organism. An important aspect of Rogers’s understanding 
of the rational, developmental and good individual is that these characteristics 
need to orient the self towards being self-directional and self-formulating. To 
accomplish this, the individual needs to exercise free choice. The emphasis on 
being able to exercise free choice is central to his argument against the classical 
behaviourists, such as B. F. Skinner, who purported that there was no such thing 
and that we are conditioned to make limited selections. In the on-going battle 
between Rogers and Skinner over psychological ideology, Rogers suggested that 
behaviourism was antithetical to the philosophy of democracy (57). As a 
philosophy, behaviourism was incongruent to the way Rogers pictured the self’s 
naturalized characteristics. Klein articulated Roger’s characteristics of being self-
determining and self-directing as linked to his American context. If this is the case, 
implicitly, we as selves are strongly, culturally shaped by democratic principles. 
Paradoxically, the quality of being self-determining suggests that we are not 
strongly shapeable.  
        
The understanding that as persons we are inherently progressive is part of 
Rogers’s therapeutic picture of the concept of self-actualization (117). Embedded 
within this term is the understanding that we are inherently developmental. 
Rogers’s articulation of the concept of progression evolved over time. In 1951, 
Rogers associated the process of change with forward movement, and as a result 
of learning (Rogers 1965: 132). Learning was thought to have occurred because of 
the client’s change in language use during therapy, and because of the client’s 
self-report of behavioural change (132-133). Both change in verbalizations and 
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behaviours easily collapse into measurable terms, reflecting that in his early years, 
Rogers was heavily invested in his role as scientist-practitioner and searching for 
an articulation of forward movement as causally induced. However, by the time 
Rogers wrote his last work, change or progression was thought to occur because 
of an inherent tendency to progress, or self-actualize, which he understood as 
something characteristic of ‘every organism’. For him, the organism participates in 
an ‘underlying flow of movement towards constructive fulfillment of its inherent 
possibilities’ (Rogers 1995a: 117). Central to the understanding of ‘underlying flow’ 
is that something actively coursed the person directionally towards an end in a 
transcendent good. This too is a causal representation of development. 
 
When we betray our humanity, we recognise that we have acted against some end 
good, such as fairness or justice. Today, when we feel outrage over 
waterboarding, mass murders by tyrants, or the abduction of two hundred girls, it 
is because we understand some higher good has been violated; a higher good 
that following makes us who we are when at our best. Such an understanding is 
recognizable when we speak of crimes against humanity, for example. This 
understanding was central to the emergence of the field of social work. It is a 
holistic and moral view that assumes we are inter-connectively tied to one another 
and responsible for each other’s social and personal welfare. Rogers’s view is no 
exception to this understanding, especially in his later embellishment of self-
actualization. He posed humankind as inter-related in a metaphysical sense, so 
that we are inextricably tied to one another and therefore need to be caring 
towards one another. The moral rationale is a frank universalism. 
 
According to Austin, a chronicler of the counselling movement and author of The 
Counseling Primer (1999), the caring that comes out of the view that we are inter-
connectively tied can be traced in public reaction to Clifford Beers’ 1908 book A 
Mind That Found Itself. The book chronicled Beers’ personal mistreatment in a 
mental sanatorium and resulted in an awakening of the public to a greater concern 
for the individual. Beers, in company with the National Committee for Mental 
Hygiene, led the charge in America to reform legislation and establish free mental 
health clinics (Austin 1999: 238). A similar story can be found in what Bromberg 
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called the ‘Century of the Child (1959: 246)’, a section of his work The Mind of 
Man: A History of Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. It chronicles actions taken 
concerning the fair treatment of children, which in his work is placed in what is 
referred to as the humanistic movement. His exemplar is Carl Rogers’s 
Counseling and Psychotherapy (1942), ‘[which] provided an essential framework 
for all counselors, especially those employed during the post World War II era. 
Rogers’s text helped meet the recently recognised and accepted needs of 
veterans returning from war’. (ibid)  
 
Rogers is generally thought to have conceived humankind as intrinsically ‘positive’ 
(Nye 1996: 86) or ‘trustworthy’ (Cory 1996: 198). The individuals whose acts 
reflected this were thought to be on a trajectory towards personal and socially 
transforming possibility. Rogers’s work was in line with the promotion of such a 
trajectory (Rogers 1995a: 348-356). Nye (1996: 86-87) positions Rogers, not only 
as a humanistic practitioner, but also as offering a brand of counselling that can be 
termed ‘humanistic phenomenology’. He ties Rogers’s therapy with Maslow in that 
both speak of human potential: ‘Like Maslow [Rogers] saw humans as having a 
natural tendency towards actualization’ (86) but cautions that both do not use the 
term in an ‘identical’ manner. However, ‘in both cases it includes the growth and 
fulfillment of basic potentialities. Humans are viewed as essentially growth 
oriented, forward moving and concerned with existential choices’ (ibid). Nye 
differentiates Rogers’ brand of humanism by coupling it with phenomenology.  He 
suggests the distinction is made through the following statement:  
Phenomenology stresses the importance of the individual’s immediate conscious 
experiences in determining reality, and Rogers maintained that knowledge of 
these individual perceptions of reality is required for the understanding of human 
behaviour. He suggested that each of us behaves in accordance with our 
subjective awareness of ourselves and of the world around us. (Ibid) 
 
Rogers built an understanding of the self and aspects of its psychological 
construction, such as introjections, as central to therapy. Therapeutic measures 
needed to keep the ball in the client’s court so that they could internalize the 
positive introjects of having self-determination and self-direction. This 
understanding is very different from any brand of analytic or behaviourist therapy. 
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[W]hen we provide a psychological climate that permits persons to be – 
whether they are clients, students, workers, or persons in a group – we are 
not involved in a chance event. We are tapping into a tendency which 
permeates all organic life – a tendency to become all the complexity of 
which the organism is capable.  
(Rogers, 1995a: 134) 
 
 
Rogers (Rogers 1995b: 39-57) saw the self as naturally relationship oriented and, 
for Rogers, the orientation was coupled with the understanding that the self arose 
from living in the material world – meaning, we become how we are treated within 
our world and through the relationships present within it. 
 
Following Rogerian humanism, my objective within therapy is to build a therapeutic 
relationship with the client. However, I explicitly do not want to build dependence. 
My goal is to facilitate the client’s movement towards what Rogers termed self-
actualization, which means exercising and making operational their right to be self-
directing and self-formulating. Importantly, the goal is to help the client disown 
familial, cultural, or social introjects that keep her or him feeling inauthentic.  
 
As I understand it, the psychological context constructed by disowning these 
negative introjects will open the client up to new possibilities of being. The 
therapist’s job is to help the client out from behind a façade of expectations and 
from disowning the who they find themselves interiorly to be or could be. This is 
not accomplished through advice giving, reprimands, or building a hierarchical 
relationship, since the client is understood as the steward of their own self-
development. Also, they are understood as the only person who can paint the 
picture of who they understand their ‘self’ to be. Implicitly, Rogers understood his 
trinity of attitudes as facilitating the growth of a needed psychological context so 
that the client could manage this. The context was a negative space, in effect; 
meaning that it was present due to a disowning that opened one up to possibility. 
In this respect, the self could re-imagine itself outside cultural givens or shapers. 
As Paul Tillich (1952: 81) stated: ‘The more power of creating beyond itself a being 
has the more vitality it has’. To go ‘beyond’, meant for Rogers, to cultivate that 
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psychological space. Also, for Rogers, that space was an active process (Rogers 
1995a: 126). 
 
Building a relationship 
Central to the Rogerian approach is an understanding of therapy as an ongoing 
process (Rogers 1995a: 132-152). Relationship building as a Rogerian requires an 
immersive environment in which the counsellor aids the client to process slowly 
and reflexively through what the client has brought to therapy. This is done by 
implementing therapeutic silence and keeping the client in the moment; ‘the 
existential now’ rather than the ‘past’ (Anderson and Cissna 1997: 49)’ and 
allowing feelings to surface and be worked through, or rather, ‘sat with.’ There is 
no trajectory towards an end goal. Therapy is hugely open-ended in this respect. 
  
The I/Thou ethic (Rogers reflecting on Buber in Rogers 1995a: 19) emphasizes 
that we should understand our other from a respectful and sensitive position. 
Rogers termed this ‘prizing’ (ibid). As sensitive and respectful, we acknowledge 
the other’s uniqueness because it is they who possess a hidden, subjectively 
formulated understanding of who they are. Rather than be concerned with simply 
the expression of natural characteristics therapy, for Rogers, needed to be 
concerned with a self understood as completely other, thereby building a 
therapeutic climate where the client could be understood on their own terms and 
conditions. It was from this psychological vantage point that the actualization of the 
client’s potential could occur. There was something therapeutic, or growth 
promoting (Rogers 1995a: 23) about being deeply understood and acknowledged 
for who one is. 
 
Thereby, accessing the client’s subjective world of meaning-making, feelings, 
sensory experience and thinking became paramount. Subjective processing 
became valorised, and having access to it a prominent feature of his therapy 
(Rogers 1995a: 127). This is not a shift from Freud. However, Rogers’s ambition 
was not to re-structure the interior facets of the self, it was to release the self from 
the introjects that kept it from being self-actualizing (ibid). Rogers’s ambition was 
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not to identify inherent, pathological structures; it was to find the real person 
hidden from view.   
 
I/Thou ethics are a branch of phenomenology. They emphasize the importance of 
shifting the self’s focus into the here-and-now, immediate circumstances – ‘the 
existential now’ as referred to above. There is a shift from past into the present, 
which is a very different view from psychoanalysis. Within therapy, when the 
therapist shifts from past to present, there is a feeling that something is unfolding 
between the people present. No response seems forced. There is a give and take 
that occurs between the engaged that feels deeply meaningful and honest. There 
is a strong sense that you know one other on an open and penetrating level. The 
subjective or hidden selves of each are brought out of the shadows.  When this 
psychological state ensues within therapy, empathic attunement is understood as 
having been made operational. And when this occurs, it is understood that trust 
has been built – an important outcome for Rogerian therapy. 
 
As a Registered Nurse (RN), I have witnessed this kind of event when a parent 
and sick infant make eye contact and prolong the joined gaze, sometimes for 
many minutes. I have witnessed it in cafes between what looked to be lovers. I 
have experienced it with my own children, husband, and friends. There is no other 
way to explain it: it is the interconnectedness felt when bonds and a sense of 
understanding are forged. We call it intimacy, and it is healing (Rogers 1995a: 
127). It is empathic attunement at its best. For the Rogerian practitioner, facilitating 
a process-driven approach to therapy by making operational empathic attunement 
is more important than identifying an end goal or expected outcome. It is the 
present journey that counts. 
  
Haugh states that by the formulating of his work, Counseling and Psychotherapy 
(1949), Rogers had qualified the positive attributes of the therapist. The authentic 
therapist needed to exhibit ‘warmth’ and ‘responsiveness’ towards the client. She 
also asserted that the therapist needed to have ‘genuine interest in the client’ and 
show ‘acceptance’ of the client ‘as a person’ (Haugh in Wyatt 2001:2). Though the 
exact terms authenticity, empathic attunement, and unconditional positive regard 
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were not used in this early work, they were implicit in the qualification. By 
emphasizing having ‘warmth‘, a strong ‘responsiveness’ and ‘genuine interest‘ in 
the client, Rogers collapsed the therapeutic encounter into one of intimacy.  
Rogers had successfully set the ground to align with an I/Thou ethic.  
 
 Perhaps the most basic of these essential attitudes is realness, or 
 genuineness. When the facilitator is a real person, being what he or she 
 is, entering into relationships with the learners without presenting a front 
 or a facade, the facilitator is much more likely to be effective. This means 
 that the feelings that the facilitator is experiencing are available to his or 
 her awareness, that he or she is able to live these feelings, to be them, 
 and able to communicate them if appropriate. It means that the facilitator 
 comes into a direct, personal encounter with the learners, meeting each 
 of them on a person-to-person basis. It means that the facilitator is being, 
 not denying himself or herself. The facilitator is present[.] 
                        (Rogers 1995a: 271) 
 
When someone is, as the child in the earlier example was, overwhelmed by 
feelings of rejection and abandonment, there can be an inclination to assuage 
affective responsiveness. This is done so that the client is not overwhelmed with 
extreme emotional reactions. It is done to give the client a reprieve from 
unrelentingly, negative, feeling states. A Rogerian counsellor has to be careful in 
this regard. However, if timed carefully, once a relationship has been established, 
it has been my experience that most clients tolerate the truth. Moreover, clients 
intuitively sense when you hold back, are disinterested or underplay their feeling 
states. As a neophyte counsellor, one usually attempts to minimize or avoid the 
affect of the emotional intensity felt. Reflecting feeling can even feel awkward and 
a little mean as if there were an intention to hurt. However, as you grow as a 
counsellor, identifying and reflecting feeling states becomes fairly reflexive. 
Feelings cease being an embarrassment to manoeuvre around or assuage. Their 
identification becomes the means that allows the client to feel understood and 
accepted.  
 
Unless the feelings of the client are captured through reflection by the counsellor 
demonstrating that they are understood, the client cannot go deeper within their 
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psychological being to access and identify their personal responsiveness to the 
introjects they disown. A Rogerian understands that the client cannot sit and 
experience feelings unless he or she feels in a safe space – in phenomenological 
terms, a field of experience – or in specific Rogerian phenomenological terms, an 
honestly portrayed psychological field of experience. As a therapist, by being there 
in full acceptance with the client, there happens what is termed ‘a corrective 
emotional experience’. In other words, the ‘I’ has not projected upon the ‘Thou’ 
anything outside the client’s actual experience.  
 
A therapist understands that a field of experience has been set up when the client 
slows down, uses long silences and appears to be in a reflective state. He or she 
is absolutely locked into their experience. The therapist’s job is to tolerate the 
silence and simply be there – be present. When the client appears to emerge from 
reflection, the therapist reflects the state to the client. Usually, they will disclose 
some break-through moment where a personal insight has been gained. In 
counsellor speak, it’s called an ‘oh wow moment’. 
 
These types of moments tend to be shared with persons with whom the client has 
an intimate connection. Hence, the moments are considered very personal and 
strongly relational. Also, the ‘oh wows’ experienced can be highly confidential 
because they are so revealing. The therapist has been allowed into the client’s 
inner world. The reflection and insights gained are understood as a product of this 
type of intimacy. As understood by a Rogerian, a deficit of these types of 
interactions keeps the client off the developmental path. 
 
An example of what Rogerian therapy is not 
Therapist: Last night you went to her apartment at three in the morning because 
you subconsciously wanted her to let you in – so you could reassume the love 
affair. 
 
Client: I went there because it was my birthday. I had no one to celebrate it with. I 
was feeling lost and lonely. The face of her apartment building reminds me that I 
was once loved – can be loved.  
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Therapist: Those feelings are a cover that hides a strong motivation for your 
behaviour. By not acknowledging it, you stay stuck. 
 
Client: I think that you are stuck there. You harp on this all of the time. I simply 
needed a memory to soothe the pain. It was what was emotionally available to me. 
I am so pathetic. 
 
Therapist: The feelings are a conflict between what you are willing to acknowledge 
and what you are not willing to. That is the source of your pain.   
 
Rogers qualified the self-understanding of the therapist as having an awareness of 
her or his emotionality and personal deficits so that she or he could manage some 
degree of objective understanding of the client (Haugh in Wyatt 2001: 2). In other 
words, introjection and projection were at stake (2) within his kind of therapy and 
could be promulgated by the therapist. Looking at this as a Rogerian, I would say 
that the example above is quite possibly indicative of the therapist’s own 
unresolved issues.  
 
Rogers’s three therapeutic behaviours were meant to open the client up to new 
possibilities of personal insight and action through the direct experience of the 
behaviours and attitudes of the therapist. Projection, an imposition and 
interpretation from without one’s self by another, and introjection, the internalizing 
of what has been projected, cannot manage this. The attitudes, when expressed 
by the therapist, are meant to free the client from past conditioning so that the 
client can begin to feel and understand their self as having self-worth.  
 
A Rogerian replay 
Therapist: Last night you went to her apartment and stood outside. Your face looks 
sad, Roger, right now as you relate this to me. 
 
Client: I wanted to feel happy. 
 
Therapist: There is a far way look in your eyes. They look glazed over. 
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Client: Silence.  
 
Therapist: You’re back. You’re feeling so lost that you get caught in your 
memories.  
 
Client: I am not happy. Standing there – it didn’t make me happy. I only felt lonely. 
 
Therapist: You feel the pains grip – now, as we speak. 
 
Client: I never get past it. I wish I could. It was my birthday. 
 
Therapist: You wanted to feel loved. And, you wanted to forget. 
 
Client: I did. I still do. I need a new life, but where? Playing the memories over and 
over again keeps me in the same place, and I always end up feeling that I have no 
place to go – no one to have fun with and relieve all the … I don’t know. 
 
Therapist: You want to shut the memories off and the feelings that go with it. But, 
right now, that is all you’ve got. 
 
Client: Yes. Pathetic? 
 
Therapist: You’re afraid I’m judging you. 
 
Client: I judge myself – and think that everyone else does the same. Maybe even 
harsher? 
 
Therapist: It’s difficult to trust. 
 
Client: Yeah! [Silence] So, I’m alone. 
 
The therapist was open to what the client had to say. Projections were avoided 
and the negative introjects from past experiences were brought out. The client was 
free to make his own meaning concerning them. The only directive was the 
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reframing of what the client said in terms of affect. By following the affect trail over 
a tendency to intellectualize the client’s narrative, the client was able to verbalize 
his personal interpretation of their sense of abandonment and fear of being 
misunderstood or judged. Through the therapist’s attitude of openness, a positive 
introject was fabricated. The attitude of openness, or rather, unconditional positive 
regard, along with empathic attunement demonstrated through the reflection of 
feelings, opened a door for the client. The client would eventually be able to 
become more open to different possibilities of self-interpretation. In other words, 
he would see himself differently and more optimistically. It was understood by the 
therapist that the client’s eventual taking on of this attitude and internalizing it into 
his psychological make-up, would further the client’s development, help him to 
self-actualize and become actively rather than passively a part of his construction 
as a self. In other words, he was self-formulating, or actualizing. 
 
Rogers understood that cultivating an attitude of openness means that we have 
potential choices to make regarding our self-understanding and development. 
Being open, in other words, is a pre-cursor to being well-differentiated as a ‘self’. 
Cultivating openness also means that the client can create relationships that are 
more responsive and interactive. This is thought to occur when the therapist 
operationalized the attitudes of authenticity, empathic attunement, and 
unconditional positive regard so that the client could then act ‘w]ith greater self-
awareness’ so ‘that, a more informed choice is possible; a choice more free from 
introjects’, which for Rogers, was ‘a conscious choice.’ (Wyatt, 2002: 2)  
 
The association of internal organization with a deep seated and special internal 
locale legitimized Rogers’s privileging of subjective experiences (Rogers, 1995b: 
201) over strictly objective ones – meaning the client’s account mattered more 
than the expert professional’s reaction. The conceptualizing of the self as a special 
locale of depth legitimized Rogers’s understanding of therapy not as technique 
driven but, rather, as accessing the depths of one’s psyche. For the Rogerian, this 





An example of an interaction understood as building self-awareness 
Client: I did something out of the ordinary for me. You know how I talk a mile a 
minute because I am afraid of not entertaining everyone – I think that entertaining 
them will make them feel better. Well, I met this guy and he asked me to coffee. 
And I practiced just saying things I noticed about him. I didn’t talk a lot. Maybe it’s 
doing the Zen. You know, you are supposed to just notice in Zen. We really 
connected. And I didn’t feel so uncomfortable when I wasn’t the one talking. It was 
kinda like when I am here with you. 
 
Therapist: You feel good right now because you allowed yourself to do something 
differently. You didn’t feel uncomfortable when just listening and noticing things 
about the guy. 
 
Client: Yeah! I think he liked it. Anyway, we connected. And I have not felt that way 
for a long time. It really felt good. Ah! I’m turning red – because I am not used to 
feeling this way. I’m seeing him again. He asked me to go for a run tomorrow. 
Yeah, but he called me right before my appointment with you. The attention feels 
so good.  
  
Once a person is able to free his or herself from negative introjects and 
projections, they can operationalize free choice in meaning-making regarding their 
thinking, feeling and sense of self. For Rogers, ‘[s]uch a person is more potentially 
aware, not only of the stimuli from outside, but of ideas and dreams, and of the on-
going flow of feelings, emotions, and physiological reactions that he or she senses 
from within’ (1995a: 127).  For Rogers, the freedom to have the choice of making 
self-interpretations builds awareness of how the self behaves in their world. It sets 
the stage to be authentically responsive. Without such a choice and world 
awareness (objective awareness), there could be no such thing as authenticity for 
Rogers. 
 
Rogers understood the feeling of discordance as a specialized internal motivator 
to do good, or right. Central to his understanding of the attitude of authenticity, 
sometimes termed congruence (Rogers 1995a: 13; 1995b: 61) or realness 
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(Rogers, 1995a: 16), was the idea that authenticity is an internal monitor. As he 
conceptualized it, one feels discordant when one is not honest; that is, when one 
externalizes feelings, behaviours or thoughts that do not correctly portray how one 
truly feels ‘inside’ (Rogers 1995a: 39, 160). Rogers, in this regard, understood 
feeling as a ‘moral’ fact (Prinz 2009: 88). Also, Rogers’s concept of emotions or 
feeling states implies the understanding that we have a natural ability to tell right 
from wrong.  
 
The privileging of the subjective experience, according to a phenomenological 
perspective, held consequences for how Rogers could view what was 
conscionable behaviour. Ethical behaviour needed to be understood as a matter of 
personal conscience gained through one’s uniquely lived experience. This 
represented a stress on one side of a contrast (universal vs. relative truth), one 
that allowed the practitioner to legitimize the relative when considering practice 
ethics. This suggests a rupture with Rogers’s universalist understanding of 
individual ontology, and it pushed him to a more materialist conception – lived 
experience creates the person. 
 
For me as a practitioner, the privileging of relative truths centralizes the individual 
person or self as the point of departure when considering ethics. Ultimately, my 
referent for determining what is ethical behaviour within Rogerian practice is my 
other. My conscience, shaped by the received valuing originating within my culture 
and ontological view, becomes secondary. From this perspective, it is a small leap 
towards valorising a relativistic, or micro view of practice ethics. The micro, or 
strongly localized, level of relationship building and the ethics played out within it 
are as important as ethics carried out on the macro or broader cultural, social and 
universalized levels. This means that my first consideration, when weighing what 
is at stake relationally, is my other’s ethical understanding of what the practice 
ethics should be. If it is much different from my own, then I need to consider the 
possibility that the practice will involve power relations rather than an empathic 
adjustment to one another. Engaging in strongly wrought power relations is a last 
resort for the Rogerian practitioner. And the practitioner needs to do everything 
possible not to engage politically with the client – unless addressing social issues 
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that directly affect one’s client and their understanding of what it means to be a 
self. 
 
In his final work, Rogers envisioned a universe where power relations were 
replaced by ‘love’ (1995a: 204). In effect, he understood love as part of a universal 
purpose. Rogers thereby softened the Protestant ethics he grew and developed in 
within his family of origin. Being loved meant being accepted according to one’s 
personal terms and conditions. The acceptance constructed a setting of safety. 
Through a respect for the actual material events played out within relationship 
building the client was put on a trajectory of positive development. Rogers’s 
understanding of love completed his universal picture of what it was to be of 
humanity. In this instance, he spoke of what it was to be within a particular micro-
humanity. 
 
The Interrelational and intersubjective 
Although Rogers took to heart the understanding that we are individuals and as 
individuals we should be self-directional and self-determining, he relied on the 
understanding that we are put together inter-relationally. For 
therapists/researchers Serlin and Criswell (Serlin & Criswell 2009: 1), an 
interrelational understanding of how a person is developed finds a parallel in the 
term ‘intersubjectivity. Theatre practitioner, educator and critic Jill Dolan accounts 
for the parallel term in Utopia in Performance (2005), when she speaks of 
Carlson’s ‘apotheosis‘ and of the strong ‘connection’ between audience and 
performers. As a term, it captures a heightened experience, or rather ‘utopian 
performatives’ which 
 
describe small but profound moments in which performance calls the 
attention of the audience in a way that lifts everyone slightly above the 
present, into a hopeful feeling of what the world might be like if every 
moment of our lives were as emotionally voluminous, generous, 
aesthetically striking, and intersubjectively intense.  
                    (Carlson in Dolan 2005: 5)  
The emotionality and interconnectedness expressed as performative is suggestive 
of being bonded in humanity through similarly experienced or shared feelings of 
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uplift and heightened sensitivity to one’s self and the other. Interestingly, along the 
lines of Dolan’s account of intersubjectivity, Rogers’s articulation of his attitudes 
led him to consider the affective experience of ‘unity’ (1995a: 129), which evokes 
feelings of bonding. It must be added though that Dolan speaks more of mutuality 
as rapture, while Rogers speaks more of the role of the therapist. He states that as 
a facilitator, the ‘union’ (ibid) provides ‘my presence’ which is ‘releasing and helpful 
to the other’.  
 
The understanding that we can understand one another on an intersubjective level 
has meaning for the attitude of authenticity. A striking feature of authenticity 
articulated in Rogers’s terminal work, one that speaks of connection as an 
outcome of being authentic, is a spiritual interconnectedness between persons 
that occurs. It was understood that, if the therapist and client responded in kind, a 
rarefied dimension of understanding was accessible, one that could be termed 
outside of ‘rational’ or intellectual understanding (Rogers 1995a: 129). 
 
For Dolan, intersubjectivity or ‘[h]uman interconnectedness is an ethical ... impulse 
in utopian performatives’ but not understood as principled behaviour derived from 
a universe that is purposeful and expressive of a binding ethical plan. Dolan 
qualifies the position through a statement by Michael Learner: 
 
The fundamental truth of our time is the interconnectedness and mutual 
interdependence of all human beings on this planet.... [w]e need a deeper 
understanding of what it is to be human....We call this approach a Politics of 
Meaning or an Emancipatory Spirituality – recognizing that people have a 
need for a meaning to their lives that transcends the narrow utilitarian logic 
of competitive marketplace and its materialist assumptions about what is 
important in human life.          
       (Learner in Dolan 2005: 136-7) 
 
An important point regarding terms that suggest transcendence, such as 
spirituality or elevation: Any term that suggests a transcendent dimension for 
Dolan is reducible to feeling states that bring about connectivity. Feelings or 
affective states reference what is experienced individually or collectively because 
of real-world events. And there is something about group activity that heightens 
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the experience. For Rogers, despite his scientist-practitioner role, such terms 
eventually came to mean an interconnectivity to a universal plan. Though there are 
occasional glimpses of an understanding more in line with Dolan’s.   
  
Dolan is quick to dismiss defining intersubjectivity in religious terms, though she 
does not deny there is a ‘spiritual’ element at stake. She adds to Learner’s 
statement, stating that 
 
While I readily underline the spiritual aspects of utopian performatives, I’ll 
emphasize, again, that I fervently wish for theatre to claim its place as a 
vital part of the public sphere. I yearn for performance to be a practice in 
everyday life, not so that it will become banal and predictable, but so it will 
provide a place for radically democratic dissension and debate, consensus 
and hope, a discursive place ... where a high level of conversation and 
debate among artists and politicians and educators and other people [is] 
imperative. Theatre can be a secular temple of social and spiritual union not 
with a mystified, mythologized higher power, but with the more prosaic, 
earthbound, yearning, ethical subjects who are citizens of the world 
community, who need places to connect with one another and with the 
fragile, necessary wish for a better future. 
          (Dolan 2005: 137) 
 
Rogers’s view is similar to Dolan’s use of intersubjectivity as an experience that 
puts us on a trajectory towards a better future, and he outlined the ‘future’ person 
in his terminal work, though he was not as materially oriented as Dolan. His body 
of work culminated in his embracing a metaphysical view. However, there is some 
connection, since both accounts recognise that shared feelings bond, giving the 
bonded a heightened awareness of the other.  
 
Also, what needs to be remembered therapeutically is that the relational context of 
the therapist-client dyad was, for Rogers, in service to building autonomy. The self 
or person of Rogers was meant to embody what it was to be the quintessential, 
autonomous, human being, or contextually, the citizen of democracy. What this 
brings out, is that within Rogers’s body of work, there is a line of understanding 
that ends in a spiritual realm, even though there is a strong material thread as well 
– one that keeps his therapy pragmatic or down to earth. 
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Self-determination and democracy 
These persons do not like to live in a compartmentalized world – body and 
mind, health and illness, intellect and feeling, science and common sense, 
individual and group, sane and insane, work and play. They strive rather for 
wholeness of life, with thought, feeling, physical energy, psychic energy, 
healing energy, all being integrated in experience. [ ... ] They are keenly 
aware that the one certainty of life is change – that they are always in 
process and changing. They welcome this risk-taking way of being are 
vitally alive in the way they face change. 
           (Rogers 1995a: 350-51) 
  
Central to Rogers’s understanding was the view that the self as an organism is a 
totality (Smith and Vetter 1991: 156). A holistic view establishes a site of 
understanding by which to link Rogers’s practice ethics with social construction. 
Psychological social construction is interested in a version of the self understood 
as a whole, rather than as a system of separate parts related to a whole. However, 
there is a caveat. Social construction sees the self not so much as a self, but as an 
extension of one’s received and appropriated cultural environments and the 
relationships that have been created within them (Gergen 2009: 2). This makes it 
difficult to speak of self-determination.     
 
Rogers’s formulation of his client-centred, humanist, and non-directive approach 
was based upon the assumption that all individuals inherently deserve treatment 
that preserves a sense of personal worth and dignity. This representation fits with 
American democracy and democratic political ideology. When exercising self-
determination and self-direction, the person is understood as expressing what it is 
to be of worth and dignity. Compassionate care is thought to preserve this sense, 
and that is the therapist’s ultimate goal. Rogers (1965b: 20) showed agreement in 
the following questions: ‘How do we look upon others? Do we see each person as 
having worth and dignity in his own right? If we do hold this point of view at the 
verbal level, to what extent is it operationally evident at the behavioural level?’  
 
The behavioural level for Rogers was operationalizing the preservation of worth 
and dignity through the three core attitudes. The result being that the real person 
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would rid her or his self of introjects that were incongruent with who he or she 
understood the self to be. By becoming more a construction of positive introjects, 
the person was understood as more responsible regarding his or her own 
behaviour and attitudes. For Rogers, then, the person’s growth towards potential 
was actually characteristic of growth as an ethical person. Moreover, this kind of 
personal growth had a broader relationship to the social context. The client’s 
movement within therapy concerned taking on the role of citizen: constructing a 
self that, according to democratic forms of governance, promotes freedom of 
choice, self-formulation, and self-direction. Thus, self-direction and formulation 
concerned emancipatory democracy. Liberation was a stake. This is made evident 
in Rogers’s following statement: 
 
Do we tend to treat individuals as persons of worth, or do we subtly devalue 
them by our attitudes and behaviour? … To what extent do we have a need 
and desire to dominate others? Are we willing for the individual to select 
and choose his own values, or are our actions guided by the conviction 
(usually unspoken) that he would be happiest if he permitted us to select for 
him his values and standards and goals?  
    (Ibid) 
 
  
To be self-formulated meant there occurred, through cultural exposure, a process 
of introjection within the self of the principles of democracy: developing the quality 
of independence, fairness and freedom, as well as being a participatory citizen 
interrelated to a whole – the political system.  
 
As an American, democracy was Rogers’s received political philosophy. His praxis 
exemplifies its principles. However, Rogers found some of his culturally received 
views unacceptable, especially those of the type of Protestantism in which he was 
raised. For many Americans, both ideological grounds are basic to what is termed 
‘Western culture’. Since he believed persons were meant to be self-directional and 
self-formulating, Rogers’s reaction makes sense. He found the linkage dangerous. 
He found through personal experience that religion rigidly shaped the self – in 
other words, it challenged these freedoms. His movement towards the acceptance 
of a natural or rationally understandable theism, or end in good, was not a step 
back into his Protestant origins, or a re-establishing of the link. Also, Rogers, like 
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Dolan above, wanted to make sense of the capacity for joy and its meaning for a 
relational humanity. He found Christian culture, especially Protestant culture, 
joyless. 
 
 The paradigm of Western culture is that the essence of persons is 
 dangerous; thus, they must be taught, guided, and controlled by those 
 with super authority. [...] Yet our experience, and that of an increasing 
 number of humanistic psychologists, has been shown that another 
 paradigm is far more effective and constructive for the individual and for 
 society. It is that, given a suitable psychological climate, humankind is 
 trustworthy, creative, self-motivated, powerful, and constructive -capable 
 of releasing undreamed-of-potentialities.  
      (Rogers, 1995a: 201) 
 
Rogers developed a utopic form of therapy that started from the premise that 
humankind was basically good and under the right conditions could express 
goodness accordingly. How the client should self-express was captured in his 
articulation of ‘the person of the future.’ His work culminated in the building of a 
fully actualized person (Rogers 1995a: 339). The construction had a perfect 
societal fit with a society created through his attitudes. Rogers’s future person was 
the perfect democratic citizen shaped by a perfectly democratic political 
environment and revealing the perfect democratic consciousness.  Importantly the 
self-actualized person felt joy. 
 
Congruence and Incongruence 
Haugh details the fully functioning person described by Rogers (in Wyatt 2001: 4). 
Such a person has ten characteristics, and she states that ‘[s]ix of the ten 
characteristics ... can be described as definitions of congruence (4)’. Congruence 
is an expected behaviour by the therapist, and is a developmental process within 
the client as an outcome of therapy. As Wyatt understands Rogers’s core 
conditions, being authentic or congruent for both therapist and client was an 
imperative constituent for ‘personality change’ to occur within ‘the client’ (iv). Wyatt 
discusses the evidence of a strong correlation between quality of relationship and 
positive outcome for the client (ibid).  
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Recent neglect of the concept of congruence may be because of the development 
of new forms of client-centred therapy, which followed in the thirty odd years since 
Rogers’s death – therapy that wasn’t driven by his understanding of what it means 
to be a self. Rogers’s understanding of authenticity implies that there is a self at 
stake within therapy that needs to be understood according to an essentialist bias. 
The later forms of client-centred therapy may have developed, irrespective of the 
attitude that Rogers insisted needed to be ingrained within the therapist’s 
character in his ad hominem understanding of what effective therapy should be. 
Therapists using these later forms of client-centred therapy appear to be more 
social constructionist in their understandings of who the self is, and what can be 
understood as the characteristics that define it. Social construction, in particular, 
spurns ad hominem or characterlogical accounts of the self.  
 
Social constructionists use contextual and relational accounts of the self. As 
therapist and psychologist David Gergan, in his Relational Being: Beyond Self and 
Community (2009), suggests, the ‘bounded unit’ accounts of ‘individualism’ (4) 
need replacing. He writes that we need a new ‘vision – one of relational being’, 
where we ‘[seek] to recognise a world that is not within persons but within their 
relationships, and that ultimately erases the traditional boundaries of separation’ 
(5). Gergan understands that the self, as a ‘bonded unit‘, requires a sense of 
‘separation’ (4) that decreases the ability to forge interrelational behaviour.  
   
Rogers understood that, through the atmosphere created by the practitioner using 
the trinity of authenticity, empathic attunement, and unconditional positive regard, 
there would occur an eventual internalization of those three attitudes by the client. 
Once the attitudes can be viewed as integrated within the self, they take on the 
characteristic of becoming deep seated within a special, interior locale. Rogers 
wanted to create depth of experience within therapy. He understood affective 
states as coming from the depths of one’s experience. A central technique of 
Rogerian practice is identifying feeling states rather than uncovering 
intellectualized rationales that support why a person has taken on certain introjects 
to define who they are. It is through experiencing this deep and personal therapy 
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together that, in Gergan’s term, there occurs a ‘bonded unit’. A Rogerian would 
dispute that a sense of separation is experienced when bonded; this sense 
decreases the ability to forge interrelational behaviour. Such an account 
challenges if we can understand authenticity from an individualist perspective. 
 
Smith and Vetter bring out Rogers’s concern with ‘conditions of worth’. The 
authors define it as an outcome of  
 
developing self-regard…when the individual introjects a number of values that he 
has learned from others ... These values may then come to serve as the criteria for 
evaluating a given experience in terms of whether or not it is worthy of self-regard. 
Values that serve the criterion function are called conditions of worth (1991: 156).   
 
An understanding central to Smith and Vetter’s claim is that shaping occurs 
through introjection. Since Rogers understood the person as possessing an 
inherent ethical monitor, shaping through introjection was not a conceptual 
problem for him. The self as understood by Rogers is inherently set up to self-
differentiate. According to Rogers, it involved building a climate of trust within 
therapy brought about through operationalizing positive attitudes. Rogers’s 
conceptualized the person as inherently ethical and able to differentiate positive 
shaping from negative introjects. The individual, under the right conditions within 
therapy, is able to self-discern what contributed to their self-worth and what did 
not. For example:  
 
Client: I stopped smoking in front of my kids. I don’t want them to take up the habit. 
It relieved the tension; I could have a cigarette and just relax. Within a moment! 
Everything reminds me of smoking, having a cup of coffee, drinking a glass of 
wine, having a meal, a talk with my husband; everything.  
 
Therapist: The comfort has disappeared and you long for it back. And you don’t 
want your kids to smoke. 
 
Client: I tried knitting. That didn’t do it. I tried running but was convinced that I 
would have a heart attack. Nothing does it for me. 
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Therapist: Not doing it is a loss. 
 
Client: I cheated a little last night – went for a walk and had a smoke!  
 
Therapist: You felt good and bad at the same time. There is a smile all over your 
face. 
 
Client: I certainly did. And, yes, there is. 
 
As Rogers understood it, the self includes some internal organization that monitors 
for ethical behaviours and attitudes. Feelings of incongruence or inauthenticity are 
understood as something that activated the monitoring. Rogers, in effect, forged a 
dynamic binary between a feeling state and ethical action that keep one 
developing in the right direction. Feeling states are a referent, in effect, of one’s 
values and judgement regarding them. Rogers never articulated this. Also, 
Rogers’s understanding of congruence suggests that affective states are 
shapeable and effective when shaped. When the Rogerian points out feeling 
states, she or he is connecting the client to a moral ground that affects. The 
therapist is not simply eliciting feeling states waiting to be stimulated because of 
past injury to one’s psychological being.  
 
A narrative practice example 
Narrative therapy comes out of a social constructionist understanding of what it is 
to be a self. The technique used within the following example is called 
externalizing the problem. The goal is to externalize the problem so that it is not 
understood as a feature of the client’s personality or self, since both are contested 
as real entities by narrative therapists. Another goal is to keep the client out of 
their feelings. 
 
Client: Everyday, everyday, they get me after school. They make fun of me and so 
does everyone else. All day long I hide. 
 




Client: I don’t want to talk about it. 
 
Therapist: They are getting the best of you so much that you don’t want to even 
talk about it. 
 
Client: No one does anything. 
 
Therapist: You want some help, but the not wanting to talk is keeping the joking a 
problem. You are stuck. 
 
Client: I don’t want to talk to you. 
 
Therapist: You are stuck and want to get out of being stuck. 
 
Client:  I couldn’t stand it anymore.  
 
Therapist: The joking is too much. Having no way of dealing with it is keeping you 
stuck. 
 
Client: When I stick needles or pins in my arms, or beat my head against the wall, I 
don’t feel anything anymore. I don’t feel stuck! I don’t feel anything. 
 
Therapist: And yet the problem somehow always comes back. 
 
Client: Today was the worst. I want them to die. I want them to bleed and have to 
hide. I want everyone to hate them. I hate them.  
 
Therapist: It was back today, and it looks like the jokes really got the best of you. 
 
Client: I didn’t do anything – yeah, they did. I was really mad. 
Therapist: You really got stuck, this time more than usual. 
 
Client: The art teacher lets me draw during lunch sometimes. Last week she came 




Therapist: When you go to the art class and draw – do something that you like – 
the joking no longer gets the best of you. You relax and are able to do something 
you enjoy with a person you like.  
 
Client: Yep. I do that a lot. She is my friend – she is like my aunt – I don’t get to 
see her much. She phones me – once in a while. She moved.  
 
Therapist: When you decide to find a way to not let the joking get the best of you, 
you manage quite nicely!  
 
Client: Yep. Can I come tomorrow? 
 
Therapist: Yep. Maybe between now and then you could find another way to not 
let the joking get the best of you. Tomorrow you could share that with me, too? 
 
Client: Okay.  
 
Therapist: Tomorrow. Good for you, Jess. High Five! 
 
What is evident in this example is that there is a high regard for the client’s ability 
to find solutions to his problem. Previously taken solutions are identified by the 
therapist, and the client is continually refocused on what they have done in the 
past that worked in dealing with a particular problem. What is implicit is that the 
client has evidenced strength to find solutions to his problem, and it suggests that 
he has the same strength to find other solutions to the identified problem. What 
needs to be noticed is that the therapist keeps all the terms used in therapy very 
concrete and concerned with action: the acts of the bullies become jokes, and not 
whether the client is not angry or sad, but whether the problem has got the best of 
him. There is very little stated by the therapist that attempts to address the client’s 
self or his personality. The therapist also sets a time frame for the client to do his 
homework outside of therapy. This manoeuvre helps build the sense of 
competency that is missing in such a brutally emasculated child – a child who has 
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Researcher-therapist Barrett-Lennard states that Rogers defined a relationship 
between therapist and client to a degree not articulated by previous kinds of 
therapy in the mid-twentieth century:  
 
Rogers has successfully delivered to the psychotherapy world a crucial 
statement that described the basic attitudes and conditions necessary for 
an effective therapeutic relationship for all theoretical orientations.  
  (in Wyatt 2001: ii). 
 
 
In defining what a therapeutic relationship should be, Rogers stated that it 
concerned his trinity of attitudes. However, the attitudes were set in a context that 
was rather complicated, one that would not necessarily appeal to all psychological 
‘orientations’ or the relationship between therapist and client that could be shaped 
by them.  
 
Rogers’s method or tools within practice consisted of being authentic, which 
means using honest expressiveness so that one’s internal feelings matched what 
was expressed through behaviour and verbalization (Rogers, 1995b: 61-62); being 
empathically attuned to the other, which means being highly sensitive and fully 
understanding (137-161); and being unquestionably respectful in a strongly caring 
manner (19-26). His end goal was to help facilitate the development of the person 
so that they recognised their self as authentic (115) and capable of having an end 
in maturity (117-119), or as he termed it, being self-actualized (351), a term he 
borrowed from another humanistic psychologist, Abraham Maslow.  
 
Rogers was one of the first clinical psychologist-therapists to address the 
therapist’s attitudes as having a positive effect upon the course and outcome of 
therapy ‘by conveying two things to the client – ‘acceptance and understanding’ 
(Kirschenbaum, 2009: 156), which were thought to occur if the three other 
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interdependent attitudes were present (Rogers 1995a: 115-117). Prior to Rogers’s 
emergence, therapy was reliant on the positioning of the therapist as an expert 
resting on a knowledge of prescriptive techniques and a system of diagnosis, 
interventions and outcome goals. This was true of the psychoanalytic camp as well 
as the behaviourist one. According to Rogers, such reliance had nothing to do with 
the clients’ personal view of their self or the relationship that it took to express it.  
 
In On Being a Person (1961), Rogers made the statement that there was a 
profound ‘change’ that had occurred within his practice, a change that took his 
practice from being a treatment model to a relational and personal model built from 
the attitudes exhibited by the therapist. He attributed the change to altering a 
fundamental question that had previously governed his work. He stopped asking 
the question ‘How can I treat, or cure, or change this person?’ and started asking, 
How can I provide a relationship which this person may use for his own personal 
growth?’ (Rogers 1995b: 32). In switching questions, Rogers radically reconfigured 
the roles of the therapist and the client into one of strong and mutual 
interdependence. The attitudes operationalized within therapy – being congruent, 
empathically attuned and having unconditional positive regard towards one’s other 
– were ‘the personal traits necessary for the counselor to be effective’ (Austin, 
1999: 21). Rogers wrote, ‘[b]y 1957 I had developed a rigorous theory of therapy 
and the therapeutic relationship. I had set forth the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of therapeutic personality change’ (Rogers 1995a: 38). Through these 
attitudes, the counsellor ‘is transparent’ and ‘nothing is hidden’ and there is ‘a 
willingness for this other person to be what he is.’ (Rogers in Anderson and 
Cissna,1997: 30)  
 
What is a technique for Rogers?   
Rogers made the point that therapy cannot be reduced to ‘method’ (1965b: 19: 
1995: 5-6). This point of view remained unchanged throughout his career, and the 
claim had consequences for how Rogers’s techniques could be viewed. At stake 
was not so much ‘a technique’ when understanding the attitudes, but rather ‘a set 
of attitudes’ shaped so firmly within the practitioner self that they were ingrained. 
Within his 1951 work, Client Centered Therapy, Rogers states that ‘the counselor 
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who is effective in client-centred therapy, holds a coherent and developing set of 
attitudes deeply embedded in his personal organization; a system of attitudes 
which is implemented by techniques and methods consistent with it’ (Rogers 1951: 
19). The statement is basically a claim that techniques should be part of the 
practitioner’s internal organization, and should be so tightly crafted as to have 
become second nature, and therefore, part of the authentic self of the practitioner. 
This meant that Rogers’s attitudes were not to be understood as simply 
implementations used within therapy: they become who you are and externalize 
how you are meant to express yourself. Eventually, the attitudes became an 
interrelated set understood as a way of being. In fact, that there is a 
distinguishable way of life was what Rogers would claim almost thirty years later in 
his final work, A Way of Being (1980). Within this work, overall, the attitudes 
morphed into vectors of a pre-existing ethics characteristic of a universe 
envisioned as relationally or intersubjectively put together. An earlier work, On 
Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy, which first published in 
1961 and was aimed at the counselling profession and the general public, made 
no such claims. 
 
Through the use of ‘sufficient conditions’ there was thought to be the promotion of 
personal dignity and worth, exemplars of democracy (Rogers, 1995a: 40, 59). The 
only stated goal within therapy would be evidence of the client’s growing ‘self-
direction’ (Austin 1999: 21), substantiated by a growing ability to use the three 
attitudes initially displayed by the therapist when interpersonally engaged with the 
therapist or when demonstrating or verbalizing self-understanding. The result, 
according to Rogers, would be an end in self-actualization where the individual 
becomes more the embodiment of Rogers’s ideal person: ‘a person who is 
capable of being a holistic or organismic entity who is in a continual self-directed 
process’ (Rogers 1995a: 343-48); one who 
 
is an actualization process ... a tendency, an activity or a functioning rather 
than an entity which then does the actualizing ... This actualizing process, 
this actualizing that ... [the person] is ... an organized whole. It functions as 
a whole with all its part-functionings contributing inescapably to this total 
activity ... [The person], as an actualizing process, has this total quality 
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originally and every step of its development. Originally ... [the person] is an 
organism, and remains this however he might change and however 
complex his activity may become ... [the person] is ... always and 
everywhere total, active actualizing gestalt. 
        (Van Belle in Wyatt and Sanders 2001: 249) 
 
Returning to the example of the young boy. This child was hugely emasculated. It 
is quite difficult to vision him using the three attitudes to become a gestalt. That is 
a level of maturity difficult to find even in adults. As a therapist, I have to keep in 
mind the client’s age. Usually, I cannot rely on Rogers’s counselling theory to 
assess an age-appropriate response to therapy and an appropriate level of ethical 
development. I tend to refer to developmental theorists such as Piaget  
and Kohlberg’s model of ethical development. However, children do exhibit taking 
on the attitudes. It takes time to accomplish internalizing them, which means that 
contact with children needs to be kept up over an extended period. Of course, this 
is true for all clients according to humanistic practice. Relationship building takes 
time. This is in contrast to behaviourist models of therapy that claim that 
therapeutic results can be attained within a few sessions, and with lasting results. 
 
As stated, the three attitudes comprised Rogers’s rather small cache of 
techniques. However, they can be broken down into behaviours: therapeutic 
listening, keeping the client in the moment and reflexively responsive, the use of 
silence, attaching what is disclosed or processed in the client’s narrative to affect, 
reflecting the underlying feelings disclosed within the client’s narrative, taking the 
client into a deeper understanding, clarifying statements, reframing and summing 
up. Operationalizing the attitudes seems simple because the techniques appear 
simple. Rogerian therapy on paper appears non-confrontational and sometimes a 
little too warm and fuzzy. However, that is misleading. Rogerian therapists do not 
skirt the loaded affect evidenced in their other. They do not avoid expressing it 
themselves. As an example, a male client of mine, upon disclosing that he had 
been sexually molested by a close family member, began to attempt to sexualize 
the client-therapist relationship. One day, he very actively made an advance. I did 
not simply state in a monotone or friendly tone, ‘you’re feeling powerless. You are 
94 
 
falling into the trap of trying to sexualize the relationship and it makes you feel in 
control.‘ Instead I clearly set up boundaries regarding the behaviours he used 
within the closed off space.  
 
Another example: I have worked with persons who self-harm. There is a pattern of 
behaviour identifiable with them. They usually grow up in an environment of mixed 
messages with a come-hither-now-go-away dynamic, and consequently 
boundaries are difficult for them to establish. This is because social cues have not 
been strongly localized within their self in a consistent manner due to the double 
messages. They basically have no internal locus of control. I have had such clients 
follow me home, camp out in my office reception room, and call me at 2 a.m. I 
have had to set boundaries in these cases in a very firm manner. My clients feel 
this type of response as rejection and abandonment. Because of this perceived 
assault, their anger towards me can be wrathfully and vengefully expressed. They 
attempt to split using ad hominem attacks and reporting an alleged insult to my 
superiors. When this occurs, I have to firmly identify the dynamics and, in clear 
terms, explain that if they entrench the dynamic in the client-therapist relationship, 
they will have to seek therapy elsewhere. Once caught in this kind of trap, the 
therapeutic relationship is no longer therapeutic. It simply plays out the dynamic 
the client grew up in.  
 
When the client experiences the honesty of the therapist, they can and will feel 
confronted. My male client did. However, he was also able to process out a 
dynamic that keep him from true intimacy with others. Affectively laden or not, the 
response of the therapist should be to point out simply the elements surrounding 
the threat, but should not get swept up in a power struggle.  
 
Also, the therapist should not hide her own thoughts or affective state to avoid 
confrontation. The ‘warmth’ and ‘liking’ that Rogers spoke of can be misleading.  I 
did not deliver the parameters of the relationship with a Mona Lisa smile attached 




However, as a therapist, whether affectively laden or not, my response in the end 
is one of patience and a belief that every human being, at their core, has 
something good to offer their other as well as humanity.  
 
Revealing affective reactions requires good timing. The client that I just described 
had been coming to therapy for over a year. He was a grown man whose narrative 
disclosed a fear of intimacy and the use of sexualizing relationships to gain 
control. He understood my response to his advances, and my reframes made it 
‘pop’. He could tolerate my response because a level of trust had been 
established. All that I reflected back was what had been touched on and explored. 
My response conceptualized what his narrative revealed in a roundabout manner 
and was collapsed into two brief statements. 
 
The response seems almost psychodynamically influenced. However, I am not 
diagnosing inherent, interior-residing, pathological impulses that are trying to get 
out. I am pointing out a dynamic that the client created so that he could negotiate 
his mixed-up world. He was reacting to his personal, past field of experience – one 
that created his particular history along with coping skills that bled into the present 
when he became fearful. 
 
The timing of a collapsed framing is important. If strongly conceptualized accounts 
are applied before the client is ready, the therapy session falls apart, and the client 
may decide not to come back. Also, if put out there too soon, the account makes it 
look like you have been holding back and just waiting to ‘let ’em have it’.  In other 
words, it can appear sadistically motivated, psychodynamically speaking. 
 
Therapist behaviours and an example of a child internalizing the attitudes 
Client: I’m late again. (Smiles, rolls his eyes and throws himself into a corner of the 
room and sits. He deliberately does not sit in his usual place – a seat across from 
the therapist.) 
Therapist: You’re out of breath, your eyes look a bit wild, and you are smiling. And, 




Client: I took my spelling test. 
 
Therapist: You don’t want to talk about being late. 
 
Client: I am always late. I hide in the back of the football field and smoke 
cigarettes. Other kids who hide out there give them to me.  
 
Therapist: And, then you’re late. You were late just now and you didn’t know how I 
would react. You are waiting to see right now. [Silence.] You would rather change 
the subject than talk about it. 
 
Client: You’re mad at me. 
 
Therapist: I am a bit. 
 
Client: I do it a lot. I think that I am getting away with something. I feel like I am in 
control. And some kids laugh at me because they think it’s funny. I like being 
funny. 
 
Therapist: Jesse, you don’t look like you’re having fun right now. [Long silence.] 
 
Client: I hate you. 
 
Therapist: [Silence.] You are really angry right now because I did not laugh at you. 
If I don’t laugh you wonder if I really like you. You are wondering that right now. 
 
Client: [Hangs head and looks away.] 
 
Therapist: [Silence.] Your head is cast down, Jesse. And you are looking away.  
You look like you are fighting back tears. 
 






Client: I don’t want to come here anymore. 
 
Therapist: [Silence.] It’s difficult coming here. [Silence.] It’s easier to hide at the 
football field. 
 
Client: I always think I’m winning when I’m late, smoke cigarettes – act silly to 
cover up. [Silence.] I’m not.  
 
Therapist: That’s painful.  
  
Client: [Silence.] I never thought of it that way.  
 
Therapist: Your face looks pretty sad. 
 




Client: I want to be different but I don’t think before I do things and people get 




Client: [Silence.] And then they make fun of me. 
 
Therapist: You’re being serious right now – honest. 
 
Client: Yeah. [Silence.] 
 
Therapist: I feel like I can trust you – my trust grows, Jesse. 
 
 Client: Yeah. 
 




Client: I want to be more honest. It’s so hard for me.  
 
Therapist: [Nods and is silent.] 
 




Client:  I feel like I’m hiding all the time. Can I have a Kleenex? 
 




Therapist: Yeah. I feel good and want to get to know who is inside. Jesse, the box 
of tissue is right there. It’s hard to cry in front of me. It takes a lot of courage to 
show me that part of you. 
 
From the scenario above, it can be seen that the child can begin to incorporate 
being honest within their self-concept. He can begin to self-disclose honestly with 
the therapist. He can be empathically tuned into his thoughts and feelings as well 
as those that of the therapist. There exists, according to a Rogerian perspective, a 
relationship of mutual respect.  
 
Universal morality 
Through centralizing feeling states as an ethical driver intrinsic to one’s being, 
Rogers appealed to universalism. Universalism strongly pushes one’s logic 
towards a metaphysical grasp of human purpose and placement within the 
universe. Metaphysical systems of understanding are based on the view that the 
universe is purposeful. Viewing the universe as purposeful has consequences for 
how the authentic self can be understood. To be authentic means that we need to 




The term ‘attitude’ presupposes an ethical driver is in place within each of us and 
that it motivates behaviour. From this understanding, being authentic, empathically 
attuned and unconditionally respectful are not simply acts or the exercising of a set 
of behaviours – it is an expression of a moral stance. If the attitudes are an 
expression of a moral stance, then an aim of Rogerian therapy is to inculcate 
morality – and, according to Rogers’s understanding, a universalized one.  
 
In his mid-career, Rogers the scientist-practitioner had ambitions to qualify the 
material conditions it took to help develop these attitudes, but by the end of his 
career, his ambition was to build a cosmological system that centralized 
authenticity as the moral imperative of our universe. The term, authenticity, or any 
of its variants, was loaded for Rogers. It spoke of individual difference, a linking to 
others through ethical behaviour guided by feelings, and a common link to a 
purposeful and relational universe. I do not go so far as to claim that a moral and 
planned universe exists. However, I do claim that if we are to be in relationship to 
one another, guided by principles and the behaviours that exhibit them, our 
existence demands that we exist as a humanity, and of course that moral concept 
is ideologically driven.  
 
Rogers did not always take equal interest in all of the three attitudes, even though 
they comprised the structural centre of Rogers’s theoretical writing, research and 
practice measures. Rogers seems most perplexed and drawn in by the term 
authenticity. As has been discussed in this chapter, authenticity refers to an innate 
moral structuring of the self, an appeal to deal honestly and fairly with one’s other, 
a practice of self-expression according to who you find yourself to be and the 
ridding oneself of social and cultural introjects that go against who one sees one-
self to be.  
 
Variants of the term authenticity are congruence, integration (Haugh in Wyatt  
2001: 2), transparency, wholeness, genuineness, and realness. Of the three 
attitudes, authenticity is the one Rogers struggled with the most. The other two 
attitudes were fairly straightforwardly posed, though the philosophical context in 
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which they were located grew. They were not as problematic to understand when 
articulating what they meant ethically for his practice.   
 
The congruence/ incongruence dynamic 
The term incongruence is a loaded term. According to Haugh, incongruence, or 
rather, dishonesty is an interruption of ‘empathy’ (3). Attunement to one’s other 
can only happen if there exists honesty between the client and therapist, because 
it builds a common ground of trust.   
 
Rogers considered incongruence ‘as the opposite of congruence (1). Rogers 
understood the self to incorporate an inherent moral editor. In this regard, 
authenticity is not only understandable as an attitude; it is understandable as an 
ethical force located within our ability to perceive. It is accessible and perceivable 
as an opposition: that of congruence (feeling something is right) and incongruence 
(feeling something is wrong). To feel either means that an affect is value laden.  
 
Like the therapist in the example above, I would never take issue with the client 
telling me he hates me. I would never take issue with him trying to manoeuvre out 
of addressing his perpetual tardiness. I would simply point out what is there or 
happens between us. If I did get drawn in to engaging in a power-struggle, I would 
feel incongruent. When I simply reflect what is happening, while still remaining 
honest about my feelings, I feel congruent.  
 
The congruence/incongruence monitor has an attached feeling state that alerts me 
when I am off track. If I feel dissonant, I am off tract. This particular feeling state 
can signal that therapy concerns my interpretation rather than what my client 
understands as related to their self. If I feel, as Rogers would have framed it, 
‘whole’ and I don’t feel dissonance, I am probably on track. When feeling 
dissonant I am no longer empathic or respectful. To be whole, ideally, the therapist 
has to be all three: honest, attuned and respectful – not simply exhibiting those 
behaviours. 
Incongruence can reveal that the therapist is soft peddling. As an internal monitor, 
the dissonance experienced when being incongruent lets the therapist know when 
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they are letting the client off the hook, or soft peddling, or avoiding the emotional 
content of the client’s narrative. It also lets the therapist become alert to when her 
or his ‘issues’ are turned into the client’s issues. Incongruence, which is 
earmarked by the experience of dissonance, is an internal monitor that allows the 
therapist to become more empathically responsive and attuned to who the client 
is, as Haugh suggests.  
 
Rogerian principles beyond the therapy session  
Brought out by the examples, is that an aim of therapy is building positive 
introjects rather than negative ones. My project with my male client was to 
facilitate his building a positive introject that he could internalize within his self and 
to replace the one that was introjected through the circumstances of his life, which 
can be summarised by ‘I am powerless’. As Rogers (1995a: 334) states: ‘Very 
perceptively, persons [can begin] to seek within for what they ... [experience] as 
valuable instead of looking for what they were told was valuable. Without question, 
they ... [begin] to meet the ... good life within themselves, and not in some outer 
dogma or dictum.’ 
 
Romeo and Juliet, Zelda, fencing and principled behaviour 
Within my dual practice, one of the populations that I worked with was kids. Many 
had grown up in the social welfare system. Some were from foster homes, some 
had parents in jail, many of their parents were high school dropouts, and some of 
their parents were abusive or had drug problems. There was usually one parent in 
the home. Some of the kids were from a poor family that generationally had 
needed public assistance. At school, many of the children were outsiders because 
they had management problems, were understood to be of a certain welfare class, 
and they were likely to be transient; historically moved from school to school. 
These kids were marginalized and made vulnerable by their life circumstances. 
 
Many of these teens and children had strength of character hidden beneath their 
behaviours that felt solid. I could feel it. However, these kids had run the gamut of 
therapies and were basically burnt out. They were resistant to therapy, and had 
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become what is termed therapy savvy in counselling speak. They played the game 
of doing therapy, but it didn’t touch them. However, because of my Rogerian 
approach they attached to me. Most were hungry for adult attention.  
 
 One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical 
 experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man’s 
 nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his ‘animal 
 nature,’ is positive in nature – is basically socialized, forward moving, 
 rational and realistic. (Rogers 1995b: 90-91) 
 
 
Rogers saw humans as intrinsically good, meaning we possess identifiable 
positive characteristics that make us who we are. These characteristics are 
embedded in an internal structuring of what is called the self. Rogers’s self is 
driven by a desire to do and be good. All the self needs is be given the opportunity 
to express good and it will under the right conditions.  
 
For Rogers, there was a correct way of expressing one’s nature by 
operationalizing positive characteristics. Importantly, understanding a human 
being as basically ‘good,’ means that the individual is seen as inherently or 
favourably ethical. In this respect, good or best behaviour was understood as self-
fulfilling. When working with children and adolescents, I understood this to be the 
case, and they felt it. 
 
My conundrum became evident. I was a therapist with no place to go when 
working with this population. The kids didn’t need therapy; they needed a place to 
express themselves as ethical, disciplined and basically good, rather than as 
pathologically driven. After working with these ‘kids’ (and this is not a pejorative 
term amongst counsellors – it shows connection) for a while, I realized that they 
needed to build a sense of competency and self-discipline. They needed to 
encounter a world that was principled in order to get this need met. Importantly, 





This realization did not appear out of nowhere. It came about by watching my son 
play the video game The Legend of Zelda. Also, because I had experienced a 
world that valorised self-discipline, competency, and creative responsiveness 
while at drama school, I began to play with the idea that my group needed to 
experience the equivalent of my past training as an actor in the UK.   
 
I have three sons and they all were taken by Link, the main character in the video 
game. As a parent, I took very little interest in the game except to monitor the time 
my boys spent playing it. One day, my youngest son said, ‘Mom, come here, I 
want to show you what I can do’. My immediate, interpretation of the request was 
that he wanted to show me how well he played video games. That was not the 
case. As I watched my son play, I realized that he had become the character Link. 
His play had gone beyond the bounds of pretending. I also understood that his 
play reflected the need for competency; a competency that was principle based. It 
takes a good deal of self-discipline and control to negotiate the different levels of 
difficulty within the playing of the game. Dressed as a medieval peasant boy, the 
sort of Robin Hood-ish looking character of Link was what would have to be 
termed authentically noble – a mini version of the Knight of the Round Table. He 
was a principled warrior who expressed a native character, and the purpose of his 
fighting concerned good triumphant over evil. Link fits the archetype of the Hero-
Warrior. My kids at the agency, male and female, adored Link. Some of their PSR 
workers used the game within a system of rewards. Many of these kids did not 
have access to the game at home. 
 
I realized that I needed to create a similar imaginary space for my agency kids: 
one that incorporated the archetype Link represented – a young hero battling evil 
who could wield a sword with the physical prowess of a dragon slayer. My drama 
training had created that space for me.  
 
The fight scene in Romeo and Juliet was a perfect vector for the particular 
archetype that needed to be expressed through play. I went to work teaching my 
group how to use a foil and do stage combat. I had learned the skill in drama 
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school, and had staged the combat scene in a ‘fringy’ production of Romeo and 
Juliet that never made it to opening night. 
 
It needs to be remembered, many of these kids were impulsive; they easily blew 
up, or acted out. I handed them weapons – thin, wooden dowels substituting for 
foils that I found at a home improvement store in town. I also told them that since 
we were working on a stage fight, they had to behave like well-trained actors. 
Their play wasn’t about the fight; it was about the ensemble creating a fight. Not 
one kid lost it, hurt anyone, or failed to take a directive instantaneously.  
 
I ceased to be the counsellor and became the director of a fight scene within a 
play. In a manner that didn’t happen within therapy, I was part of the ensemble. A 
relational dynamic that couldn’t happen within therapy, because of the resistant 
role my kids had taken on, was forged. Together we were doing a job – mounting 
a fight scene. 
 
Before I taught my group to use a foil, I taught them breathing exercises and how 
to get to centred. This theoretical space is one in which the actor is understood to 
be maximally relaxed and focused, while minimally experiencing bodily or mental 
tension. Usually, one’s breath becomes the focus as one works to relieve tensions 
within the physical body and distractions within the mind. The actor breathes any 
type of tension away. The technique was very helpful when I felt that the kids 
might become over-enthusiastic in their play. As I understood it, and this came 
directly from my past theatre training, actors gained the emotional, mental, and 
physical control they needed to do scene work when they took themselves into 
centring. I called centring ‘Dog’, the understanding being that it made the stance 
less theoretical and more concrete. I taught the kids to manage centring by doing 
‘baby pose’ – a position borrowed from Hatha Yoga. With their body stretched out 
on the floor face down, it immediately got them into a personal space where they 
had to self-attend, breathe and relax.  
The group did not appear to interpret Dog as judgmental on my part, or as a 
version of ‘time out’, but rather as an acting technique. At the agency, every time a 
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child acted out they were made to take a ‘time out’, to sit outside the group until 
they could collect themselves. Sometimes, a time-out was used punitively. 
 
I also taught the group exercises inspired by the Sound and Movement exercise, 
so that the group could become attuned to one another and gain some spontaneity 
within their play without going overboard. As therapy savvy and resistant, they had 
learned to hold back within therapeutic play. Oppositional and explosive 
disordered, the kids frequently lost it. By doing theatrical play, however, the kids 
evidenced behaviours that were controlled, as in the case of the stage fighting, as 
well as spontaneous and empathic, as in the case of sensitivity-building exercises.  
 
In the version of the Sound and Movement exercise used at my drama school in 
the UK, an ensemble of students would sit in a circle with eyes closed. One 
student would pass on a sound that had a movement attached to it. We could all 
hear the sound but not see the movement. The person left at the end would show 
the end movement while making the sound. Then we would all share how we put 
the sound to movement. Sometimes there was unity to the movement almost 
across the group. A goal of the ensemble was to interrogate why this happened or 
not. As we repeated the exercise using different vocalizations we felt ourselves 
relax into a gestalt. When the movement became more sensitive to and expressive 
of the quality of sound, we felt bonded and freed up as a group in a manner we 
hadn’t experienced at the beginning of the exercise. Also, there was an 
understanding that, as a group gestalt, we had centred, and were feeling 
maximally relaxed, gently alert, and open. Reaching this psychological space was 
what I hoped to achieve with my kids. Looking back, embodied within the actions 
and goals of the exercise were positive introjects. So that the individuals in the 
group were working interrelationally, working in a sensitive manner, interrogating 
the value of a prescribed action, trusting experiential learning rather than simply 
engaging in intellectual activity, and trusting a creative responsiveness and the 
value of spontaneity. 
 
This example showed that when provided with positive introjects persons grow. 
Another important feature of my group’s play as an ensemble of actors was that 
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personal insights concerning the choices one makes regarding behaviour began to 
flourish. The kids started taking apart the behaviour of the characters they were 
playing within the fight scene. They started looking at personal motivation, what 
happens when behaviour becomes so entrenched it is no longer a choice, and 
what happens to responsible behaviour when part of a group pits itself 
antagonistically against another group. Importantly, as the group became more 
interrelational, appropriately physical, and able to concentrate on behaviours 
externalized by the characters they played, they also exhibited joy. 
 
Rogers’s three therapeutic behaviours are meant to open the client up to new 
possibilities of personal insight and action through directly experiencing the 
behaviours and attitudes of the therapist. In the case of my group, what became 
important was not experiencing my facilitative approach. Being actively involved in 
work that directly provided positive introjects, the kids were able to take on within 
themselves the personal involvement and commitment to principles of practice – 
being disciplined, respectful, attuned and tolerant. As well, they were able to own 
up to and share what they actively thought about managing the creation of 
character. The act of staging a fight, and within that staging taking on principled 
behaviours, opened these kids up to possibilities created within their material 
circumstances.  
 
I did not make any one of the kids take part in the play. Every member of the 
group was allowed to join in, or not. None of the children opted out of, or dropped 
out of, the play. One child sat on the side-lines at first. However, when I handed 
out the dowel-foils he quickly got in line to receive his. The only other condition 
that I made was that once part of the ensemble the member had to show up and 
finish working out the fight scene no matter how many days or weeks that it took. 
Many of these kids had been diagnosed as attention-deficit disordered.  
 
Within Rogers’s understanding, the three attitudes, when expressed within the 
therapeutic encounter, were meant to free up the client from past conditioning; 
conditioning that had introjected feelings and understandings of poor self-worth. 
As understood by Rogerians, to be open to possibility requires an honest 
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expressiveness. This occurred with my grouping of kids. The kids honestly 
expressed their views, took cues from their others in an attuned manner, and were 
deeply respectful of one another within the playing out of the scenes and the 
exploration of character. The individual children within the group, according to all 
appearances and at least for a time, let go of the negative introjects that had 
contributed to their personal ontology. In so doing, they were able to construct new 
and positive ones through the play. As a Rogerian, I understood that they were 
becoming authentic and self-actualized. The theatrical play accomplished what I 
couldn’t do as a therapist, and in a more direct and short-term manner.  
 
Rogers understood that cultivating the attitude of openness means that we have 
potential choices to make regarding our self-understanding and development. The 
activity of choice making is understood to build the internalization of positive 
introjects within the self. Having an open condition for play that provides an 
opportunity to make free choices is understood as a pre-cursor to being well-
differentiated. These kids evidenced that by having a creative, open space, one 
where they could operationalize freedom of choice, they could become 
differentiated while still being connected to the group. From this experience, it is a 
small step towards building conscientiousness, or in universalist terms, a 
conscience, or empathic attunement towards one’s self and one’s other. 
 
The kids, City Creek, spontaneity, costumes and immersion 
For Rogers, perceiving the other’s subjective reality can occur if one is attitudinally 
sensitive enough. Rogers (1995a: 126-28) understood that the attitudes of 
authenticity, empathic attunement and unconditional positive regard are ‘forces’ of 
consciousness’, which guide the therapist forward in a deeply sensitive manner so 
that the other can be understood at their subjective level. Rogers stated that it is 
 
 the counselor’s function to assume, in so far as he is able, the internal 
 frame of reference of the client, to perceive his world as the client sees it, 
 to perceive the client himself as he is seen by himself, to lay aside all 
 perceptions from the external frame of reference while doing so, and to 
 communicate something of this empathic understanding to the client.  
                       (29) 
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As one author characterized Rogerian therapy: ‘[t]o expose oneself to the 
presence of the Other means to be open to being touched existentially by another 
person’s reality.’ (Schmid in Wyatt and Sanders 2001: 199) For the Rogerian, what 
is expected of me as a practitioner in the building of my consciousness is expected 
of the client. The existential concerns for me are the concerns of the client.  
 
The following example concerns working with a group of children and adolescents 
in need of experiencing themselves as empathically attuned to their others within 
an ensemble arrangement, spontaneously responsive, and as existing within the 
moment offered by an experiential field. For the Rogerian, understanding the other 
in an empathic manner does not always concern conceptualization and theorizing. 
It concerns feeling and sensory-based experience. In other words, to understand 
my other’s subjective and existential reality, I have to sense-experience, or feel, 
my way towards ‘getting’ my client. The question in the following example was: 
How does the counsellor facilitate sensory-based understanding between the 
persons of the group? 
 
Blumenthal (1984: 83) relates that experiential exercises, such as the Sound and 
Movement exercise, were done by Chaikin and the ensemble so that the actor 
could ‘locat[e] powerful feelings through movement and breathing’. The feelings 
located would have been attached to a past emotional experience. When using 
exercises relatable to the Sound and Movement exercise with my kids, strong 
emotionality was something I was trying to avoid. I worked to nudge my kids into a 
psychological space where they could sense the other and begin to trust and 
empathically adjust to them. Many of my kids had a hard time reading social cues 
that were not blatantly obvious or strongly affect laden. They also had a difficult 
time trusting the environment and those within it. 
 
Rogers (1995a: 28) made a distinction between ‘a declarative and an empathic 
attitude on the part of the counselor’. He basically aligned a declarative statement 
with one that concerns information gathering, interrogation, clinical clarification and 
maintaining distance. Rogers (ibid) stated that ‘when the counselor statement is 
declarative, it becomes an evaluation, a judgment made by the counselor’. The 
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empathic response, contrastingly, is one that picks up on the client’s feeling, 
mood, sensory experience, and subjective understanding.  
 
Many of the kids that I engaged with while doing agency work were resistant to 
doing therapy. They were tuned out, lacked spontaneity in their everyday activity, 
and their connection with others appeared hollow, hyper-vigilant, or reserved much 
of the time. These were qualities that suggested that they couldn’t trust. For 
Rogerians to be of value to their client, they have to be able to build trust. The 
question becomes, what does one do to get the clients sensorily activated within 
the moment, spontaneously alive, and in tune with their environment- and other 
conditions understood to build or exhibit trust? Again, I returned to theatre play to 
manage the problem.  
 
As an actor-in-training, I did classical ballet, Graham, modern and expressionistic 
forms of dance. I learned that if I wanted to disinhibit myself as an actor, I could 
just turn on the music and get moving. If I wanted to get in touch with a mood, I 
would do the same. As an actor, I also knew that there was nothing like a costume 
to make one act and feel differently about oneself or one’s other. 
 
I put together a bunch of material, glitter, feathers, paint, buttons, glue, and belts   
– anything that I could find – and put the kids in a room and told them to make a 
costume. They weren’t given instructions on what to do or how to do it. There was 
no right way. Over the week, I arranged for some musicians, who moonlighted at 
the agency as PSR workers, to play for the kids. Then I booked the agency van to 
transport the kids. Within a few days, the costumed kids, the musicians and I were 
in the van heading for City Creek, an area within the city limits of Pocatello, Idaho. 
It has trails beside a creek where people hike, run with their kids and dogs, and 
mountain bike. The three musicians set up a couple of drums and a keyboard, and 
began playing. The only instruction the kids were given was to stay on the trail, not 
to throw anyone into the creek, and not to go past a certain point on the mountain. 
At first the kids looked awkward and just stood around, then one girl took off 
running. Some of the kids began to follow her. One child simply climbed a tree and 
hung upside down. Some formed their own groups and began to run. The groups 
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ran in different directions rhythmically and in tune between the groups. They all 
caught up with each other for a while and ran together – then, broke off in new 
groups.  As the music changed, so did the rhythm of the groups. The kids 
appeared empathically attuned, spontaneous, and in the moment. Importantly, 
they appeared to like themselves and their others. 
 
In the end, the child in the tree got down and pulled a short tantrum. He wanted 
none of it. He had serious abuse issues and always hung out on the periphery of 
group activities. However, he had managed to make a costume.  
 
The Pocatello Women’s Correctional Facility: empathic understanding and 
respect as the terms and conditions for play 
The term, ‘congruence’, which, as stated, was the precursor to the later used term 
‘authenticity‘ was first used by Rogers in his 1951 statement: ‘We may say that 
freedom from inner tension, or psychological adjustment, exists when the concept 
of self is at least roughly congruent with all the experiences of the organism.’ 
(Rogers 1951: 513)  ‘In short, when a person is functioning fully, any internal 
organismic experience will be fully received in conscious awareness without 
distortion (5)’.  
 
Gill Wyatt, a therapist/researcher, characterizes the concept of authenticity as 
often ignored by client-centred researchers and theorists until the late 1990s: ‘It 
wasn’t until 1997 that person-centred theoreticians brought their attention to this 
often neglected and misunderstood concept.’ (in Wyatt, ed. 2001: vii) This point is 
difficult to imagine for a client-centred therapist of my kind, since having 
congruence, which is the ‘experiencing of a present moment’ that is ‘present in my 
awareness’ so that ‘what is present in my awareness is present in my 
communication’ (Rogers 1995a: 15) is characteristic of having ‘psychological 
health.’ (Haugh in Wyatt ed. 2001: 1)  
 




It has been found that personal change is facilitated when the 
psychotherapist is what he is, when in the relationship with his client he is 
genuine and without ‘front’ or facade, openly being the feelings and 
attitudes that at that moment are flowing in him.  
(Rogers 1995b: 61)  
 
 
If it is true that to have psychological health one needs to experience congruence, 
the Rogerian practitioner needs to create circumstances where the client can feel 
and act congruently. What this boils down to is the understanding that from the 
existential now of experiencing, introjects such as choice-making, authentic 
behaviour, empathic attunement, trust and respect are built. And, in keeping with 
an earlier claim, when such value-laden introjects are internalized, a citizen is built, 
and a sense of well-being for a person raised within a culture shaped by 
democratic political ideology can occur. Such an experience is likely to reinforce 
the repeated expression of the introject and the trying on of new ones. 
 
Such a creation can be a huge challenge when working within prisons. I found this 
the case when working as an agent for Idaho State University in its Center for New 
Directions within the Applied Tech. The centre was mainly staffed by Rogerian 
therapists and so as therapists we could create a self-reinforcing system. We 
could also forget there was another world outside the centre.  
 
Arriving at the door of the prison, I quickly found that my idea of best practice did 
not fit with some of the policies and procedures marked out within its system. It 
was a bit of a shock. I had been set up to think that this particular institution was 
Rogerian friendly. The set up came about by encountering women inmates who 
were allowed to attend a skills class that another therapist and I taught. The class 
was about online applications and job interviews. Part of my job at the centre was 
teaching communication skill acquisition and doing academic counselling. 
 
Rogers (1995a: 334) stated that by using congruence within therapy, and once the 
client had internalized this behaviour: ‘[v]ery perceptively, persons [begin] to seek 
within for what they were experiencing as valuable instead of looking for what they 
were told was valuable. Without question, they [begin] to meet first the good life 
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within themselves, and not in some outer dogma or dictum, or in some material 
form.’ My experience teaching the women inmates the skills acquisition class, as I 
understood it, expressed Rogers’s view. 
 
 Perhaps the most basic of these essential attitudes is realness, or 
 genuineness. When the facilitator is a real person, being what he or she 
 is, entering into relationships with the learners without presenting a front 
 or a facade, the facilitator is much more likely to be effective. This means 
 that the feelings that the facilitator is experiencing are available to his or 
 her awareness, that he or she is able to live these feelings, to be them, 
 and able to communicate them if appropriate. It means that the facilitator 
 comes into a direct, personal encounter with the learners, meeting  each 
 of them on a person-to-person basis. It means that the facilitator is being, 
 not denying himself or herself. The facilitator is present[.] 
                                                (271) 
 
Each woman enrolled within the class was due to be released soon. The view of 
the prison was that the women needed to learn job skills that would make them 
productive members of society, in order to not be recidivist. The class would give 
them the tools to become socially competent, in other words. 
 
I walked into the classroom not knowing what to expect; maybe women in chains 
dressed in baggy outfits? – like something I had seen in movies? I found nicely 
dressed women, not one of them dragging a ball and chain. No guards were 
present. I immediately began to react to their presentation. They were good 
listeners, they asked questions relevant to the course, and they all seemed very 
happy to have exposure to on-line job applications.  
 
After a couple of hours it was time for a break. One of the women told me that they 
were allowed to go outside and smoke during break time. I said fine. Why not? 
They were here without guards. Why shouldn’t they go outside? It seemed like a 
reasonable request. Some of the women didn’t have cigarettes with them, so I got 
some for them. I asked them to be back in fifteen minutes. They left to go outside 
of the building and smoke, however, they didn’t return on time. I had a lot of 
material to present so I went outside to fetch them. Plus, I had the uneasy feeling 
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that they may have skipped out on me. There they stood, smoking away. I was 
really relieved. 
 
Once back in the classroom, I said something like, ‘Guess you had a few, um?’ 
They laughed, and that was that. I started to lecture about communication skills, 
and the woman who had asked permission to go outside and smoke raised her 
hand. She stated, ‘We were not supposed to leave the building. I lied. And, you 
are so nice to us.’ I replied, smiling, ‘I guess you won’t do that again.’ We all 
laughed. The dishonesty had not been congruent with how I had treated them and 
so they felt dissonance. It was within them to act towards me in a respectful 
manner. It was within them, through positive encounters with someone who 
showed them respect by taking in the circumstances with a bit of humour, to begin 
to build the positive introject of being upfront. It was within me to rid myself of the 
introjects gleaned through my cultural understandings, a stereotypical view of 
women inmates as impervious to warm caring.  
 
Encountering the women in the step-down unit of the prison 
Rogers’s skill set (conduct set) was quite minimal. The scenarios presented 
evidence this. The lack of a huge skill set makes his therapy appear deceptively 
simple and the techniques, on the page, appear easy to learn. The behaviours that 
express them are associated with ones that suggest quotidian intimacy between 
persons who are close. Rogers understood elaborate or over-applied skill sets as 
overkill and detrimental to relationship building. The understanding came from his 
exposure to psychodynamic forms of therapy and behaviouristic ones. He also 
understood that, used as techniques rather than as the result of having well 
integrated or internalized attitudes, his form of quotidian intimacy would backfire. 
As he stated, ‘the counselor who is effective in client-centred therapy holds a 
coherent and developing set of attitudes deeply imbedded in his personal 
organization.’ Therapy for the Rogerian is not therapy.  As Rogers (Rogers in 
Kirschenbaum 2009: 156) further stated, ‘the counselor who tries to use “methods” 
is doomed to be unsuccessful unless this method is genuinely in line with his own 
attitudes.’ In other words, the methods used, and how they are used, exposes the 
therapist for who they are as a self – as either honest, caring and respectful, or as 
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technological, removed or distant, and manipulative. Importantly, the client will pick 
up on both types.   
 
When I found my self at the prison sometime after the cigarette incident, I was 
sent to work at the step-down unit. This unit housed women who were due to be 
released, and needed to be in an environment where they could transition to the 
outside world. Some of the women were allowed to take jobs in town, allowing 
them to be unsupervised by prison staff. The women’s freedom was incrementally 
gained as they demonstrated readiness to return ‘to society.’  
 
The prison wanted to return the women ‘to society’. It is rather difficult to have an 
intimate and productive relationship with ‘society’. These women needed to 
experience a more personal relationship than what ‘a society’ could offer, as I 
understood it. Within the prison system, they were not allowed to use first names, 
they had few belongings, and their time and activities were regimented and 
imposed by authorities. According to my understanding, these women needed 
gradual exposure to more personalized relationships. These women hadn’t landed 
in prison because they had turned away from society. They may have engaged in 
criminal activity, but their incarceration was due to their life having been void of 
personal relationships that built positive introjects from which to construct a self. 
Many of these women had mental health diagnoses that were equal to the child 
and adolescent population mentioned above. Many were cutters, most had a 
history of abuse or neglect – all symptoms or indications that the individual 
engaged in criminal activity because an adequate exposure to warmth and caring 
was missing. My dilemma was: how do I, without doing personal therapy, engage 
my new group in a personal manner, without putting them at risk of going against 
prison policy and procedure? The policy and procedures were basically meant to 
do away with personal identity.  
 
Rogers’s therapy is meant to build a climate of trust (Rogers 1995a: 225): a 
condition that hinged upon his trinity of attitudes (43) being implemented within 
therapy so that intimacy could be built. What I planned to do with my group at the 
prison, which my training as an actor had taught me, was build an environment of 
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trust through play so that the group could feel some sort of cohesion. I had no idea 
how to manage any of my Rogerian insights or aspirations when I walked onto the 
unit. I had no idea what the play was going to look like. The actor in me said, ‘just 
wing it’. 
 
Ontologically speaking, within the core of our being when at our best, 
characteristically we are authentic, empathically attuned and responsive to each 
other, and hugely and sensitively respectful. We can be understood as 
characteristically and intimately inter-connected with our other or others when at 
our best, since Rogers’s three attitudes are meant to forge relationships. 
 
Before I had agreed to do the workshops at the prison, I had set some limits. The 
room where the group projects were carried out had to be free of prison personnel, 
and the women had to sign a paper stating they would maintain the confidentiality 
of the group work. They could not disclose what their fellow inmates revealed 
within the group. This is normal protocol for therapists, and mandated by the ACA. 
 
The prison culture understands that it robs the inmate of their personal identity. It 
also understands that the inmate population, in general, is starved for warm and 
affectionate bonds. I understood this when going to the prison. I also was wary 
that my group work should not unleash physical and emotional yearnings that 
could get some of the women in trouble. I had to keep them safe. Physical contact 
was forbidden in the prison. Women on the step-down unit could find themselves 
back in the main prison if they engaged in physical contact. 
 
I walked into a large room to meet the women. I had them do some centreing 
exercises, and then had them push a few tables together to make one big round 
table. As I viewed it, the table would build a personal yet connected space where 
each woman sat, and maintain enough distance so that there was very little 
chance for physical contact. I had everyone introduce herself. They all used their 
last names as was customary in the prison. Then I had them think of a character 
out of a book, film, TV program or play that they could take on in a role-play. It 
couldn’t be a last name. The role and name had to be one they identified 
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personally with, or would like to identify with. I had them reintroduce themselves as 
the character and then had them disclose why they chose that character. From 
that point on, while doing group, they were to be called by their character’s name, 
and they had to think of the attributes of the character as their own. By this time I 
had drawn the group in. I could feel it. 
 
Then, I mentioned boundaries. Immediately I lost them. They remained polite and 
attentive in a detached way. However, I knew I had lost them. I had them all write 
out a rule for conduct and communication on a piece of paper. Then I took a paper 
lunch bag out of my backpack and the women put the pieces of paper in it. They 
did as requested, but their behaviour revealed a lack of congruence – they were 
looking at each other sideways. They just were not into it at all. I was another 
‘therapist’ working from the high ground of psychological authority. The room felt a 
bit tense. As an actor I knew I had to relieve the tension with a bit of humour or I 
would not get them back. I took the bag and blew a bunch of air into it, twisted the 
opening tightly, put the bag on the floor, and jumped on it. It made a popping 
sound. Then I said: ‘maybe we should dispense with rules and simply be 
respectful of one another’. Everyone laughed. I had them back, and this was 
because I was able to work spontaneously and react within the moment due to my 
training as an actor.  
 
My opening act, so to speak, was one instance of success with the group. 
However, I had many defeats. Some of the women could not tolerate the 
opportunity to take on another identity. In the group, many had been over-
institutionalised throughout their lives. As a Rogerian, I was very shocked that not 
everybody responded well to warmth and caring. I was also shocked that a lack of 
warm responsiveness is looked upon as the status quo within a prison 
environment. Many women in prison are diagnosed with borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) with antisocial features. The diagnosis is associated with persons 
who cannot tolerate warmth or caring for protracted periods, if at all – even though, 
they also crave connection. (See Linehan 1993: 5-20) Having strong, antisocial 
features, the women understand the traits of warmth and caring as personal 
weakness. They will bully or take advantage of those persons they see as weak 
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with a sadistic intent to hurt. They are understood sometimes as predatory. Many 
of these women had suffered severe emotional, physical, and sexual abuse at a 
very young age. 
 
My understanding of such types is that selves incorporate the features of 
paradigms or institutions through exposure – in the case of the over-
institutionalised personalities cited above, they become their pathology when 
repeatedly exposed to systems that repeatedly diagnose them with similar 
pathologies. I need to add that I had worked with BPDs outside the prison system. 
They responded well to Rogerian therapy in conjunction with a more social 
constructionist approach. However, from the initial contact, you had to be totally 
honest and set strong boundaries. Importantly, it took a long time for them to trust 
me. I worked with some of these clients for over a year and a half.  
 
The social constructionist approach modulated their ‘getting into’ their feelings. It 
has been my experience that if overwhelmed by affect, such clients can be 
propelled into self-harm. The constructionist approach set some external goals to 
help structure these client’s lives. It is commonly understood that such clients 
usually live enveloped in a sense of chaos, which means that their life situation 
and personality are not well-structured. When experiencing a sense of chaos they 
can cut or self-harm. I always keep this description in mind when working with 
these clients. However, it represents a break with Rogerian therapy. 
 
The Latina women: improvisation, role reversal, the non-expert, risk-taking, 
and building a positive introject 
Within my rural community there are poor individuals who because of their social 
situation are not given their rights in full measure. What I am referring to is a class 
system based on economic advantage. As one’s economic status is procured and 
maintained, so is the distribution of rights, such as the right to choose. To be 
treated as of worth and dignity and as a member of a greater humanity, which 
envisioned as a theoretical or real structure, requires a commitment to an ethics 
that is principled. As principled, it speaks of human rights, such as the right to be 
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self-determining and self-directional within a relational context that works for the 
betterment of all because it concerns humanity.  
 
The more I worked as a therapist doing agency work, the more I realized that 
rights are attached unfairly to economic structure. It ate at me. Nowhere was this 
more evident than when working with women who were poor and abused, 
especially if the woman was Latina and without a green card; these women who 
do our dirty work, the work that most Americans will not do, are an exploited class 
within the USA. They are what are termed ‘illegals’. And they are looked upon as 
having actively given up their rights when taking on the status of illegal. Most come 
from Mexico, especially from the borderlands, where American industrial firms set 
up maquiladoras during the 1960s through 1980s. These were manufacturing 
complexes that built a society of exploited workers whose income was better than 
Mexico’s general populations of under-privileged and poor, but whose wages were 
not enough to raise them out of poverty. Especially exploited were women, whose 
children were left to roam the streets while their mothers worked long hours. Many 
Latinas come from El Salvador, a country that is without the rule of law. Its cities 
and towns are overrun by gangs, and the country is part of the drug route from 
Columbia to the North. Whether Mexican, Honduran or El Salvadoran, Latina 
women, rather than being looked upon as economic and political refugees, are 
looked upon as the equivalent of twenty-first-century serfs. Because they have 
‘chosen’ to enter the country illegally, they are thought to get what they deserve: 
exploitation and a loss of rights. They are also looked upon as here to get a free 
handout. 
 
I encountered a group of six or seven Latina women when working at a shelter for 
abused women. I had taken over from a social worker that had worked with them 
and had given them all a diagnosis of depression. Some of the women did exhibit 
depressive symptoms, but they were not suggestive of an organic disease, but 
rather, their situation. They all exhibited a great capacity for joy, the ability to build 
connections, for learning, and for providing emotional support to one another. 
However, the social worker had made it a condition for services that each woman 
takes antidepressants. As an RN and mental-health therapist, I knew these 
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women did not need medication because they did not exhibit the symptoms 
associated with moderate to severe depression. I also knew that the social worker 
was stepping out of her professional bounds by offering to withdraw services. The 
grant that covered the agency program did not mandate taking medication by the 
recipients. All the women’s narratives within therapy exhibited themes of hope. 
Also, they were able to take care of their children, sleep well, establish a daily 
routine, keep up their physical appearance, and eat. They were not moderately to 
severely depressed.  
 
The social worker had pressured the women to leave their husbands. But all of the 
women were devout Roman Catholics, and they were simply not going to do that. 
In each one of their charts, created by the social worker, were notes that said they 
could not build insight into their problems. Their narratives in therapy and group, 
however, revealed they had solid insight into their problems. They had no financial 
security, and therefore, no political power in their relationships with their significant 
others or society in general. The women also understood that, if they had some 
modicum of financial independence, their lives and those of their whole family 
would improve. Each one of them wanted a job. Each one refused to take public 
assistance other than the shelter and counselling services offered by the agency. 
All of the women had issues that had to do with economic and cultural 
empowerment. So my question was, how could I facilitate the women getting their 
needs met and through their own actions?  One of their biggest obstacles was that 
they couldn’t speak English.  
 
I had to use a translator when working with the women since my Spanish 
language skills are rather poor. It was that fact that cinched how to work with them. 
I have travelled broadly, and I am very shy when trying out languages that are 
foreign to me. Reverse role-play was the answer – role-play through improvisation. 
I devised a group where we built a narrative of an American woman who couldn’t 
speak Spanish and was lost in a Mexican town. She needed food and shelter, and 
her luggage had been lost. She was left with little money and no ability to contact 
family for help. Some of the women of the town decided to help her. I took on the 
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role of the lost woman, and the group, the women of the town. A rule of the 
devising was that no English could be spoken.  
 
The Latina women had the same sensitivity concerning new language acquisition 
that I did. They were embarrassed about feeling or looking stupid. They were 
fearful of people getting annoyed or impatient with them because they couldn’t 
speak the language when attempting to get their needs met. Within the role-play, 
they saw the expert therapist look less than expert. It put me in the same boat with 
them, and it normalized their struggle. Importantly, the role-play was fun; we 
laughed till we hurt – a lot. Together we felt frustration because of the limitations of 
not being able to use even pigeon English to give and get directives. We came to 
impasses, and sometimes I even managed to remember some Spanish. Through 
the play, some negative introjects were frustrated. The ground was set to build a 
sense of social, cultural, and personal empowerment. To build empowerment 
offered choices for these women that they did not presently have. 
 
Once a person is able to free themselves from the negative introjects and 
operationalize free choice, Rogers (1995a: 127) writes, ‘[s]uch a person is more 
potentially aware, not only of the stimuli from outside, but of ideas and dreams, 
and of the on-going flow of feelings, emotions, and physiological reactions that he 
or she senses from within’. For Rogers, freedom of choice builds awareness of the 
self and one’s world, and sets the stage to be authentically responsive to making 
our lives and world a better place.  
 
As a Rogerian, I understood that these women, through being empowered, could 
feel themselves as more authentic. Rogers’s conceptualization of the term, 
authenticity, reveals two aspects: as the attitude grows, it not only means being in 
touch with who you are ontologically when at your best, it also means that a 
heightened awareness is needed to get in touch. It means that the locus of correct 
conduct is within each individual – similar to Kant, but, for Kant, through our will 
and reason (in Abbot, trans. 1987: 17-19). That locus is a means of internal 
organization that monitors for ethical behaviours, which means there can be self-
judgement and self-evaluation. For the Rogerian, when a cultural or social 
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situation does not match up with who you see yourself to be, you feel dissonance. 
For the Latina women, the dissonance was the cue to risk-take by exploring issues 
of empowerment and disempowerment. The dissonance created an internal 
dynamic necessary to expand one’s concept of one’s self.  
 
After I left the agency, I met four of these women a couple of years later. They 
were walking in the local shopping mall. After hugs and squeals, we caught up on 
each other’s lives. All the women were working legally at a hotel, cleaning rooms. 
Two had a driver’s license. All had taken the English-as-a-second-language 
course (EASL) offered at a local facility through Idaho State University. All were 
still married and reported no physical abuse, except one. She was separated from 
her husband. 
 
The Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA), devising scenarios, competency, and 
positive introjections 
As an RN, I did adjunct teaching in a program offered jointly between Idaho State 
University and Idaho Job Service. My job was to teach pre-nursing program 
students and staff that worked in residential care facilities or nursing homes. The 
goal was to get the students and staff state certified; the certification was 
associated with a high standard of care. Having completed the course and passed 
the state exam, the students would be Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs). They 
would qualify for better pay doing the same work they had done prior to becoming 
certified. The pre-nursing students would also qualify for entrance into Idaho State 
University’s nursing program.  
 
The joint venture was to help Idaho’s working poor obtain a better wage. The 
hourly wage in Idaho is one of the lowest in the country. It is not sufficient to 
support a family, even if there are two parents within the family working full time. 
Rural eastern Idaho is mostly Christian. There are huge Catholic, Mormon, and 
other religious groups resident in the area, ones that encourage having large 
families. Thus, family income is a huge concern for the area I live in. Many people 
working as CNAs are the working poor of my community. They see the CNA as 
vital to their economic survival. Idaho has the distinction of being the state with the 
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most heads of households holding two jobs in order to survive. Most nursing 
assistants and career CNAs are single women with children to support. In eastern 
Idaho, if you are the working poor you are statistically most likely to have not 
finished high school. You are most likely not to go to a trade school, professional 
school, or university. All that means that you are likely to be stuck in jobs that have 
high burnout rates associated with depression, and that you are at risk of finding 
yourself on public assistance, along with your children. You then fall into a class 
whose rights are reduced. 
 
I taught these classes twice. The program had a difficult time keeping committed 
staff because the class load was three days a week for eight hours a day. That 
meant that the instructor had to prep classes, devise training scenarios, devise 
and conduct written and skill-based tests, and manage site-specific intern level 
training. Adjuncts in this program typically received $2,500.00 for eleven weeks of 
work. The student load was high for a nursing class that is lecture and skills 
acquisition heavy: eighteen to twenty-two students. This was problematic. The 
state was willing to fund these programs, but only minimally. Finding qualified staff 
was very difficult for the program director. Because she usually ran short of staff, 
the director had to lean on the staff that she had. 
 
Further, most of the students had problems building the study skills necessary to 
complete the course. The failure rate was high. Remedial skills, such as reading or 
test taking, were just not developed in many of the students. So, how does an 
instructor deal with the problems built into the program?  
 
I broke the class into sections divided between lecture and skills-training time by 
using acting improv. I tested after each improv. I also made use of higher 
functioning students on the university track, and there was a buddy system put in 
place so that the most skilled and knowledgeable students could help the ones 
that lagged behind. We did warm-up and relaxation exercises to handle the 
anxiety that comes with theoretical and skills-based learning. I turned the class 




 As an ensemble, we would build a narrative that concerned a patient in an acute 
setting with compound physical symptoms. There was always a hugely concerned 
family member to consider and adjust into the care measures. We built sequenced 
measures that targeted the psychological, interpersonal, and nursing needs of the 
patient and their family. As the student carried out the measures within the improv 
during the first few rehearsals, they would say them out loud in a tightly sequenced 
way. They learned their lines and ‘business’ on their feet and through repetition, 
just as I had done as an actor. Then we would take the improv to the next level, 
and make the narrative an emergency life-and-death situation. My rationale was 
that the students would learn to incorporate their anxiety into their learning of the 
script and skills. I had to as an actor. 
 
My students all passed their certification exam – the first for the program. As a 
Rogerian, I understood that because most of my clients were given less than 
favourable circumstances to build positive introjects as students – ones that 
allowed them to vision themselves as competent and able to overcome 
unfavourable life circumstances – they needed the opportunity to stage 
themselves in a hopeful manner. By acting out competency and strength of 
character, they were able to incorporate the experience into who they saw 
themselves to be, at least for a short time period. 
 
Playing soccer: switching roles with anxious and disempowered kids, and 
getting in touch with feelings 
Rogers understood that self-understanding for the therapist was important within 
the therapeutic relationship. He stated that there needed to be an awareness of 
one’s own emotionality and personal deficits so that the therapist could manage 
some degree of objective understanding of the client (Haugh in Wyatt 2001: 2). In 
other words, negative introjection and projection were at stake within his kind of 
therapy, and he wanted to avoid both. Rogers understood that introjection and 





In building my applied theatre practice, I used role reversal, as evidenced in the 
example of working with the Latina women. With the Latina women, the technique 
was used because they understood that their identity as Mexican women had 
been marginalized by a mental health system that did not respect their cultural 
values. They suffered because of negative societal projections aimed at them 
because they were Hispanic and illegal.   
 
However, the technique was also useful in working with adolescents and children, 
not specifically as a measure meant to restore a sense of empowerment against 
institutionalised care, but as a means to facilitate the internalization of positive 
introjects that countered a self-image associated with fragmented and 
dysfunctional home lives. Many of the young came from personal backgrounds 
where they had been abused or neglected. Some had lived in a series of foster 
situations. All harboured the potential of becoming over-institutionalised, meaning 
that they were at risk of becoming resistant to therapeutic measures meant to 
counter their negative self-image.  
 
There was a common problem that I observed within institutional care systems. 
The clients within them over time were worked on repeatedly by therapy. Usually, 
it was the brand associated with the medical model, which reduces the client to a 
series of pathologic features. Over time, these pathologic features can be looked 
upon by the client as who they are.  
 
As I claim, human selves incorporate the features of diagnostic paradigms through 
exposure. They also incorporate the sense that they are pathological if the 
paradigms concern mental health. If this occurs, and there is little positive 
structuring of the self by positive introjects, the client might well become the 
pathology. They will act accordingly. Many of the kids that I worked with were 
diagnosed as attachment, explosive, and impulse-control disordered. Their 
behaviour and attitudes manifested the disorder. Granted, their personal history 




The care system, in effect, projects a diagnosis associated with pathology upon 
the person of the client through its diagnostic measures. The client then 
internalizes the projections. Being worked upon therapeutically, across time and 
different institutions, reinforces this understanding so that it becomes entrenched 
in how the client understands his or herself to be. As a therapist, I needed to 
counter this dynamic, but not through more of the same therapy. The kids needed 
play, and not play therapy. They needed to build positive introjects that countered 
their self-perception as damaged or sick. They needed to do it through the 
freedom of being self-directional and self-actualizing. They needed to be creative 
rather than moulded.  
 
As a former actor, I visualized theatre training as a means to manage this. I set out 
to incorporate within my practice creative play as theatre training. In my 
understanding, these kids were no longer clients; they were actors learning to free 
themselves up, self-express, and become part of an ensemble, or rather, a valued 
part within a whole. I had no understanding that there was a discipline called 
applied-theatre practice available to my kids and me. I was simply going to do 
‘theatre’ by incorporating how I was taught as an actor into my practice, years 
before I became a Rogerian therapist or an RN.   
  
Rogers understood that his three attitudes built a psychological context or climate. 
Through relationship building, the client could internalize positive introjects. A good 
many of the boys that I worked with had impulse-control problems. However, what 
I noticed, was that when they first arrived at the agency where I contracted in, they 
tended to be worriers but not violent. After months and months of being worked on 
therapeutically throughout the daily after-school routine, they became more and 
more aggressive rather than anxious and worried.  
 
What I also observed was that, when I singled out a boy and took him out to play 
one-on-one soccer, he was able to cool down. The physical exercise on its own 
did not produce the results. I insisted that he switch roles with me: he became the 
coach and I the player. Much of the time, the one singled out became so 
immersed in their teaching role that they forgot themselves as pathologised. Their 
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behaviour became cooperative. They not only appeared to relish their role as 
coach, they appeared invested in me as their student; a bit of mentoring was 
evident. They seemed to be genuinely interested in me as a person.  
 
As Rogers understood, to be facilitative there needs to exist a relationship that is 
warm and caring. It is through warmth, caring, and the showing of a genuine 
interest in one’s other (Rogers 1995b: 74-75) that people grow in their humanity.  
What soccer play also brought out is that facilitation somehow needs to be put in 
the hands of the person usually facilitated. It is through this act that something is 
seeded which allows them to take on an empathic adjustment towards their other. 
Through the role reversal, I observed that there was a behavioural and attitudinal 
change with my clients. However, the change was fleeting since I was the only one 
using my methods within the agency. The therapeutic measures used by the other 
professionals were scientist-practitioner based: they were meant to be objective, 
specifically corrective, and distanced.   
 
The director of the agency was initially very enthusiastic towards my proposal to 
incorporate theatre into my work with the kids, and my work with the kids in this 
capacity was advertised. As I soon learned, my work was used as a hook to bring 
in clients. It was a novelty and it appealed as one – that is, until the director found 
out that the agency could not bill the State of Idaho’s Health and Welfare system 
for my services. The owner-director brought in more income through the work of 
PSR workers, who had very little training in human service work and were 
workshop trained by the agencies that employed them. In my particular rural area 
there was a lot of income generated off their backs. It was reported that the 
agency that I had contracted with was making a profit of $300,000.00 per year. I 
left. Within a year, the agency was closed down due to fraudulent billing, and the 
director of the agency was barred from running social programs.  
 
The point is, that although applied theatre practice can make a difference in 
people’s lives, it has no direct avenue into the institutions that can afford the 
services – not in my rural area, anyway. However, it is precisely because of the 
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lack of a strong, institutional presence that applied theatre actually works with 
populations that have been over-institutionalised.  
 
Moving on 
It has been proposed that my theatre training was a key factor in an attraction to 
humanistic forms of counselling practice, especially that of Carl Rogers. In the next 
chapter, I will explore some of the assumptions that I made regarding what 
behaviours or attitudes determine ethical practice. The assumptions were a direct 
result of my exposure to a theatre training that used experimental techniques 
attached to attitudes that implicitly ascribed value. The techniques and attitudes 
resonated with the ones associated with Rogerian practice. What will also be 
explored are particular examples from my training as an actor that led me, in 
conjunction with my humanistic or Rogerian practice, to build my brand of applied 
theatre practice.  There will be a link made with the examples provided here. The 
argument of Chapter Four will illustrate why I have jumped ship, and rather than 
practice as a dual practitioner between counselling and applied theatre, have 








Joseph Chaikin’s The Presence of the Actor  
and My Training as an Actor  
 
 Theories and systems on paper are seldom what they are when they are 
  an active process. Once on paper they get frozen by their most serious 
  adherents, become intractable, and are applied for all occasions.   
          (1972: 34) 
 
Locating myself within the research: Remembering a personal, historical 
space and the practice ethics built within it: Studio 68 of Theatre Arts and 
Joseph Chaikin’s, The Presence of the Actor 
 
The use of Joseph Chaikin’s only written book fulfills a function for the research: It 
is a tool or prompt by which to interrogate the performance and life values that I 
learned as a student-actor while at a drama school in the UK. In effect, it helps 
capture a personal, historical space where I began to forge a practice ethics that 
would eventually bridge across theatre into counselling practice. It even impacted 
how I experienced my ethical role as a Registered Nurse. It is certainly a core 
ground that has driven the understanding of my self as an applied-theatre 
practitioner. 
   
I initially called on The Presence of the Actor as part of my research because, 
intuitively, I felt there was a connection to be made between Rogers’s practice 
ethics and the ethics expressed in this particular written work. In some respects, it 
exemplifies the main principles of practice that helped shape Rogers’s humanistic 
counselling theory, and it may be the reason I was so attracted to Rogerian 
therapy as a therapist-in-training. A goal of this research is, upon interrogation, to 
understand critically what I initially received intuitively. This is in keeping with 
applied-theatre practitioner and researchers Saxton and Pendergast’s challenge: 
to know critically one’s own practice ethics.  
 
The drama school that I attended had an experimental nature to its training. The 
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training reflected a concern with making the student-actor a more holistic entity. 
The experimental part of the training concerned building a strongly relational 
atmosphere, or ensemble environment, where the actors were thought to work off 
each other as an interconnected whole within a common ground of performance. 
The value of interdependence was strongly fostered, however, without putting the 
actor at risk of totally compromising individual creative activity. Importantly, it was 
a small leap towards viewing interrelational ensemble work as ethical practice 
behaviour, or best practice.   
 
Contributing to my ethical perspective in such an environment, it became apparent 
that the ensemble work needed to enhance individual creativity. For the student-
actor, there was a reciprocal and dynamic relationship between independence and 
interrelational activity. The positive opposition makes sense for ‘selves’ 
constructed by internalizing principles of a democratic political philosophy. Two 
formulating principles of practice that arise from the positive opposition are: 1) we 
are at our best when we understand ourselves to be part of a collective humanity 
that promotes the general welfare and the good of all, and 2) we are at our best 
when being self-determining and self-actualizing. These sensitivities, or rather, 
principled understandings, were foundational to Rogers’s praxis. The experimental 
exercises articulated in Chaikin’s labs and reflected in his The Presence of the 
Actor exhibit the same sensitivity. As an example, the Sound and Movement 
exercise implements positive opposition by facilitating group cohesion and 
sensitivity while maintaining the integrity of the individual actor-self. 
 
The studio followed no formalized account of what experimental theatre should be. 
The thrust and impact of the experimental element was accommodated by inviting 
in individual teachers who were actors, writers and directors, and sensitive to the 
vision of the two men who built and ran the school. One director was an American, 
Robert Henderson, who had directed on Broadway and in the West End. Another 
was Peter Lindsey, who had contact with Grotowski and who was a former actor, 
and then a director. Each of the school directors claimed that, through the work at 
the studio, they hoped to frustrate the offerings of traditional theatre training, which 
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they felt cultivated a voice stacked upon a body. They wanted an integration of 
both physical components. They wanted an affective and psychological integration 
within the two physical elements. The rationale being that the actor could use her 
or his multiple capacities more synchronistically and symbiotically within group 
work as well as individual work. From this perspective, it is reasonable to 
understand the self of the actor as an integrated whole when at her or his best. 
Performance, lab experimentation or training should setup a climate where holism 
can be managed by not compromising the integration of the actor. Rogers viewed 
the human self (actor-self) as an integrated whole, as did Chaikin.  
 
Dance, expressive movement, creative imagery, sensitivity-building exercises and 
yoga were strong elements of the training. According to our dance instructor, Liz 
King, who danced with the Stuttgart and Royal Ballets, Bejart and The Place, this 
inclusive and eclectic approach had been evidenced in dance companies she had 
worked with. Importantly, such activities were meant to help bring about the 
integration of the actor-self when applied to theatre training. Through such 
integration, the self was understood as capable of being more open to possibility. 
To be a self requires an integration of physical, emotional, intellectual and spiritual 
capacities is an understanding evidenced in Rogers. It is also found in Chaikin’s 
understanding of the actor as an ideal gestalt that is totally responsive to whatever 
is within her or his field of experience. Both thinker-practitioners understood that to 
be integrated into a wholly functioning organism is what it takes to move towards 
possibility. Rogers captured this in his understanding of the ‘future person’ and in 
Chaikin’s authentic, functioning actor. 
 
If integrating the self into a holistically functioning, creative actor is an ambition of 
training, it is a small leap towards understanding expressiveness, creative 
imagery, and exotic or new forms of training the body, spirit and mind, as crucial 
elements for shaping the experimental actor. In the 1970s this tripartite pursuit by 
the actor was common.  
 
It readily follows that ethical practice conduct concerns continually frustrating old 
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forms and the attached values that accompany them. From this perspective, true 
ethical behaviour is the critical challenging of everything that evolves into the 
status quo. This is implied in Chaikin (1972: 135) when he states that practice for 
the actor concerns transformation – continuous transformation through exercises 
that access an ‘internal territory’. 
 
Further, out of such a rationale arises the positive valuing of the disinhibited actor, 
at least for this former drama student; one who can break from established 
societal and practice norms. A refrain heard across the studio was that ‘we needed 
to lose our inhibitions’. It was thought the way to do this was to constantly throw 
oneself into new experiences; especially those brought about by rare, 
spontaneously created, or untried techniques of practice. It is a small leap into 
valorizing what appears rare or under-represented, and spontaneously created 
within one’s playing. A refrain heard within many of our classes was ‘stay in the 
moment’. By staying in the moment something rare between actors was thought to 
be possible. Something rare in the individual’s playing was understood to occur.  
 
Variations analogous to the Sound and Movement exercise were freely used by 
the instructors within the studio. The exercise was a central feature in Chaikin’s 
labs at The Open Theatre. The actor-student was not allowed to rely on props or 
elaborate costumes when creating a performance, but instead, on communicative 
exercises that stretched one’s physical, affective, and imaginative resources. A 
common refrain was ‘You need to open yourself up and take a risk’ – stretch 
yourself’.  The expansion of personal resources needed to grow as an actor was 
thought to occur best by responding to one’s other within practice, as well as 
through spheres of being where the actors experienced themselves as 
interconnected as well as personally freed. 
 
The plea concerned expanding one’s experience beyond the narrow limits 
imposed by one’s past experiences. Meeting what was implored, ideals or 
principles of practice were formulated: those of ‘being open’, ‘being sensitive’ and 
participating in ‘transformative events’ that moved the actor to new possibilities of 
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performance.  As a student-actor, I learned to positively value the personal 
qualities of being open and sensitive to the events of the moment and my other.  
As I understood it, one way to manage what became principles of practice was to 
try to cultivate spontaneous behaviour when exploring within the studio 
environment. 
 
Through the received imploring, I learned that one needed to take risks in order to 
be transformative. The actor could not rely on old, comfortable, established 
stereotypes of playing characters; ones highly valued by commercial or long 
established theatrical forms. As a risk-taker, I valorized, or idealized, spontaneous 
responsiveness. This was because I assumed that spontaneous behaviour lacked 
the form of judgement that would keep me from risk-taking. Spontaneity became a 
strong principle of practice, as did risk-taking and the liberty of disinhibition. All 
these values became an essential aspect of the act of creating, whether as an 
individual or a member of the ensemble of students.   
 
In the studio, the student-actors were continuously in rehearsal or production. The 
training was complete and continuous immersion: six days a week, sometimes, for 
over two years. Many of the productions used seasoned professionals along with 
the students so that the student-actors could learn through exposure to their 
experience.  
 
The immersive environment of practice was not apparent only in the length of the 
training day or the workweek. Nor was it only evidenced by placing the student in 
productions requiring long rehearsal periods with professionals who modeled an 
immersive quality to practice. It was evidenced in the experimental acting 
exercises that required total concentration by the participants. Total concentration 
became synonymous with immersion, and the best way to practice.  
 
On a relational level, immersion meant that when in relationship with one’s other 
actor, one needed to attend to her or him to an unfaltering and open degree. One’s 
responses needed to be spontaneous and sensitive, as well as not pre-thought-out 
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or strongly contrived. If responses were contrived, the attendant actions were 
recognised as dishonest, or inauthentic (unless we were doing stylized forms of 
acting). 
 
The experimental element of training was supplemented with traditional voice and 
acting style classes. The Stanislavski method and Michael Chekhov’s actor 
training method were encouraged amongst others. Eclecticism prevailed! Over 
and over, the mantras urged that you needed to suit the methods to your personal 
and ensemble needs within the moment. The sentiment rang especially true with 
Valerie Colgan, who had worked with Beckett as an understudy for Billie Whitelaw. 
She also sometimes worked with the RSC, which under Peter Brooks in the early 
1960s had concentrated on ensemble building during rehearsals and workshops.  
 
Those traditional training methods were included in the training with more 
experimental practice. These setup an environment of theoretical inclusion. What 
followed was a positive valuing of dynamism by me as a student-actor. Dynamism, 
in effect, became a principle of practice, one that permeated the work done within 
the studio. I intuitively accepted that the traditional needed to provide a backdrop 
to the experimental. And I did not get the incongruence. 
 
Given such exposure, contrasts became important, leading me to value difference 
and oppositions. However, the inclusive nature of building positive oppositions, 
which enabled a resulting dynamism by which to understand practice, was 
something I simply took for granted. It may be the reason why, after the 
undertaking of this research, I can accept my own essentialism along with my 
newer, social constructionist proclivities when attempting to interrogate and 
construct what my brand of practice ethics amounts to. I accept the tensions built 
into the alignment of two disparate philosophies as a means for critical evaluation, 
rather than understand those tensions as an indicator that I should take an 
either/or positioning. 
 
It was within the atmosphere created by this dynamism and the principles or ideals 
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of practice that built the positive oppositions that I read Chaikin’s book. It 
resonated with me because of what was offered at Studio 68. Because I had 
nothing to compare it with, except American academic theatre, the training 
seemed biblical, as did Chaikin’s The Presence of the Actor. How the studio 
operated, bringing in a variety of outlooks, was just the way it was for me – and I 
assumed it was the same for every other student-actor and professional actor out 
there.  
 
However, such theoretical inclusion muddies the waters for critically establishing 
my personal practice ethics – it may build a dynamic that forces criticality, 
however, such inclusion is complicating. Within Chaikin’s work, as with Rogers, 
was a network of intersecting and sometimes oppositional philosophies. Mid-
twentieth-century America saw a convergence of philosophical inquiry into a non-
heterogeneous mix of thought: strong materialism, existentialism and 
phenomenology influenced the thinking of practitioner-theoreticians across 
disciplines. Pursuing criticality when interrogating one’s practice ethics is a layered 
task, and it necessarily removes one from simply interrogating one’s own ethical 
sensibilities. You have to look at your historical placement and the philosophical 
sensitivities that characterize it to more fully understand your personal practice 
ethics. I know I have just touched the tip of the iceberg through this research.  
 
Witnessing productions at the RSC, National or The Actor’s Company, I had no 
other vision available to think training should be anything but what it amounted to 
in the studio. I witnessed Timothy West dance more than half-naked in War Dance 
while seemingly immersed within the performance. He appeared to stretch himself 
in new directions throughout the performance. There was Jane Lapotaire in As 
You Like It, whose integrated and energized voice and body were spellbinding. Ian 
McKellen and Sarah Kesselman, in The Marquise Von Keith, encompassed all I 
hoped to become as an actor. Their discipline, sense of fun and energy, together 
was incredible to witness. The ballets of Kenneth McMillan offered the bodies of 
dancers challenging the rigidity of classical ballet, while somehow respecting the 
form. The staging for his ballets emphasized the dancers rather than bulky sets. 
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Seiji Ozawa flourished his conductor’s baton, a virtual extension of his arm that his 
body followed after. He appeared consumed by the music. There was Josephine 
Baker at the Palladium, evidencing mastery over the integration of voice and body! 
Little in the London theatre climate of this time pointed to any other alternative for 
training, at least for me. There was Danny La Rue dressed in drag, challenging 
gender divisions through humour. Everything fit together within my experience, 
suggesting that theatre training couldn’t be anything else than what was offered at 
the studio. For me, Chaikin’s book, first published in 1972, was an account of what 
was. The training at the studio contributed to making the work seem mainstream in 
the mid-1970s.  
 
Admittedly, I was a bit star-struck by the whole environment, and that is something 
I have not lost. My core self fits well with valorizing enthusiasms. 
Characteristically, I am idealistic and usually optimistic. And how I am made up 
psychologically as a self affects my criticality. I am aware of this and have become 
hyper-vigilant concerning it, hoping that my attention guards against over-
idealizing my owned principles of practice and the systems of thought and logic 
that support them.    
 
It was within this ethical terrain, built within a practice environment in a small 
studio in London, that I developed a strong understanding of what it was to be an 
ethical practitioner. The ethics gleaned, established within a personal historical 
space, apply across practices that I have been educated and engaged in: acting, 
directing, writing, nursing, and mental health counselling. As a practitioner in each 
individual field, I have been influenced by principles inherent within or underlying 
the actor-training methods associated with Chaikin’s brand of experimental 
theatre, and strongly exemplified within his book.  
 
This research concerns, not so much Chaikin’s account of what actors’ training or 
lab work should encompass, as much as it does my reacting to, and sustaining 
across time, some of the ethical elements evidenced in it; ones that strongly 
resonate with Rogers’s humanistic counselling philosophy. The inclination to 
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intuitively connect both is evident because of similar philosophical principles 
comprising each thinker’s practice theory – principles that infer positive valuing, 
and what is understood as good or best practice.  
 
A personal context  
My ethical sensibilities were gleaned from two disciplines, when experimental 
theatre (my brand garnered from training in the UK) met counselling practice, and 
were underscored by a background that preceded entering drama school. My first 
university experience was at Seattle University in the State of Washington. It was 
a somewhat conservative Jesuit institution. The conservatism mainly manifest in 
its curriculum. However, the social scene offered a lot of interaction between 
people with divergent views on what constituted true, ethical behaviour.  
 
The social environment provided an air of creative freedom from which to explore 
or interrogate the topic of ethics. As well, there existed an academic element that 
promoted freethinking, which challenged the curriculum meant to shape and make 
mainstream the interrogation and dialogue concerning the topic. In this particular 
educational arena – within a theoretical landscape constructed by both the 
elements that promoted creative free-thinking and the ones that followed more 
traditional, essentialist lines of enquiry within the classroom – a tension existed 
that created a very positive atmosphere and energy. There is no other way to 
explain it adequately, at least for me.  
 
The dynamism that contributed to that energy enabled the creation of academic 
stars within the institution. The classrooms of these star teachers became hotbeds 
for discussion and argument, not only for the students enrolled in the specific class 
but for non-enrolled students as well. Sometimes the walls of the classrooms could 
not contain everyone. I remember that I sometimes had to sit outside a classroom, 
out of view of the professor, listening along with others vying to be within hearing 
distance. It was the 1970s, and the year before, Seattle had sustained huge race 
riots. Seattle University had been a hotbed for student activists during the 
uprisings. Many of the faculty, modeling the Jesuit Berrigan brothers, both of 
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whom had been imprisoned for their activism, took to the streets. 
 
Though the Philosophy Department’s main approach for teaching philosophy was 
historical, it also promoted what can be termed classical ‘Western Catholic 
Thought’. However, some of the university’s star teachers taught Hindu, Buddhist 
and Taoist philosophies. A particular star was an ‘essentialist’ ethics professor, 
another was a Hassidic rabbi. Maybe it wasn’t intentional (Jesuits usually are 
intentional), but building diversity and dialectic was implicated as the true way in 
which to construct a moral ground, as was the ideal of openness to difference. 
Implicit in the classroom space was the understanding that the theoretical, 
because of the dynamics created by exposure to diversity and a pluralistic 
atmosphere, would eventually translate into identifying ethical actions that 
promoted a good for all.  
 
The divergent grouping frustrated the essentialist outlook that strongly framed 
much of the curriculum. Nevertheless, I was strongly attracted to Greek 
rationalism; an affinity that remains the case. I had been a closet atheist, on and 
off, for many of my high school years. The metaphysical construct of a holistically 
conceived Universe, driven by the ideals of Justice, Fraternity, Knowledge, 
Fairness, Liberty and Beauty, and captured in The Republic of Plato, was very 
appealing in place of a religion. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics absolutely sent 
me, not only because he mixed pedagogy and conduct becoming a citizen 
together in his theorizing, but also because he mixed an elegant use of terms 
providing movement along a continuum of behaviour that suggested positive 
development. Similar structuring of ethical philosophy can be ferreted out in 
Rogers’s terminal work. 
 
As an undergraduate, I shifted between majors. I was drawn to Literature, 
Comparative Religion and Drama. However, I was mostly attracted to the study of 
Philosophy. After a couple of years, though, I felt I had gotten trapped in my head, 
was isolative (counsellors in my area use this term to signify deliberate isolation), 
and experienced little joy in being. The enthusiasms of the classroom environment 
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seemed just that. I wanted purpose.  
 
I had found purpose as a drama student in high school. I had acted in school 
productions, drawn to plays associated with the avant-garde, especially ones that 
were beyond my understanding. Leonard Melfi comes to mind. Another student 
and I did Birdbath at a student assembly. I had no understanding of what the lines 
meant; they just sounded gritty and provoking.  
 
I had also been exposed to the theatre at the Ashland Rep, a major American 
theatrical venue known for the quality of their productions. The plays were starkly 
minimalist in their production values; the stage usually bare of props, and the 
actors’ movements supple and their voices connected to their bodies. A production 
of Jean Anouilh’s Antigone swept me away. The actors worked on levels with no 
props, and the costuming was comparatively spare – shades of grey and 
suggestive of another period than mine. The ensemble of actors stood out against 
a background of black and changing shadows. They were right on top of the 
audience, making sustained eye contact and pulling the audience in.  The 
concerns of the play became my concerns, as I became immersed in the action 
and language on stage, which questioned the idea of an all-pervading ‘Justice.’ 
 
As a university student disenchanted with the inert quality of life, while stuck inside 
my head, it began to dawn on me that philosophizing, on its own, did not 
necessarily translate into building a better world. It also dawned on me that the 
interactivity between theatre practitioners creating theatrical productions offered a 
space that operationalized principles of behaviour, and the philosophy that evolved 
around them, into practice. I began to look for a major that could meld philosophy 
with social justice and action. I had entered university originally as a Literature 
major with a minor in Drama. I returned to the Drama Department. However, not 
for long. 
 
Importantly, I quickly found that I lacked the strong skill set needed to become a 
theatre practitioner so that I might meld drama and philosophy into social activism. 
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Nothing less than what I witnessed at Ashland was going to do. Within the time it 
took to complete a term in academic theatre, I realized that I needed a 
concentrated academy training to become a viable actress, director and writer, 
with a social-activist agenda. I decided to get the skill set needed to be an actor. 
 
In the drama section of Seattle University’s library was a magazine called Plays 
and Players, with advertisements for different drama schools. Most were situated 
in London and a few in New York City. One in particular grabbed my notice: Studio 
68 of Theatre Arts, London. Within five months of seeing the advertisement, I 
arrived in London, contingently accepted to the school. By the second term, I was 
a full student with a scholarship.  
 
Situating Joseph Chaikin historically: The shapers that contributed to the 
context backgrounding the experimentation within Chaikin’s lab 
 
 The first requisite for an actor ... is to accept ... that what takes place in the  
 world is taking place within himself, and that the actor is connected with 
  whatever takes place in the world. 
                    (1972: 39) 
 
Blumenthal credits Chaikin’s development as a theatre actor and director to an 
overall environmental force that was starting to brew in New York City. A new 
climate was being forged out of alternative sites of theatre making. She states: 
‘Chaikin came to New York to break into theatre in 1955, just as the first rumblings 
of off-off-Broadway were getting started. He became one of the growing numbers 
of artists who, over the next several years, turned away from the established stage 
to experimental lofts and cafes’ (1984: 1).  
 
Blumenthal states that questioning everything concerned with theatre practice 
typified the emerging New York City theatre scene. She states that the new artist’s 
  
questioning reached into nearly every facet of performance: the relationship 
between theatre forms and observable reality; the connection between actor 
and character; the role of the audience; the responsibility of art to address 
social issues; and the economic structure of the industry itself.  
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          (1984: 1)  
 
The theatre scene was not only the shaper. Chaikin, through his work with The 
Living Theatre, became interested in theatre as a tool for social activism. This 
interest, in turn, shaped his lab work offered as part of The Open Theatre. As 
Hulton notes, The Open Theatre was pinned in social concerns relevant to its time. 
One of the over-arching social concerns was that of identity, both on the personal 
and broader cultural level. On both counts, living authentically rather than as an 
introjected identity, impregnated by the images sold to the American public by 
industry and marketing, became a huge issue. Exercises devised within Chaikin’s 
lab concerned image making as negative introjects. The perfect people exercise 
exemplifies this (Blumenthal 1984: 87-89). Also, as Blumenthal points out, 
reminiscent of Rogers, the exercises were an ‘exploration’ of feeling states 
‘incompatible with the actor’s internal ‘impulses’ (90-91).  
 
By the mid-1960s, when The Open Theatre had forged its identity within the 
theatre of the ‘avant-garde’, or rather, the experimental theatre of New York City, 
many Americans were striving for a redefinition of American identity. As a society, 
Americans saw on nightly television the core political and social values of 
democracy fractured by the atrocities of the war in Vietnam (in Hodge, 2000: 154). 
One only has to think of Mai Lai. Within Chakin’s tenure with The Open Theatre, 
the American public witnessed a president, the brother of the President, and 
Martin Luther King killed in cold blood, and in a graphic detail never seen before. 
 
The state of American Society 
 O’Neill describes in his popular chronicle, Coming Apart (1971), the immediate 
post war era: 
 
Who can do justice now of the 1950’s? For liberals and intellectuals it was a 
dull, sad time, the age of television [ ... ], track houses, garish automobiles, 
long skirts, and bad movies. [ ... ] When the sixties arrived with its theatrical 
fashions and events, the fifties seemed still worse. The 1960’s enjoyed the 
longest period of sustained economic growth in modern history, making the 
unemployment and Eisenhower recessions of the previous decade seem 
inexcusable. The politics of the fifties were equally as shoddy, being 
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dominated by five men – Truman, Taft, Eisenhower, Joseph McCarthy, and 
Adlai Stevenson [ ... ] At least half the period was preoccupied with a wholly 
false issue: the supposed menace of American communism. Foreign policy 
was hardly better. Secretary of  State John Dulles’ moralistic approach 
was laughable when not sinister. [ ... ] Materialism and conformity prevailed 
everywhere. [ ... ] Most people still expected economic growth alone to meet 
the country’s needs. [And] the arts – painting, architecture, the dance – 
flowered.  
            (3-4) 
 
Chaikin arrived in New York City into a ‘charged’ atmosphere of growth in the arts. 
The world of arts that he stepped into was driven by writers such as Tennessee 
Williams, William Inge and Lillian Hellman. The Actor’s Studio developed actors 
who could push realism to the extreme, giving a human face to social taboos 
representative within the characters devised by these playwrights. Martha Graham 
and George Balanchine flourished in the world of dance while re-visioning tired 
forms and breathing new life into old narratives. Music bled classical, jazz, and 
blues into a distinctly American form – all arts that were potentially commercially 
profitable, but cutting edge and that bucked or challenged social norms; 
sometimes in an hidden and sometimes in an explicit way. However, a strongly 
alternative theatre with roots in the progressive movement and the Roosevelt era 
now reacted against the moralistic political environment that had prevailed within 
the 1950s, and began to flourish. Alongside innovative theatre and the more 
progressive type that would eventually become newly radicalized as a form of 
protest and social activation, commercial art flourished on Broadway. 
 
The 1960s replaced the 1950s. However, the suspicion and paranoia that 
characterized the 1950s continued. There was something else that had fomented 
in the 1950s and 1960s: interest in America’s constitutional prerogative, especially 
the ability to exercise one’s voice effectively and the extending of having voice to 
those who had been marginalized. Concerns over repression and introjection 
switched from being specifically psychological applicable terms into being 





Before his tenure with The Open Theatre, Chaikin was an occasional member of 
The Living Theater. And it was as a member of this group that he apparently 
became more oriented to the role of actor-activist (Chaikin 1972: 51-52).  As he 
described his involvement with ‘the Becks’:  
 
Politics was what undid it. I had resisted that aspect of their theater because 
it had seemed ridiculous and unnecessary to me. The world didn’t seem to 
me all that bad. I used to say to them again and again, ‘Are you a theater or 
are you a political movement?  You can’t be both.’ I was very determined to 
define my path, and it was their ambivalence about what they were doing 
that made my path appear clearer to me.  
          (51) 
 
The Becks had cast Chaikin in the part of Galy Gay. The character faced an 
ethical dilemma that appeared to resonate with Chaikin’s growing ambivalence 
towards his use of the Beck’s theatre as a venue for recognition and a possible 
springboard into eventual stardom. That ambivalence, according to Chaikin’s 
account, was the catalyst that provided with the impetus to become an activist:  
 
I started getting involved in political things, and getting involved in 
demonstrations, and getting arrested and going to jail. I was only there a 
couple of nights at a time, but it had a lasting effect on me. I began to feel 
that the political aspect of the Living Theater, which had looked so 
ridiculous, was very necessary. And the fact that it was ridiculous didn’t 
make it any less necessary.  
          (52)  
 
 
The 1960s fomented into a social and class war meant to combat poverty, 
promote the expansion of civil rights, and educate a populace who would 
eventually eliminate strong class lines. The war within America pitted a ruling 
class, which aligned with the military-industrial complex strongly forged within the 
1950s, against an activist citizenry that would define, in a huge way, the 1960s. 
 
The social activism was early on energized by a rhetoric that called for a noble 
‘sacrifice’. This sacrifice played to the understanding that, as Americans, we are a 
citizenry conceived through and committed to ideals of fairness, justice, and 
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freedom. To retain the rights associated with these ideals or principles of 
democracy, we needed to put ourselves on the front lines advocating for social 
justice. As the term sacrifice implies, activism was dangerous since its activity was 
meant to challenge a strong and powerful status quo.  
 
 On January 17, 1961, President Eisenhower closed the old era with his  
  Farewell Address; three days later President Kennedy opened the new  
 one at his inaugural. The two speeches, like the men and their times,  
 could not have been more different. Each perfectly reflected its author.  
 Eisenhower’s ponderous language eased the shock of his warning  
 against the military-industrial complex. “The potential for the disastrous  
 rise of misplaced power exists and will persist ... The prospect of  
 domination of the nation’s scholars by federal employment, project  
 allocations, and the power of money ... is gravely to be regarded.”   
 Kennedy sounded better: “We observe today not a victory of party but  
 of celebration of freedom ... Now the trumpet summons us again” to 
 “forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance.”     
                                                (29-30) 
 
 
Both speeches touched the raw nerve of people turned off by the ‘comfort’ and 
‘blandness’ of the 1950s; a reaction that amounted to what Arendt (1968) called a 
place without a political sphere – a sphere created by an engaged, activated and 
justice-seeking citizenry.’ (1995: 3-31)  
 
Both speeches picked up the polarized political mood of a people, one that was 
instrumental in the 1950s – producing theatre intent on generating new forms that 
relied upon strong interaction and deeply committed personal involvement from 
actor, director and playwright to audience. Collaboration became a hallmark of the 
movement and signified strength, even within a collective of small numbers 
against an overpowering status quo. The collaboration sought was sometimes 
characterized as fairly militant, or radical in nature. Taking up social causes 
typified the radicalism, reminiscent of the Romanticism that characterized Rogers’s 
humanistic practice. However, it was much more hard-edged and aggressively 
demanding.  
 
The social movement of which The Open Theatre was a part, produced a 
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radicalism that embraced both conserving the political ideals of fairness, justice 
and freedom and challenging the institution of the military-industrial complex that 
had become powerful in the 1950s. This institutionalised force developed its power 
and influence within government, despite the democratic ideals that were 
constitutionally setup in the form of ‘inalienable rights’, and which were understood 
to guarantee against the power of institutionalism; a power which was understood 
to work against the best interests of the American people. The bifurcation played 
out within the 1960s would be exemplified in the battle between the conscientious 
objector and the draft, the student activist and university administrations, the civil 
rights movement under Martin Luther King and the backlash against it by the Black 
Panthers, and Selma against the KKK.   
 
Within three years of his presidency, John Kennedy was assassinated, and after 
his death, the paranoia that had taken hold on a social level in the 1950s loomed 
large. Martin Luther King’s assassination followed Kennedy’s, and then, Robert 
Kennedy was also shot in cold blood.  Anger, because of the introjection of 
negative values by an industrial and military elite into a supposed democratically 
governed society, exploded. Elitism became associated with the repression of 
democracy’s shaping ideals. Trust in government and institutionalism evaporated, 
especially amongst America’s youthful and liberal populations. The anger played 
out across the campuses and cityscapes of America, through emotionally charged 
demonstrations against all institutions American, and it sometimes turned into 
what appeared to be repressed rage unleashed in the form of deadly riots. Huge 
sections of cities burned in the inner cities, the American version of European 
ghettos, and signaled a nation that was hugely fractured.   
 
The country, as a citizenry, became very markedly ‘Right’ or ‘Left’, and the division 
played on television nightly. The Open Theatre became emblematic, not only of a 
site for experimental theatre, but also as a forum and venue for the radical left, 





The philosophical and psychological influences that were strong shapers of 
Chaikin’s lab work 
Chaikin’s workshops offered a means by which the philosophy of phenomenology 
could influence individual acting and ensemble practice which brings up a parallel 
between Rogers and Chaikin. Both of these men’s practices were built on a 
philosophical understanding of the self and the construction of techniques that 
made the engaged within the practice more open, and that emphasised human 
epistemology and ontology, and what it meant to be transformed.  
 
Like Rogers’s therapy, Chaikin’s labs were operationalized by strands of 
understanding historically associated with philosophy, rather than acting theory.   
Like Rogers, Chaikin’s practice was shaped by an agenda of bringing about social 
awareness and change that was spearheaded by a convergence of philosophical 
outlooks centralizing the understanding that the self needed to be addressed; in 
Chaikin’s case, it was the actor-self.  
 
 I understand that the conjoining of theatre and philosophy is contested (Puchner 
2013: 541), as well as considered de rigueur (Krasner and Saltz 2006). It is 
extremely important within the subfield of applied theatre (Holland 2009: 529-542; 
Nicholson 2002: 81-89; Prentki and Preston 2009; Pendergast and Saxton 2009; 
Taylor 2003: 76-101), an increasingly visible and important sub field that Puchner 
did not account for in his article Afterword: Please Mind the Gap between Theatre 
and Philosophy. 
 
The end goals of Chaikin’s practice were to shape a political agenda armed with 
an epistemology that could handle and promote it. His aesthetic was ‘ideologically 
inflected‘ through his political agenda, epistemology and ontology. His ambition 
was to have a systemless system. However, in order to manage this, he could not 
have appealed to political agendas, epistemology or ontology as the concerns of 
practice. What can be claimed is that his work, within The Open Theatre, unfolded 
and developed a system through pre-existent philosophical concerns similar to 
Rogers’s. How Chaikin could aspire to work within a systemless system was 
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possible because his practice was inflected by pre-paradigmatic philosophical 
arguments that had not yet become entrenched within American culture: 
existentialism, I/Thou Ethics and phenomenology. He didn’t have the historical 
distance and perspective to understand this, however. The same was true with 
Rogers. Both Chaikin and Rogers’s practices can be looked upon as vectors for 
these ideas because they propagated some of their claims. In other words, both 
provided the inoculant, by building introjects through their practice and 
performance that were related to philosophical understandings.   
 
Dorinda Hulton (in Hodge 2000: 151) states that ‘[c]hange and transformation are 
at the heart of Joseph Chaikin’s life work’. In The Presence of the Actor, Chaikin 
writes of what it takes to change and transform the actor. At the core of such an 
aspiration is a personal practice philosophy with a radical end: to frustrate the 
status quo of theatre practice, and thereby open the actor up to new possibilities 
and means for performance. Rogers was concerned with a parallel aspiration 
when building his therapeutic practice.    
 
Hulton, in her chapter, “Joseph Chaikin And Aspects of Actor Training: Possibilities 
Rendered Present” (in Hodge 2000: 151-173), breaks down Chaikin’s use of the 
term transformation for the student-actor. She states that it was captured in a 
programme for one of The Open Theatre’s first public performances. Within the 
programme, basic principles of practice can be discerned – ones that tell the actor-
student what actions are needed for the actor to be transformed.  
 
Though they can be viewed as principles of practice, they break down into the 
means by which to achieve transformation. As principles and means, they are not 
unlike ones core to Rogers’s practice philosophy.   
 
Within The Open Theatre, these core principles were foundational from the 
beginning. Hulton, when researching her chapter in Hodge’s Twentieth Century 




 What you will see tonight is a phase of work of The Open Theatre. This 
  group of actors, musicians, playwrights and directors has come  
 together out of a dissatisfaction with the established trend of the  
 contemporary theatre. It is seeking a theatre for today. It is now exploring  
 specific aspects of the stage, not as a production group, but as a group  
 trying to find a voice. Statable tenets of this workshop: (1) to create a  
 situation where actors can play together with a sensitivity to one another 
  required of an ensemble, (2) to explore the specific powers that only  
 live theatre possesses, (3) to concentrate on a theatre of abstraction and  
 illusion (as opposed to a theatre of behavioural or psychological   
 motivation, (4) to discover ways in which the artist can find his  
 expression without money as the determining factor. 
   (Open Theatre archives 1963 in Hulton, Hodge 2002: 163)  
 
What is clear from the statement is that at issue is ‘sensitivity’ towards ensemble 
members and the performance material; respectful collaboration; an authentic 
voice; reception, or attunement; and the powers present within an event that is 
processed. The principles of practice that were meant to govern the performance 
behaviour of the actor and ensemble resonate with Rogers’s. It is not difficult to 
find a parallel in Rogers’s articulation of the three primary attitudes which he 
understood were needed to conduct therapy: authenticity, empathic attunement 
and unconditional positive regard, which when operational, were understood to 
create a practice climate for change.  
 
Joseph Chaikin, prior to his involvement in The Living Theatre, had put his sights 
on becoming a star within a celebrity-making, theatre-for-profit establishment. He 
claimed that on joining The Living Theatre, he had no political motivations, ethical 
agenda, or aesthetic commitment to the company, and that he was apolitical and 
quite indifferent to using theatre as a platform for social consciousness-raising or 
action. Chaikin claimed that his intentions for joining the company were purely self-
serving. That would change, and lead Chaikin to help build The Open Theatre in 
the early 1960s. An instrumental part of the formulation of the company was 
Chaikin’s workshops, or rather, labs, where, through the use of improvisation, 
social issues were explored and techniques were created for devising. Devising, or 
improvisation, is a type of theatre practice that is understood as open and, in The 
Open Theatre’s case, a ‘collaborative creation’ that ‘bring[s] into existence ... 
material [understood to be created] ex nihilo’ (Milling and Heddon 2006: 3). 
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The Open Theatre began from a group that ‘limped into existence’ (Pasolli, 1970: 
2). This occurred on February 1, 1963, in ‘a borrowed auditorium of The Living 
Theatre’ (Ibid). Pasolli states that ‘[s]eventeen actors and four writers declared 
themselves to be a new theatre group, did some warm-up exercises and two 
improvisations, and then went across the street for coffee’ (Ibid). In a similar 
manner throughout the next few months the group met and conducted workshops. 
By summertime ‘they went off in all directions, and whether the group existed or 
not was at that point an open question’ (Ibid). However, they did prevail as a 
group. 
 
The ontology: the authentic actor 
 
 We find ourselves formed by the setup and may respond in one of two 
  ways. We continue to re-create ourselves or we reinforce where we find  
 ourselves to be. (Chaikin 1972: 12-13) 
 
 
Within his lab, a primary element for the experimentation carried out in The Open 
Theatre was Chaikin’s reaction towards mainstream theatre, citing it as part of the 
bigger social set-up that makes people passive and easy to manage through 
financial markets. Turned off, as Chaikin understood it, people weren’t capable of 
being politically and socially active on an authentic level.  
 
Chaikin’s use of the term authentic suggests he meant being honest. And what is 
further implied is that honesty is contrasted with being repressed; in other words, it 
meant that one’s interior, which was understood as capable of harboring one’s 
authentic or real self, was masked by external behaviours, social presentations 
and pressures or attitudes. The masking could be involved in what was evident or 
non-evident to awareness, maybe only intuitively felt. This resembles Rogers’s 
sense of authenticity.  
 
The authentic actor, according to Chaikin, was one who was open to continued 
possibility, rather than trapped within a set-up. His notion of authenticity was 
concerned with not hiding something real through building facades. It suggests 
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that there is a real way by which to behave and express one’s self when being 
authentic. Chaikin understood the authentic actor as one without boundaries, or as 
open to possibility, as Rogers would have framed it.  
 
Embedded in Chikin’s interpretation of the authentic actor was a concern with 
immersion and presence, or being so hyper-attuned to the moment that one’s 
other is compelled to watch and be drawn in. In The Presence of the Actor, 
Chaikin recalls the work of actors Ryszard Cieslak, Ekkehard Schall, Kim Stanley, 
Ruth White, and Gloria Foster in his account of what is to have ‘presence’. (20) He 
states that presence is a ‘kind of deep libidinal surrender’ by which the actor, as an 
integral part of his or her performance, gives out ‘a quality that defies distance: ‘It’s 
a quality that makes you feel as though you’re standing right next to the actor’ 
(Ibid).  
 
The force of the ‘surrender’ draws you into the experience in a hyper-attuned 
manner; in other words, it suggests a oneness or unity that is conveyed 
experientially across the theatrical experience. Chaikin’s Midsummer Night’s 
Dream exercise experimented with hyper-attunement, which finds a parallel with 
Rogers’s empathic attunement that eventually collapsed into a portrait of a 
universal gestalt within his last work. Chaikin did not push the idea so far, 
however, experimenting with gestalts permeated his practice. A more extreme 
example is illustrated in his Midsummer Night’s Dream exercise (1972: 140-144).  
 
Central to this practice is the understanding that a deep connectedness or unity is 
felt because of the actor’s presence. Within this is the sense that the actor is at her 
or his most authentic. What also is suggested is that being authentic ties to a 
larger meaningful order or system of communication that transcends the verbal. 
Rogers, in his last work, was interested in non-verbal telepathic means of 
communication. 
 
Within Chaikin’s vision of the authentic actor was the additional characteristic of 
being politically charged through social activism, together with the understanding 
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that the actor should develop a political and social awareness so that he or she 
could have a voice. As Chaikin understood social set-ups, not only did they rob the 
actor of the capability of taking political action, but also they robbed the actor of 
her or his voice because the actor had been set up to be a passive consumer. His 
exercise, Perfect People captured this (Pasolli 1979: 36-40).  
 
Passivity and repression 
As Hulton (in Hodge 2000:154-155) and Blumenthal (1984: 1) assert, Chaikin 
understood The Open Theatre as a place of experimentation and research. It was 
a place where the ensemble and its audience might become aware of what 
contributed to their passivity, and in the process, learn to make informed choices 
concerning their and others’ political and social welfare. A goal of The Open 
Theatre, Hulton (in Hodge 2000: 153) asserts, was to bring about social and 
personal transformation. Both goals needed to be driven by the ability of the 
members of the ensemble ‘to think of the inconceivable – a space without 
boundaries’ (Chaikin 1972: 47). Again, a parallel can be found with Rogers. The 
Open Theatre’s labs can be characterized as open, or as Rogers framed it and 
brought out in Chapter Two, ‘open to possibility’.  
 
A psychological mechanism was addressed within Chaikin’s workshops. Chaikin 
may have wanted to stay clear of ‘motivations’ within his experimental work 
(Hulton 2000: 155); however, he wanted to explore repression and passivity, not 
only on a personal level, but on a societal level as well. Both suggest a 
psychological motivator was operational in building Chaikin’s anti-system.  
 
A central technique of The Open Theatre and the process of becoming 
transformed 
Pasolli claims that during the initial workshop, before the hiatus that occurred after 
the initial meeting of the actors that were to form The Open Theatre, ‘[t]he 
technique on which The Open Theatre subsequently built its aesthetic’ (Ibid) was 
put in place. What transpired was devising; a form of theatre playing that Chaikin 
inherited from working with The Living Theatre. Heddon and Milling characterized 
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Chaikin’s understanding of devising as ‘a mechanism whereby transformational 
experience in the workshop, for the actor, could be echoed and carried forward 
into performance, which it was hoped would then effect a similar transformation in 
the audience’ (2006: 40). ‘The actor’ doing the devising ‘by force of his art’ was 
understood to experience a ‘transcendent moment in which he is released from all 
hang-ups of the present situation’ (Malina and Beck in Heddon and Milling, Ibid). 
Transformation, according to this framing, was a shared occurrence between 
audience and actors; it was understood as carried out through a kind of 
transmission. The actor as the vehicle of this transmission, needed to become 
opened up so that she or he could get past negative cultural introjections (hang 
ups) or a ‘psychic rut’ (Blumenthal 1984: 90).  
 
The opening up allowed the actors to transmit to the audience more positive 
possibilities of being; more authentic ones, in effect, were thought to become 
actualized. This is echoed in Rogers in the therapist-client relationship. 
Importantly, according to Malina, transformation happened because there was a 
letting go by the actor of internal reactions that limited her or him as an actor. If 
this was the case, building authenticity through the letting go of introjections as 
well as allowing authentic impulses to surface when playing were embedded in the 
term transformation.  
 
An example of this can be illustrated through a moment in my training as an actor, 
which is reminiscent of Artaud throwing himself on the floor and engaging in 
convulsive movements. Our instructor had the student-actors build two parallel 
lines. We each took turns moving through the lines, over and over, attempting to 
shed physicalized mannerisms that we were comfortable with. By the end of the 
run, we were all convulsing on the floor. I had never heard of Artaud so did not get 
the connection. I absolutely hated the exercise and had to let go of a lot of shame 
to manage it. After the exercise was done, a feeling pervaded and cut right 
through me. I had been absolutely exposed, and the experience stayed with me 
for the rest of the day – in fact, it felt like I was wearing it and that everyone I came 
into contact with wanted to look away. Today, I cringe thinking about it. However, it 
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taught me where my limits were as an actor.  
 
The theatrical activity or play may have set the stage to develop a Rogerian 
sensitivity; the dealing with feeling or internal places where we fear to tread. In 
order to manage overcoming fear, there needs to be a condition of trust. Because 
of the interconnection within the ensemble of student-actors, and with Irene, the 
instructor, we were able to risk-take even when feeling completely vulnerable and 
exposed. Accessing internal spaces that are repressed because of negative 
introjects pervading a client’s more conscious awareness makes sense of the 
exercise at City Creek, where the kids ran to their own internal rhythms, freed up 
and attuned with each other. 
 
For Chaikin, to reach a point of transformation means that the actor would have 
had to study the whole event of what was taking place within the lab. And the 
whole event had to be studied as it was presented; it had to broaden out the 
actor’s understanding beyond the event’s limiting aspects. This had its 
consequences. 
 
What became privileged within the explorations of the labs were the perceptual 
forces of subjectivity and intersubjectivity needed to fulfill the aspiration to visualize 
and understand on a deep level what was available to awareness – that is, if the 
actor tried hard enough. To actualize this ambition, the playing centred on 
juxtaposing images that called into question our received perceptions of an event 
and the values we placed on them. Again, the Perfect People exercise explored 
this. Within my drama training, we regularly used exercises in which we had to 
stare into the eyes of our other for minutes at a time to ‘really get’ them. When the 
exercise stopped, it felt as though we were deeply connected on an attuned and 
empathic level. 
 
The productions created through the lab work, and which had to do with 
challenging the status quo in order to open up more authentic ways of knowing, 
became emblematic of the play within Chaikin’s labs. The labs consisted of 
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exploring opposing images that were meant to stimulate the onlooker into making 
choices concerning social action. What were also highlighted were the 
consequences that result from carrying through the choices. The Serpent was a 
production that resulted from this kind of lab work (Chaikin 1972: 62-63). It recalls 
the children’s theatre example of Chapter One, where as a touring group, the 
actors built contrasting images of woodsmen and wenches and kings and queens 
that basically served as potential introjects. Through the contrasting characters, 
choices were exposed regarding moral action. Rogers’s building of the ‘future’ 
person fulfills the dynamic. It is also fulfilled through his conceptualization of the 
idealized self – a self that backdrops how the client actually experiences his or her 
self. The dynamic seen within Chaikin’s labs is echoed in my play with the young 
adolescent male who was able to choose to be my coach, rather than be the victim 
of his own impulsive behaviours. 
 
Repression and introjection 
Adding to the political, social, and aesthetic context of Chaikin’s labs was a 
psychological dimension that is striking: the defenses of repression and 
introjection, understood as existing on a larger social scale, were interrogated. 
Being transformed meant getting rid of the repressed and insidiously received 
images propagated by the status quo, which determined who the actor and 
audience understood their selves to be. 
 
Transformation, then, was able to relieve society of the psychological, controlling 
mechanisms of repression and introjection. No longer was the actor or individual 
within theatre or society unconsciously obliged to internalize prevalent images, 
fabricated by the status quo, into her or his internal makeup, or self. With such a 
liberation, more authentic impulses, such as creating a fairer society, would be 
allowed expression and externalized into action. In humanistic terms, once rid of 
these psychological mechanisms, theatre and society could get on with the 
business of building a humanity. Like Rogers, what is basic to Chaikin’s 




By addressing repression and the introjection that it presupposes, Chaikin pinned 
his practice to a psychological context. Importantly, Chaikin understood these 
psychological mechanisms to exist on a larger scale than on just an individual one; 
they include economic and political levels of the wider society. Chaikin’s 
experimental theatre targeted them. As a student-actor doing children’s theatre, I 
intuitively understood this. 
 
Addressing introjection and repression fits with the activist agenda to bring about 
social and political transformation within a failing democracy. As Chaikin 
understood it, the values introjected by a market economy, commercial theatre, 
and the military-industrial complex into American society needed to be strongly 
questioned and replaced by values that had been lost, repressed, or languished 
unaddressed. The change envisioned was to reinstate the ideals of freedom and 
fairness (Chaikin 1972: 93), building a collective humanity rather than support for 
an arrangement of special interest groups that overtly and insidiously shaped lives. 
The same sentiment can be found in Rogers. 
 
The pre-conscious 
Pasolli, in describing the exercise Transformation, brings out that idiosyncratic 
behaviour, captured in an image made by the actor, was at stake when building a 
transformative performance within the lab. Idiosyncratic behaviour was understood 
to cause a dislocating experience that frustrated predicable responses to 
situations played out within the exercises of the labs. It was a mark of freed 
impulses (Chaikin 1972: 8-9). This is exemplified in the Sound and Movement 
exercise. What moves the exercise is not a sequence of logical psychological 
reactions that make sense, but rather, a releasing of the unconscious, the 
psychological territory of defenses usually associated with psychodynamic theory 
(Tolson & Tolson 1990: 41).   
 
An example given has two actors playing fighting brothers, when, suddenly, one of 
the brothers turns into a ‘wild animal’ (Ibid): ‘He has transformed his identity’ and 
the other actor has to respond in kind. As Pasoli frames it: ‘Transformation taps 
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the unconscious resources of the actor’, or rather, the repressed ones, and the 
actor ‘who, in jumping from one set of circumstances to another, relies on links 
between given and potential situations which he would not necessarily understand 
rationally’ (Ibid). What is understood to be at stake within the playing is reciprocity 
and reception, or rather, the intersubjective attunement of the actors. 
 
Chaikin (1970:26) wanted the actor ideally to arrive at ‘that other level ... where 
there is no possibility of fixing conclusions’. As Chaikin stated in his meditation, he 
wanted to get past the ‘already fixed’, and that the ‘actor must involve himself with 
different ways of perceiving besides his own’ (Chaikin 1970:56).   
 
Receptivity is at issue within the Sound and Movement exercise. Pasolli (1970:4) 
states that the exercise as a ‘whole was to be a transmission of energy and a 
passing of kinetic material, but with the emphasis on the coming together of two 
actors who create a dramatic event by ‘inhabiting’ the same kinetic environment’. 
HIs account suggests that the somatic expressiveness of the actors can be non-
representative of internal experiencing. Pasolli (1970:4) states that the actor 
receiving the somatic gestures somatically casts the ‘first actor’s statement’ 
through ‘impulsive re-creation’ with ‘an appropriation of its dynamics and form; that 
is a response in kind’.  This is a rather behavioural depiction. It cannot be forgotten 
that Chaikin was interested in ‘experiences you have in your life: the before and 
after things, when you are not quite the same after as you were before’ (123), or 
from ones ‘from which we [...] act, where there is no possibility of fixing 
conclusions or exchanging facts’ (26). The experience suggests that a goal of the 
ensemble work was to experience strong absorption within the playing so that the 
ensemble, in effect, became a gestalt. The shared understanding within the 
ensemble, which privileges sensory and feeling-based knowledge that usually gets 
associated with spontaneous, impulsive action that connects us to underused 
resources of understanding and image-making, was meant to facilitate a gestalt.  
 
Blumenthal (1982: 90) states that the transformation exercises had to do with the 
desire to ‘[explore] hidden connections and impulses’ – again connecting the 
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exercises to the releasing of the unconscious. She states that the exercises 
originated in Viola Spolin’s workshops with actors, where she used ‘games’ and 
‘early expressionist dream-play techniques’. Again a dislocative technique is at 
stake, where scene work abruptly shifts idiosyncratically or randomly. Releasing a 
more authentic impulse meant accepting that a topographical arrangement of 
preconscious pre-exists the response. What are released are hidden and 
sometimes fearful impulses. This is a Freudian understanding of consciousness 
(McWilliams 1994: 118-120). 
 
 As Blumenthal describes:  
 
[m]id-scene, an actor might change their character’s age, sex, species, or 
relationship to others; the time of day, year, or history; the location; the 
physical scale; and so forth. Liberated from the restrictions of naturalistic 
consistency, they could show hidden associations, fantasies, and passions.  
           (1982: 90)   
 
This too, is a Freudian understanding. However, there is a slight turn that is 
offered as well. Blumenthal’s interpretation brings out that a motivation of the 
exercise was to keep the actors receptive, or rather, in tune with each other (Ibid) 
keeping them hyper ‘alert’, ‘present’, and able to ‘adjust to each others shifts’ 
(Ibid). What historically was associated with hidden pathology, within Chaikin’s 
understanding, becomes the means by which to be empathically attuned, or 
receptive.  
 
In my training as an actor, the students would pair off and sit touching back to 
back. We would get in touch with each other’s breathing and muscle tensions, and 
slowly breathe in unison letting go of muscular tension. Then, we would add gentle 
sounds, and that, too, would become synchronous. Next gentle swaying 
movements in sync with one another were added. Eventually, we would all stand 
and move away from each other, still part of the group. We would build a circle 
while standing back to back, slightly removed from one another in what felt to be a 
collective space of fusion: a gestalt. Breathing, voice, and movement would 
become synchronous as little by little we stepped away from one another. 
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Interestingly, there is a similar experience within Rogerian therapy after a trusting 
relationship has been forged. Rogerians do not use clipboards, tables, or any 
physical structure that may act as barriers between client and therapist. We 
generally sit in a comfortable chair directly in front of the client, maybe three feet 
away from them. The client and therapist, sitting in their chairs, have to be on the 
same physical level. The therapist sits legs slightly apart with their arms resting on 
their knees and their fingers gently entwined. The therapist then leans in slightly 
towards the client. All movement is keep to a minimum. When the therapy pulls the 
client into deeper, reflective moments, the therapist and client’s movement, mood 
and breath matches. In counsellor speak, it is called mirroring. 
 
The technique of mirroring exists as an acting exercise in Spolin’s Improvisation 
for the Theatre (1999 ed: 61-63). At drama school the students built versions of 
the Sound and Movement exercise so the ensemble could explore synchronous 
movement. The goal was for one actor to ‘reflect all movements initiated by [their 
other]’ (Ibid) as their other was carrying them out. In order to accomplish the 
mirroring, the receiving actor had to closely and intensely focus and be present to 
the other actor. 
 
Considering authenticity, introjections and repression 
 
The frustration arising out of a group of people looking for an alternative 
way to represent the ‘who’ is the most essential part of the development 
of a company. Through the frustration the group comes up against their  
own forms of institutionalised thinking, and the culturally dictated forces, 
even those fully adapted by the professional theatre. The living mobile  
actor dealing with the prepared immobile answers become a dialectic  
towards the development of a new discipline. 
         (Chaikin 1972: 15) 
 
If the goal of the lab was to be released from ‘hang-ups’, the issue of authenticity, 
or the authentic ‘who’, was a central concern within the labs held by Chaikin. 
Looking at it through the lens of introjection, the term ‘hang-ups’ as something to 
avoid means to be cognizant of imposed values that you do not own. Chaikin 
proposed that the actors manage losing their ‘hang-ups’ through building a 
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dynamic of oppositions. 
 
A central dynamic within Chaikin’s labs was the pitting of what had become 
institutionalised for or by the actor against the open-ended. In the quote above, for 
example, he speaks of the institutionally driven ‘immobile’ actor in opposition to the 
liberated, authentic actor, who by virtue of being ‘freed-up‘, was mobile. In other 
words, the actor-self was freed up and readied to interrogate her or his intuitions, 
sensory experience, responsiveness, hunches, hang-ups, inspiration, relational 
activity, and moment-to-moment experiencing within the ensemble work of the lab. 
Through such exploration, the actor was understood to construct something 
unencumbered by theatrical conventions. What was implied is that the more the 
actor-self could free her or himself from the entrenched, theatrical conventions, the 
more authentic she or he became as an actor-self. The playing out of stereotypes 
and what we called ‘canned responses’ were to be avoided by the ensemble of 
students at my drama school. With this goal in place within the lab, it is easy to 
assume that there needs to exist for the actor-self, an opportunity to create 
internally an actual space of openness; one where performing can spring from 
uninhibited impulses, opening up a potential.   
 
The labs’ mission, then, was to liberate the actor, making her or him more 
authentic, or rather, uninhibited and disengaged from received understandings of 
what or how the actor should be or how they should behave. An assumption of 
being uninhibited implies that a ‘consciousness‘ attached to an ‘ego’ is at stake, 
and that both need a housecleaning. As Chaikin asks in his meditation, which is a 
recommendation for the actor to examine his own ‘consciousness’:  
 
does he draw his impulses from a liberated consciousness or from the 
same consciousness which he believes to be necessary for his daily 
personal safety? Does he draw from a common human source or from a 
contemporary bourgeois ego?  
          (1972: 9) 
 
 
Chaikin uses the term ‘common human source’ as meaning a transcendent, true 
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source. Participating in the ‘true’ source by the actor means that the ego and its 
consciousness are freed up. A dynamic opposition is at stake; applied to the actor-
self, the term means that her or his ego is freed up from institutionalised 
understandings of what it takes to shape the actor-self. The actor-self is now ready 
to be shaped by the true source: freedom. Implicit in Chaikin’s understanding is 
that liberty is a state common to us all – meaning it accounts, at least in part, for 
what it is to be of humanity in a modernist sense. What is indicated is that the 
actor when at their most freed up, is at their most authentic state of being. Ethically 
speaking, the actor is at their best. 
 
If this was the case for Chaikin, the practitioner (director in Chaikin’s case) needs 
to promote a brand of liberty that moves the actor beyond convention or the 
institutionalised in general. In doing this, he facilitates the actor in becoming more 
fully a participant in humanity. When thinking oppositionally, what is implied is that 
activity within practice that stifles the building of the authentic actor is wrong. A 
way to instill authenticity within the actor-self would mean examining the freed-up 
ego in opposition to an ego fettered by the aspiration to succeed in commercial 
theatre or belong to any status quo.  
 
The ego and consciousness were not the only things at stake for Chaikin when 
building an open and authentic actor-self, so was introjection and passivity:  
 
Social man is the man in relation to the party, the person as actor. Actors, 
while they are acting, are recommending. Actors, through their acting,  
are validating a definition of identity and rendering other definitions  
invalid. Recommending a way to perform oneself is working to sell a 
mode of being.  
         (Chaikin 1972: 69-70) 
 
Implicit in the statement above is the understanding that if you don’t want to 
‘recommend’, or ’sell a mode of being’, then you need to explore an alternative. 
For Chaikin, that begins with examining the identity introjected by society; the one 
that has been accepted passively as a self. In other words, it has been received by 
the actor-self without examination. The need for the actor to examine introjections 
that lead to passivity is found in the Perfect People exercise. 
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If Chaikin’s labs were concerned with the examination of the actor’s passive ego 
(22), what followed from the examination was the possibility of creating an 
authentic identity if an actor can overcome the introjection. It is a small leap from 
this understanding to assume that the term identity implies that the introjection of 
societal values constitutes who you are as a self, if you let that introjection happen. 
What also is implied is that there is a personal responsibility to examine how you 
can be released from such introjections. An important understanding is that the 
actor can rise above what has been introjected. The transcending can occur if the 
actor is open to new possibilities of playing and, within the playing, examines fully 
what the introjections imply regarding the actor-self. To be free of introjections and 
to become more authentic, Chaikin’s aim was to explore what it meant for the 
actor to practice openly, working from ‘imagination’ and a ‘creative impulse’ whose 
object was to chart the unknown. (Shepard in Fife 1983: 202-203) To be 
transformed meant to encounter the unexplored by working from ‘impulses’ as if 
they had not been ‘tamed’ (Shepard in Fife 1983: 203).  
 
For the actor this meant being open to building and experimenting with exercises 
that were not introjections from other training or methods, but were unique to the 
company, or if borrowed, made their own. As Chakin stated, the actors needed to 
work with ‘no existing discipline’ save what the company invents as ‘its own’ (15).  
Chaikin stated that he was interested in what drives exploration by the actor 
towards ‘the inconceivable’, the ‘place without boundary’. (Chaikin 1972: 47)  
Chaikin’s ‘place without boundary’ is similar to Rogers’s field of possibility. As 
Blumenthal states, their aim was to accomplish ‘uncharted explorations’ (1984: 
17).   
 
No absolute terms and the psychological power of unity 
 There is no principle I have in absolute terms. Not one. 
        (Chaikin 1972:112)  
 
 The actor should study the theories, appreciate how they came about,  
 and then depart from them.                                                                                 




Acting theories may not have conspicuously shaped Joseph Chaikin’s labs; 
however, some structured understanding did shape them. Chakin’s brand of 
experimental theatre shares some of the same striking characteristics with 
Rogerian counselling. The shared characteristics suggest that cultural 
undercurrents were actively shaping both practices: both practitioner-thinkers were 
hoping to develop what could be looked upon as open anti-systems of practice 
that could activate social transformation by frustrating the status quo. To build the 
anti-systems both Chaikin and Rodgers appealed to many of the same concerns 
and elements: both were concerned over the authenticity of individuals, which 
because of the introjected images and values promoted by a corrupt status quo, 
make the individual less than individual; both understood institutionalism as an 
active repressor of values that make us self-determining and self-directional. In 
other words; both practitioners understood principled behaviour as actions that 
promote individualism.  
 
The practitioner’s behaviour needs to promote self-determination and self-
direction. Being authentic is associated with these characteristics and, within each 
practice, was understood as a right. If a right was at stake, the actor-self of Chaikin 
and the person-self of Rogers are to be regarded as efficaciously political when at 
their best.   
 
In Chaikin’s The Presence of the Actor, the actors appeared to be not so much 
directed as facilitated to unfold through their senses and feelings in a process that, 
over time, would morph into a production. The anti-system was meant to be built 
from an organic processing, as was the actor’s role within it. The unfolding nature 
of Chaikin’s facilitation within the anti-system can be deceptive. As Chaikin’s 
influence within the theatrical community of New York grew, the rights of the 
ensemble diminished. By the time Chaikin left The Open Theatre, it had become 
synonymous with the person of Chaikin. A company formed as an anti-system and 
visualized as a collective (Munk in Performance, Vol. 1, 1971: 82-90) had become 
Chaikin’s. Even though, ‘the ensemble’ originally was meant to ‘celebrate ... the 
virtues of the work-in-progress, the commedia of life in the process of becoming 
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itself ‘(Coco in Performing Arts Journal, Vol. VII / No. 3, 1983: 26) the final word 
was Chaikin’s. And while his process had once stood for a transformation that 
challenged any status quo, by the time he left The Open Theatre Chaikin had 
positioned himself outside the ensemble as the head of the company. A status quo 
of one was established. However, through the process of creating a company built 
as an ensemble, principles of practice that gestured towards building a collective 
were forged despite the hierarchy that was gradually established. One was the 
principle of facilitation where lab work was understood to unfold rather than to be 
imposed. Unfolding was understood to occur if it was sensory and feeling based. 
Out of these understandings principles of practice were formulated: the principles 
of facilitation and sensory- and feeling-based exploration. Principles easily 
collapse into being understood as rights if supported by a modernist framework of 
understanding.  
 
When I was a student at drama school, the same principles were put in place. An 
example of this is when the ensemble of students was told to improvise The 
Hobbit. We couldn’t use words or props and the work within the studio lasted for 
about three hours, two or three times a week for three months. The play was very 
physical. Importantly, because of the lack of props or dialogue we became very 
attuned to one another, feeding off each other’s actions. The class director, Colin 
Davis, sat patiently by, easing out our performances. He avoided directives and 
had a collaborative style when working with the actors. As a student, I never 
questioned if he was part of the ensemble or not, though his role was one of 
director. Director and student-actors, we all worked off each other. Our ability for 
deep or strong levels of concentration grew. As our capacity developed so did our 
feelings of connectedness to each other within the play. A good way to account for 
this phenomenon was the understanding that our sense of connection simply 
unfolded and wasn’t coerced. From such lived events it is easy to conclude that 
positive introjects were fabricated, at least for me. Internalized, the phenomenon 
was imprinted as principled, or rather, right or correct behaviour. This included 
actions that unfolded during the processing of the lab work done; non-coerced 
play; collaborative play; ensemble playing; the use of physicality, affect and 
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sensory experience; empathic attunement; immersion; receptivity; and a common 
ground of play. When working as a therapist devising group work through the 
Romeo and Juliet exercise as well as the one done at City Creek, I called on the 
principles gleaned through my experience improvisng The Hobbit. The Hobbit 
experience and the principles gleaned from it were a positive set-up.  
 
The importance of process rather than end-goals 
If Chaikin’s goal was to build a transformative practice, one that challenged the 
status quo of theatre making, it meant that standards of practice derived from the 
status quo could not apply within his labs. As Chaikin stated: 
  
 All prepared systems fail. They fail when they are applied, except as  
 examples of a process which was significant, at some time, for someone 
  or some group. Process is dynamic: it’s the evolution that takes place 
  during work.  Systems are recorded as game plans, not to be  
 followed any more than rules of courtship can be followed. We can 
  get clues from others, but our own culture and sensibility and  
 aesthetic will lead us into a totally new kind of expression, unless we  
 simply imitate both the process and the findings of another.  
                     (1972: 21). 
 
One way Chaikin attempted to frustrate working from set-in-stone rules or theories, 
was to keep the actors within the ensemble continually in process (Ibid). In my 
training as a student-actor, this goal was exemplified in Colin’s choice to have the 
students work on a continually running piece for three months. I was afforded the 
opportunity to witness, as an audience member, a similar theatrical event done at 
the University of Exeter’s Drama Department. It was a devising by Professor 
Phillip Zarrilli and his students. The whole production took approximately six hours. 
I sat through it twice. 
 
Importantly, keeping the actor-self continually in process challenges the 
understanding that practice means (exercises) should be directed towards 
achieving preconceived end goals. Lab work that is an interrogation of the stream, 
flow, or process of experience, is a phenomenological project. It means being 
existentially present. When the act of processing is practice, the actor can be 
understood as continually open to the possibility of the moment. If the actor-self is 
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always open to possibility, it is not far to understanding her or him as continually 
developing and open.  
 
The Romeo and Juliet exercise of Chapter Two was influenced by my sense that it 
takes a lived-through, open-ended process to build positive introjects that young 
adolescents and children could try. As I understood it, while they tried on being 
competent actor-fencers creating a character when staging the fight scene, 
introjects could be internalized that corresponded with who they ideally or 
internally understood themselves to be.  
 
Chaikin’s envisioning the actor within the lab as continually in process meant that 
the playing within the lab needed to be adaptive to the living circumstances that 
the actors within the company found themselves involved in during the present 
moment. By using chairs in different physical configurations during the Hobbit 
exercise – as we climbed through, sat on top of, built barriers, scooted, turned 
them into bridges or magical pots, and used them as horses or thrones – we 
learned a creative skill set as actors and how it affected our psychology as 
efficacious and daring actors. We learned how the skill set shaped our responses 
to one another and ourselves.  
 
No ego 
The notion of creating an immersive environment together with the goal of staying 
present can serve to create a sense of merger between group members. This was 
true of The Open Theatre. Creating deep or strong interrelational activity, or 
merger, meant the actor had to foster within her or himself clarity of focus without 
ego. As a student-actor attending to my other in the Back-to-Back exercise, I 
understood this to be the case. I also understood that there could be merger, or 
interconnection, between the actor and the audience, if one was close enough to 
mark out faces, break the barriers of the fourth wall, or was able to invite audience 





Improvisation, receptivity, immersive conditions and intersubjectivity 
 In order to study character, the actor usually separates himself from  
 others. This is the first mistake. The study of character is the study of “I” 
  in relation to forces that join us [ ... ] the first are observable political  
 social forces which move irrevocably through all of us who are alive at  
 the same time in history. (12) 
 
Pasolli (1970: 20) claims that the exercises developed within Chaikin’s lab 
exemplify ‘radical change‘ that is made through ‘the circumstances of an 
improvisation made by actors‘, which is an adjustment made towards the 
behaviour of another actor’. He, in effect, defines what it is to be receptive. The 
term as Pasolli presents and understands it, translates into having concrete 
properties or replicable actions within play. However, the term receptive can be 
translated differently. 
 
In his labs, Chaikin was concerned with immersive conditions as part of the 
exploration. An immersive experience within an ensemble suggests that 
intersubjectivity or a transmissive means of communication between the members 
is operational. The term ‘being at one’ exemplifies this occurrence. Immersive 
conditions that bring about intersubjectivity can be understood as an extreme form 
of empathic attunement.  
 
As student actors, we experimented with transmissive means of communication. 
One example was when we sat back-to-back but did not touch. We simply sat 
without knowing who sat behind us. We would do this for about three to five 
minutes with our eyes closed; then we would slowly return to our seats against a 
wall without looking, carefully sit very still and simply breathe for a couple of 
minutes. We would open our eyes and disclose who we thought it was that had sat 
behind us. A good deal of the time we were right.  
 
Chaikin and Rogers both understood maintaining attunement or receptivity 
towards the other as fundamental to practice. And principled behaviour is 
behaviour that promotes receptivity and immersive conditions. Within a principle is 
embedded a right that needs to be carried out within practice. For a modernist, a 
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responsibility has been fulfilled when rights are facilitated. As a student-actor 
engaged within the exercise cited above, I fulfilled this responsibility by staying 
present and immersed within the play. This meant not dulling my senses or my 
gaze by attending to my internal impulses. It meant attending to my other’s 
impulses. It meant being readied and centred by simply breathing, letting go of 
muscular tension without becoming a noodle, and focusing outward. From this 
position or attitude I could take in my other for who they were. 
 
As a Rogerian, I wait for a client to begin his or her narrative; when I point out the 
client’s behaviours in order to jumpstart the session, I am similarly readied and 
present. Learning to use these techniques and attitudes seemed to come easily for 
me. Although they are regarded as difficult postures to learn for the novice 
counsellor. 
 
Understanding that a self can rise above the givens of culture and can then 
become actualized, or authentic, was a goal of both Rogers and Chaikin. Both 
understood that the status quo needed to be frustrated, or shook up, if we are to 
become actualized. If this is the case, to be ethical as a practitioner I need to 
promote behaviour that challenges or questions the givens of a culture if it keeps 
my other from feeling authentic. This position was taken in my work with the Latina 
women described in Chapter Two; women who didn’t need or want 
antidepressants to deal with their culturally imposed situation. To feel authentic 
they needed empowerment in the form of a positive introject played out through 
improv. 
 
As stated, at the drama studio, I worked in a lab environment that valorized 
experimental processing meant to disinhibit and free up the actor from past 
cultural shaping. I felt emboldened by the processing and a sense of having 
personal agency. The positive introject of a can-do approach may have facilitated 
an intuitive understanding that role reversals and improv were what the Latina 
women needed rather than scripts, counsellor speak for drugs, which in the case 
of these women, were unnecessarily prescribed ones.  
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Chaikin and Rogers valued open-ended processing within a practice situation over 
a predetermined end result. Upholding this value has significance for me as a 
practitioner: if I am not working towards a clearly defined end result, I can respect 
my others on their own terms and conditions. Respecting the other, especially the 
marginalized and vulnerable other, on his or her own terms and conditions was a 
value that resonated with Chaikin (1972: 93). For me, what is at stake in accepting 
this value is a principle of practice and the right that can be derived from it. This 
stance directly relates to working at the women’s prison, another example from 
Chapter Two. It is likely that my training as an actor allowed me to become attuned 
to the inmates on their terms and conditions by stomping on a bag full of papers 
containing written-out rules. It is probably also why I could sit in a room with a 
small boy and just listen to him, instead of trying to give directives.  
 
Attempting to be free of a pre-conscious while also attaching somatic and 
impulsive movement to an emotional content 
  
 Quite often the actor mistakenly assumes that his preparation should  
 consist of filling himself with broad emotional experiences, Instead the  
 actor must find an empty place where the living current moves through  
 him uninformed. A clear place. Let’s say the place where the breath is  
 drawn ... not the breath ... but where the inhalation starts. An actor who is 
  fully emotionally prepared is overwhelming his internal life, is filling the  
 cleared space, and all this functions against discovery. 
          (Chaikin 1970:66) 
 
The Sound and Movement exercise came to be used in Chaikin’s lab work within 
The Open Theatre after he had ‘encountered Viola Spolin’s theater games’ 
(Harding and Rosenthal; eds. 2006:76).  The exercise was one of the first and 
continually used series of exercises within Chaikin’s lab work for The Open 
Theater (Pasolli 1970:2).  Blumenthal (1984:83) states: ‘One actor would begin a 
simple, repeatable gesture using both his body and voice, not selecting in advance 
what the action should express, but playing with it until it touched on a clear 
condition’. Pasolli (1970:4) states the repeatable gesture was to be ‘a simple, 
sharply focused action with the voice and the body, an impulse action neither 
representative of everyday behaviour nor expressive of inner feelings; a pure 
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action, as it were’.  
 
In his description, Pasolli brings out that the ‘repeatable gesture’ of the body and 
voice is understood as independent from any internal driver. However, taking in 
Blumenthal’s account, from the ‘pure action’ a ‘clear condition’ can be identified 
through repetition. Blumenthal (1984: 83) in her interpretation brings out that the 
initiating ‘somatic’ or physical, reflexive action brings about emotional content. The 
account implies that the body-voice can identify or connect to an internal impulse. 
Some sort of shaping force is at issue no matter how reflexive the somatic 
response is.   
 
What is at stake is a responsiveness that can bring about, from the depths of one’s 
being, an affective responsiveness that is intrinsically moral. Again and similar to 
Rogers, there are traces of the Kantian understanding that within our internal 
make-up is an ethical monitor. Rogers’s monitor was human affect. It was 
articulated in his understanding of authenticity and formulated as congruence, 
meaning that how one felt internally needed to match up with one’s external 
attitudes and behaviours.    
 
As a student actor, I learned that if something felt incongruent within my playing, I 
was being false, for instance, using stereotypical characterizations that did not 
belong within the theatrical work being rehearsed or interrogated within the lab, or 
responding in a pre-determined manner when it was not warranted within the play. 
In other words, I experienced a sense of dissonance. As a therapist working with 
the kids up City Creek or within the Romeo and Juliet exercise; kids who had 
grown up playing the Legend of Zelda when they could experience themselves as 
principled warrior-heroes, I counted on this internal monitor to exist within them. 
 
Within the theatrical experience, the feeling of congruence can suggest that there 
is synchronicity between players, and movement towards intersubjective 
understanding. The physical body through abstract movement somehow, within 
Chaikin’s understanding, should hook up to internal impulses that eventually, when 
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carried out between actors, build synchronous understanding or experiences 
between actors. Adding to this understanding – that a goal of lab work is to build 
an authentic actor – it is a small leap from this perspective to understand that 
something deeply moral charges the synchronous experience between members.  
  
A major assumption of this exercise, when viewed through Blumenthal’s account 
in conjunction with Pasolli’s, is that somatic expression initially can be abstract, but 
when carried out repetitively, leads the actor to recognise or experience a specific 
condition that is usually not accessed. It reveals hidden aspects of the self of the 
actor. The actor is opened up. This understanding of an internal access appears in 
writings by Jung, who built a dichotomy between a persona and an authentic, 
interior-located self (from a discussion with Carl Levenson and Judith Hutton 
Levenson, Pocatello, Idaho, 14 August 2014). As a drama student, I did the Sound 
and Movement exercise influenced by this understanding. When working with the 
kids at City Creek, the understanding backgrounded my ambitions as a counsellor. 
 
The epistemology: openness, objectivity, and the self 
The understanding that we have the capacity to be open is built upon the 
assumption that there exists a self that is self-aware, and can differentiate 
between self and what is outside the self. The self who is open to experience is 
simultaneously objective and subjective – even when self-absorbed or feeling 
immersed within an experience.  
 
As a student actor I never fused with my character so that I couldn’t tell who was 
who, or was so disassociated that I could not tell my imagination from my situated 
reality within the play of the studio. Such fusion was an ideal and non-attainable. I 
understood this. However, the ideal kept me chipping away at any personal 
roadblocks that might inhibit that imaginary condition. My understanding was that 
the more open I became to the reality of my character in an experiential way, the 
better I could understand it. I took for granted that my perception of my imaginary 
other was managed by a perceptual capacity that was not fragmented into a divide 
between objective and subjective realities.  
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My sensitivity has historical roots. Heidegger, a phenomenological philosopher, 
captured the dual human ability to self-immerse and self-differentiate when he 
conceptualized the self as ‘standing-out-in-itself-from-itself’ (in Fried and Polt, 
trans. 2000: 15). The statement captures how, at one-and-the-same-time, I am 
subjective as well as objective when experiencing my-self or the world outside 
myself. Within Heidegger’s conceptualization is the understanding that though 
intrinsically subjective, the self is not solipsistic: it is strongly aware of what is 
outside it. By being thusly aware, Heidegger’s self can open up to the possibilities 
‘of being’, as he would have framed it. His was an ontological statement.  
 
Contrastingly, as a humanist, I am concerned with how I should act towards my 
other when considering what it is to be open, which is a statement concerning 
ethics. I rely on Heideggar’s ontological account. I have to, since being open to my 
other is crucial within my practice. When applied to the authentic actor-self, the 
concept of being open means letting go of taken-for-granted shaping by one’s past 
practice environments and the expectations experienced within them. I am 
speaking of good practice. However, in order to have such an aspiration, I must 
operate under the assumption that the self is capable of being self-objectifying. If 
the self can objectify itself, it can objectify its other or the world outside itself. This 
aspect of my understanding is important because social construction easily slips 
into solipsism. If solipsistic, one cannot be understood as capable of being 
authentic or ethical. Authenticity becomes a useless term because you can’t be 
anything else. The consideration of ethics is impossible in a world of one. 
 
 As I have interrogated my practice within this research, social construction has 
begun to inflect my understanding of what constitutes ethical practitioner conduct. 
If authenticity is at issue when considering one’s ethics, it means that the actor-self 
can understand her or his world and the other to a fairly high degree. Such 
understanding would especially be reinforced, if as I claim in Chapter Two, we 
internalize the principles that shape or are extractable from the dominant 
philosophies that help construct us culturally. As put forward, internalized, the 
principles can be understood as features or characteristics of who we understand 
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ourselves to be. With both phenomena in place, we can claim understanding of 
things outside our self. Nevertheless, this kind of understanding can be taken too 
far.  
 
Within the ethics of mid-twentieth century phenomenology as proposed by Martin 
Buber, objectification of one’s other was considered unethical when in personal 
relationship (Buber in Smith trans. 2004: 34). Objectification, as Buber understood 
it, was projecting on the other and their world your interpretation of how things are 
or should be. This meant that you were not allowing yourself to experience who 
the Thou was and how that other actually existed in the present. His was a 
principled argument against objectifying, as was Rogers’s.  
 
For Chaikin, objectifying social or cultural setups was an important part of his 
experimentation within the lab environment. Again, his Perfect People exercise 
exemplified this. Also, his desire to access the internal self of the other could be 
considered an objectification process, or at least is the first step in the process.  
He broke, in this regard, with I/Thou philosophy where Rogers did not. 
 
Being in the moment 
If sensitivity towards the other is at issue within a practice, as it was at The Open 
Theatre, it meant that the company (and Chaikin along with it) was aware of the 
hazards of being too objectifying when working with one’s other.   
 
This awareness fits with a commitment to the principle of openness. The actor 
must be deeply open to the field of experience, including everything and everyone 
within it. This speaks of being so highly focused on what is going on around you 
that you are not working from pre-formulated expectations of what practice should 
be. You are in the moment, in other words, and freed up. 
 
As a student actor, I learned that I had to stay existentially present in order to be a 
good actor, meaning I could not jump ahead of myself within the playing. Chaikin’s 
Sound and Movement exercise was meant to keep the actor in the moment. 
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Keeping in line with the experiment, the student actors at the studio would play 
imaginary ball, again forming a circle. In the physicalisation of throwing an 
imaginary ball, the actor meant to catch the ball has to physicalize his or her 
response according to how the other actor throws the ball. That means 
immediately reacting to the speed of the throw, the ball’s weight and density, its 
size, and the force it was tossed or slammed with.  
 
As a director working on The Gospel According To Eve, part of my master’s 
project, I used this form of physicality when attempting to get the actors to open up 
and become more immediately responsive. Using a foil that is a small wooden 
dowel instead of a heavier metal foil echoes this kind of physicality. As does the 
movement to the drums and keyboard of my kids up City Creek. 
 
Being centred 
Being centred, a state in which the body and mind are free of tension and relaxed, 
is also understood as a state of readiness for whatever is out there and might 
come one’s way; the self is open, in other words. I learned this concept when I 
was a student-actor. It is a concept, or as I took it, an actual condition where my 
body and my mind are unoccupied by concepts but ready for whatever was in my 
field of experience. Centered, the actor was understood as capable of creating 
from their authentic depths of being, which would open them up creatively. Central 
to this understanding is a core assumption of Chaikin’s: that at our deepest and 
most intrinsic levels, we are creative. 
  
Rogers thought this as well. This kind of understanding translates into ethical 
terms: at our best, we essentially are creative and are meant to let go of the status 
quo in order to be more open to experience. The use of ‘Dog’ with my kids to help 
them centre before doing the fight scene in the Romeo and Juliet exercise 






Building an ensemble 
The building of an ensemble as a culture of its own, and galvanized through new 
experiences of playing, was an important ambition of Chaikin’s. According to Lee 
Worley, an original member of The Open Theatre, the labs were integral in 
formulating the original ensemble of actors that made up the theatre. In an 
interview in Boulder, Colorado, she disclosed that the ensemble initially was a 
tightly knit unit that needed to immerse itself in the play of the lab. The exercises 
and the techniques that came out of the labs, according to Worley, made The 
Open Theatre what it was: a non-imitable grouping. It was inferred that the skills 
built within the labs were not easily transferable to actors who weren’t steeped in 
the methods from the initial moment that the actors developed as an ensemble.  
 
In the interview with Worley, she stated that, when Chaikin eventually brought in 
new actors on an impermanent basis to work in the performances, the ensemble 
suffered, and it was the beginning of the demise of The Open Theatre (Lee Worley 
interview, Boulder, Colo., 19 July 2010).  
 
Lee Worley is one of the people to whom Chaikin dedicated The Presence of the 
Actor.  What she suggested was that the actors later brought into the ensemble 
were not versed in The Open Theatre’s culture. Chaikin, in effect, frustrated a 
formulating method; one that facilitated strong, enmeshed interactivity within a 
company of people, and was the outcome of long-standing relationships forged 
through hard, immersive, and exacting work. The company, or rather the 
ensemble, understood what it was to work, not only as individual and distinct 
members of a collective working from their own personal depths of experience, but 
from the depth of the collective experience as well. Such depth was an outcome 
built by active behaviours and attitudes developed by the ensemble that set up 
conditions particular to the company. 
 
Chaikin gave a very different account of the problem. For him, the actors had 
succumbed to the trappings of notoriety and had lost their work ethic as authentic 
actors. This account is in direct contrast to Chaikin’s envisioned actor, as spelled 
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out within his book. An envisioned actor, as he saw it, should be able and willing to 
violate all past responsiveness and conditioning introjected by a status quo. This 
was a centralizing research topic of his lab work with the actors of The Open 
Theatre (Chaikin 1972:7-8) that inspired its experimentation. 
 
Personalism, subjectivism, solipsism and differentiation 
Chaikin’s practice philosophy was pinned in what can be characterized as 
personalism, or rather, subjectivism. Personalism is heavily reliant on the 
supposition that there is a self to speak of, as well as a psychology that explains it. 
Psychologically, the self is explained through terms or conditions that are 
‘anchored in perception’. James Bugenthal in his work, Challenges Of Humanistic 
Psychology (1969), states:  
 The self-anchored mode of research holds that a careful consideration of  
 the single case is often sufficient for the truth in psychology. More 
 important, this view maintains that a person carefully observing his own   
 subjective experience can add substantial and dependable insight into 
 the nature of human behaviour (Bonner, 1965; Stephenson, 1961). The 
 psychologist with the gift of imagination knows that there are occasions   
 when, in order to comprehend the nature of human nature, there is no  
 substitute for his own human nature. Experience has taught him that  
 often he can understand human beings only by the means of his own   
 humanity. (62) 
 
What this means for a practitioner is that if they have sufficiently researched their 
own experiences through their subjective nature, they can generalize truths about 
the practice environment and the people within it from their own subjectivity. 
However, such generalizations rely on some conventional understandings that are 
culturally received. Chaikin’s received understandings can be identified as 
psychological defenses. The understanding that there exist psychological 
defenses shaped his subjectivity and what it was to be an actor-self. 
 
Phenomenological psychology addresses a self shaped through experiential 
processes. When shaped through experiential, here-and-now processing, the self 
is thought to be more authentic. Chaikin spoke of the set-up in opposition to being 
authentic. His understanding of the set-up was through the lens of defenses that 
were in response to an outside world. In this, his subjective understanding was 
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conjoined to objectivism. However, he fell pray to solipsism. 
 
Highly personalized experiential processes are regarded as the legitimate manner 
by which to determine authenticity, but confining one’s actions and thoughts to 
them runs the risk of developing an isolationist view of the human condition. As 
isolated beings, we are imprisoned in an interior world; we become victims of our 
own interior psychology.   
 
Central to the understanding that we are strongly or predominately subjective 
beings is that we are alone and have great difficulty understanding what exists 
outside our ‘selves’. We are, in effect, hugely alienated from the world around us 
because of our perceptual limitations. As perceptually handicapped, we cannot 
grasp what exists outside of us to a useful degree of objectivity. In other words, we 
exist super-differentiated from our environments and the others within it. If we are 
basically solipsistic, there is very little possibility of coming to a symbiotic 
understanding between people. Chaikin also understood people as interrelational. 
We cannot speak of a strong interconnection between people without 
acknowledging that we recognise difference. Interconnection presupposes 
difference. 
 
A complicating factor, when trained to believe that symbiosis between actors can 
occur, is that strong subjectivity makes it difficult to speak of collaborative efforts 
through the use of language or through concepts that are not highly abstracted. 
Chaikin relied upon strongly abstracted accounts of what it took to shape the 
actor-self. The Midsummer Night’s Dream is an example (Chaikin 1972: 140-144). 
 
Another objective of his exercises was to explore symbiotic understanding 
between the members of the ensemble through sensorial mediated processing 
together. For example, when doing the Hobbit exercise, we had to use bodily 
sensations understood as synchronously experienced between members of the 
ensemble, rather than verbal cues, to support our playing and experimentation. 
Our reliance on the understanding that sensory connectedness would occur while 
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doing the exercise presupposed that at the same time we could have objective 
and subjective understandings of what was occurring. Our perceptual capacities 
as actors were in dynamic relation to one another, in other words.  
 
Existential psychologists in mid-twentieth-century America took up the 
existentialist understanding that we are alienated beings. They were interested in 
the emotional life that occurs within a person’s psychological interior because of 
that strong sense of alienation. What Chaikin spoke of concerned perceptual 
capacity rather than strictly existential alienation. One can view the human 
condition as one of suffering because of an alienated nature or because of 
perceptual limitations; both biases make it difficult to derive an ethics of practice 
from either perspective.    
 
Abraham Maslow captured a consequence of the view that human beings are 
alienated in his article Existential Psychology: What’s In It For Us? He stated that 
alienation makes it difficult to work out ‘the concepts of decision, of responsibility, 
of choice, of self-creation, of autonomy, of identity itself.’ (in May ed.1961: 57)  For 
me, these ethical considerations are ones that fed into the construction of 
American democracy.  
 
Democratic essentialism relies on the assumption that we are predisposed to 
working out ethical terms because we have the capacity to think objectively. We 
can get outside ourselves. Existential phenomenology, with its strong concern for 
subjectivism, sets us up to see ourselves as not naturally predisposed to working 
out these ethical terms and concepts. Since they can apply to both individual 
selves and the greater communities of people that make up a nation, fully 
addressing the terms requires that there is enough subjectivity to apply the 
concepts to the particular and enough objectivity to generalize them into 
abstractions that apply equally across a population – in the cases being 





The set-up, congruence and introjection 
As stated, the sensibility that we are primarily and strongly subjective beings 
backdrops the lab work done by The Open Theatre in its examination of ‘the 
setup’. The setup poses us as socially moldable into images that are not 
congruent with what is internally real. The internal impulse is associated with a 
desired real and better impulse, while a socially constructed outer image is 
associated with an unreal, adulterated shell imposed from without. Authenticity as 
congruence is at issue. For Rogers, congruence was a central issue for 
developing his counselling theory. The notion of congruence was principled: to be 
an authentic self or person, one needed to be honest about what one thought, 
experienced, and felt. 
 
A binary opposition backdrops both Rogers and Chaikin’s privileging of what can 
be termed unadulterated, good, interior impulses over a socially construed or 
shaped image representative of introjected valuing. Through this reasoning, an 
interior territory is construed as a sanctuary of real, good, better, or the authentic 
(congruent), removed from the material world and its cultural and political fabric. 
 
Chaikin understood his practice as challenging an imposed or introjected system 
of values, which, through experiential mediated processing by the ensemble of 
actors, could be uncovered. The non-repressed, or rather, authentic actor was 
understood to be more present and able to be more fully actualized within the 
experience of performance, becoming resistant to introjected values. To be 
considered fully present presupposes that the actor can become clearly 
perceivable through sensory and feeling-based knowledge by one’s other.   
 
Ways in which to be more present and authentic were interrogated within the labs 
through work done using the Sound and Movement exercises. The exercises’ 
exploration involved opening up the ensemble to non-preformulated 
responsiveness to their own and each other’s internal impulses. Central to the 
project was the understanding that such play provides the accessing of ‘somatic’ 
or ‘internal responses’ that are usually repressed, though they are authentic. What 
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was being explored was a more intuitive means of knowing. Intuitive knowing can 
be understood as transcendent knowing. In other words it not only captures the 
non-obvious, but it captures what is buried behind façades, or rather, the real. 
 
The transcendent actor-self and the basis of Chaikin’s method  
 As Blumenthal (1984:5) noted, there is a sense of transcendence in Chaikin’s 
sensibilities: ‘He has a sense of Transcendentalist wonder that is distinctly native.’ 
Chaikin has a sense of ‘transcendent wonder’ because of the phenomenological 
perspective that was within his practice. The perspective evolved some of his 
methods. Again, I refer to the Midsummer Night’s Dream exercise. 
 
Going back to Heidegger, central to understanding of the self posed as standing-
out-in-itself-from-itself is the view that the self is placed in the physical reality of 
experience. However, the self also transcends that physical reality. This self is not 
understandable as of reality (time and material space) as much as it is 
understandable as being in a reality. Conceptualizing one’s self as in a reality 
suggests that any analysis of one’s self starts with the view of it being placed 
within one’s own subjective reality. First, one needs to build a personal framework 
for understanding his or her reality before grappling with placement within an 
outside reality. This does not mean that the locus of understanding is always 
subjective. What is being spoken of is an initializing first step for inquiry. 
Phenomenological inquiry was hugely methodological. 
 
Evidence of panpsychism, or rather, radical subjectivism 
 
 Acting is a demonstration of the self with or without a disguise. Because 
  we live on a level drastically reduced from what we can imagine, acting 
  promises to represent a dynamic expression of the intense life. It is a  
 way of making testimony to what we have witnessed – a declaration of  
 what we know and what we can imagine. One actor in his acting  
 expresses himself and touches nothing outside of himself. Another actor, 
  in expressing himself, touches zones of being which can potentially  
 be recognised by anyone. 




Hulton was concerned with spatial terms used by Chaikin:  
 
he reaches for metaphors or images of ‘space’ and ‘place’, in order to 
communicate his ideas and perceptions. He speaks for example, of 
territories, zones, spheres, abandonment, exile, occupation and habitation.  
        (Hulton in Hodge: 2000: 155)  
 
Such terms convey a sense of ‘space’ and ‘place,’ and in a material sense. 
However, they can also convey a perceptual bias that is not grounded in the 
material and which became an inoculant for Chaikin’s terms and metaphors. 
Within The Presence of the Actor, there is a repeating pattern used by Chaikin of 
‘nonbehaviouristic’ and loaded metaphors. The patterning suggests a ‘place’ and 
‘space‘ where the terms become metaphors for individual, human, subjective 
experience. Chaikin speaks of levels and realms. 
 
However, Chaikin was interested in the group experience as well within his lab 
work at The Open Theatre. The terms cited by Hulton can suggest that, through 
symbiotic understanding, there exists a collective understanding that can be 
accessed through the metaphors of levels and realms. As metaphors, the terms 
suggest phenomena that transcend situation, time, and place, emblematic of a 
metaphysical reality in the vein of Rogers’s reflections on the possibility of a 
structured universe that we are all part of.  
 
Though Chaikin never directly spoke of such a universe in his The Presence of the 
Actor, it seems to lurk behind his use of mystifying terms like ‘levels’, ‘spheres’, 
and ‘realms’. Understood as physical territories, these metaphors seem concrete, 
which suggests that they have a structural and real content.  
 
Despite this, when reading Pasolli’s depiction of the exercises used within 
Chaikin’s labs, it appears that Chaikin’s lab work can be broken down into 
empirical terms. Pasolli accomplishes this by centring on observable activity and 
the sequences of events that make up the exercises. However, his empirical 
depiction leaves something out:  Chaikin’s use of the metaphorical terms. Pasolli 
(1970: 4) speaks of the ‘inhabiting’ by the actors of ‘the same kinetic environment’. 
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He goes on to qualify this statement as a reference ‘to the body and the voice.’ 
The terms body and voice are empirically coherent, easy to observe, replicable 
through behaviour, and suggest Chaikin’s ties to a material sensibility. However, 
for me, that characterization never rings true as complete. 
 
Pasolli’s project was to outline the exercises so that they could be used as a 
template for teaching situations or company development. His project had an aim: 
it captured behaviours. Taken on its own, Pasolli’s work can be misleading. If 
Blumenthal (1984: 15) was right in her statement that The Open Theatre ‘wanted 
to explore the non behaviouristic’, there needs to be an additional accounting. 
Chaikin did appeal to knowing that is outside observable data: to ‘things ... that 
have not existed before (Chaikin 1972: viii)’ which might identify (referring back to 
Hulton) the absent context loaded within the structure.  
 
The project of unpacking a content, in which is embedded a transpersonal model 
of communication, is evidenced in the Midsummer Night’s Dream exercises. 
Within this series of exercises, Chaikin wanted to explore the relationship of the 
actor to the audience. The exercises were not about direct audience address, but 
rather, concerned what can ‘pass’ between the actor and the audience. In the 
explication of the Midsummer Night’s Dream series, according to Chaikin, there 
existed a level of understanding between actor and audience that is best 
described as communing.  
 
Chaikin (1972:141) notes that these exercises were worked on during ‘the fall of 
1966’. ChaIkin’s frequently used term ‘levels’ was put in the context of being an 
intermediary field of communication for the actor. The terms levels, zones or 
spheres were loaded with the possibility that a transpersonal field of 
communication existed and that panpsychic communication is a reality.   
 
Chaikin’s construing of an imagined person as an intermediary field of 
understanding was problematic. It was a study of actors and what they hoped 
occurred within their relationship with the audience when performing. In effect, the 
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series of exercises was an exploration of solipsism, an extreme form of 
subjectivism. The exploration was part of the context within the framing of locales. 
In other words, radical subjectivism was one of the ‘new perceptions’ and new 
experiences (Chaikin 1972:58) that helped formulate The Open Theatre’s work. In 
the explication of the Midsummer Night’s Dream exercises, Descartes’ problem of 
‘cut[ting] the mind off from material reality [occurred]. It transformed consciousness 
into an isolated entity contemplating its own modifications’ (Donceel 1967:187). 
Also, the collapse into solipsism implied that the actor was lost in her or his own 
head or experiencing, and therefore, the actor’s position as an efficaciously open 
practitioner, able to ‘draw his impulse from a liberated consciousness’ (Chaikin 
1972: 9) was compromised.  
 
Abstraction and the intuitive process 
 
The theater, insofar as people are serious in it, seems to be looking for a 
place where it is not a duplication of life. It exists not just to make a mirror of 
life, but to represent a kind of realm just as certainly as music is a realm. 
But because the theater involves behaviour and language, it can’t be 
completely separate from the situational world, as music can. But much 
passes between people in the theater which is intuitive.  
         (Chaikin 1970: 25) 
 
Chaikin’s reference to music illustrates that his use of exercises within the lab 
environment was concerned with abstraction as a way into the intuitive process; a 
kind of locale not located by the constraints of time and space. 
 
As Hulton brings out, Chaikin built a practice environment that speaks of locales, 
but in my understanding, they are not totally materially explicable. There are 
locales of understanding articulated within Chaikin’s work that have to do with 
transpersonal models of understanding, or radical symbiosis.  
 
Though Chaikin stated that ‘[t]he terms realms, levels, modes, are all ways of 
trying to define a territory of experiencing’ (1972:128), as ways, they have a 
common psychological denominator: subjective experience informed by the 
unconscious. Pasolli states:  
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Transformation taps the unconscious resources of the actor, who, in 
jumping from situations which he would not necessarily understand 
rationally. Thus the device mines levels of meaning in a given situation 
which might not be otherwise evident.   
          (1970: 20)   
 
Importantly, Chaikin speaks of levels in a way that suggests there are multiple 
levels of understanding that may feed into the unconscious. 
 
Chaikin (1970:66) further states that ‘[t]here are streams of human experiences 
which are deep and constant, moving through us on a level below human sound. 
As we become occupied with our own noises, we’re unable to be in that stream’. 
This statement, on the surface, suggests that there is a whole internal world to be 
in touch with as an actor. The statement is not particularly problematic when 
speaking of the single actor. However, when attempting to share this experience, 
or open one’s self to another’s experience, it becomes problematic. The 
Midsummer Night’s Dream series of exercises exemplifies the problem. In the 
exercise, there is the actor, the intermediary who is a person that houses qualities 
that exist within the actor and audience, and there is the audience. A through-line 
of relationship and communication is hoped to be established by the intermediary, 
which in effect, functions as a perceptual field so that there is connection and 
understanding between the actor and the audience. 
 
Gestalt and the problem it poses for an ensemble  
Jill Dolan (2005: 6), in an account of Chaikin, emphasized his hope to shape a 
better world than the one offered by the American political-economic culture of his 
time. She captures what the term transformation should embody when speaking of 
value: 
  
Theatre and performance offer a place to scrutinize public meanings, but 
also embody and, even if through fantasy, enact the affective possibilities of 
‘doings’ that gesture towards a much better world or, as director Joseph 
Chaikin, the famous founder of The Open Theatre, once said, ‘a dynamic 
expression of the intense life’.  
 
By offering concentrated, interpersonal, and wish-oriented moments, theatre 
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 becomes a privileged, intimate arena of human experience within which 
  one can demand that the promise of another dimension of existence be  
 revealed, and that the impossible be achieved/experienced here and 
  now, in the presence of other living human beings – the impossible,  
 namely a sense of unity between what is usually divided in our daily  
 life: the material and immaterial, the body and spirit, our mortality and our 
 propensity for perfection, for infinity, for the absolute. 
                (Chaikin in Dolan  2005: 6) 
 
From Chaikin’s description of the theatre as he envisioned it, it is not difficult to 
assume that transformation should build a total experience between actor and 
audience. Chaikin was interested in a certain type of locale that the actor and 
audience inhabited as one; a place of contact where both merged and that can be 
understood holistically: a gestalt. What the research of the lab aimed to uncover, in 
part, was a method by which there could be mutual or synchronous experience.  
 
The goal to make the actor simultaneously expressive with their internal 
experience yet communicative with other actors and an audience, can collapse 
practice into panpsychism, or rather, a transpersonal model of communication as a 
way out of solipsism. The desire, as Blumenthal (1984: 1) suggests, to ‘transmit 
conditions that have no adequate expression in life or art: feelings too extreme or 
elusive to have a vocabulary, too complex or subversive to have a forum’ makes 
the practitioner especially vulnerable in this regard.   
 
Penetrating ‘elusive forms of understanding’ that originally were meant to further 
understanding of the self as a self (actor-self) becomes problematic, since Chaikin 
wanted to broaden out the phenomenological address. He wanted to transpose 
the considerations of the self and its subjectivity as though it resembled an 
ensemble playing as an organic whole or gestalt. Unfortunately, Chaikin used the 
same terms and conditions when addressing the singular actor as when 
addressing the plurality of the ensemble.   
 
Chaikin’s exercises were meant to build a common vocabulary of understanding 
within the ensemble, especially at the non-verbal and experiential level. The aims 
of the Sound and Movement exercise bore this out. Groups of persons communing 
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experientially require a different understanding of how one knows than one that 
comes from a philosophy of a self situated in its own reality. The terms that make 
sense of one project, do not necessary translate to another when speaking of 
communicative processes.  
 
Importantly, Chaikin addressed a group that was understood to be built from its 
members’ simultaneous experiences. This was evidenced in the Sound and Music 
exercise. A question comes up for me: how did they differentiate in order to 
communicate? However, the question misses the point: Chaikin’s desire to find 
wordless communication and terms that might explain it meant he aspired to tap 
into what it meant to be symbiotic. Actors tell of experiencing such an inter-related 
relationship and the non-verbal communication that comes from it when practicing 
ensemble. Counsellors do also when working within a practice inflected by 
phenomenological understandings of what it is to be a self in one’s own world.  
 
Where Rogers theorized about panpsychism and transpersonal models in his later 
writing, Chaikin actively and intentionally tested the models out to a degree not 
evident even within Rogers’s encounter work.  
 
There was a desire to test out telepathic transmission of experience, which was 
articulated in the vernacular of the day as a giving out or getting the vibe, or being 
on the same wave-length.  
 
There is that level on which we live where we deal with obtainable 
 information and assumptions and we exchange with one another the  
currency of data. Then there is that other level, from which we also act,  
where there is no possibility of fixing conclusions or exchanging facts. In 
that creative stage the actor is in a bafflement which has no sophistication 
and no direct information. He has suspended his personal protective armor 
and is without what we know to be an organized identity. 
         (Chaikin 1972: 26) 
 
Hulton (in Hodge 2006:156) reminds us that Chaikin, within his practice, ‘was 
articulating an ‘explainable structure’ with a content that is ‘untranslatable’. If that 
was the case, the actor’s job was to make the ‘content translatable’ through the 
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activity of the labs, perhaps not through verbalisable language, but rather, through 
exercises that promoted physical and psychic interrelational activity between 
actors, which over time made what can be termed experiential sense amongst the 
actors of the ensemble. The Sound and Movement is an example of such a 
project. The term intersubjectivity captures the exercise’s project.  
 
Both Chaikin and Rogers, through their praxis, expand the application of the terms 
and conditions of existential phenomenology, a project originally concerned with 
the singular individual, to interpersonal communication within groups. Communing, 
or rather, transpersonal means of communication, became an important 
consideration as they imply the ambition to unite understanding symbiotically. 
What in effect was occurring was an attempt to explain a moral ground where the 
individual and interrelationships mattered. In effect, both were constructing the 
launch pad for social constructionist concerns. 
 
Rogers’s articulated a strongly transcendent level of communication, so that his 
later writing was permeated with the ghost of deism. He built a metaphysical 
picture of the universe, each entity comprising the whole, related intersubjectively 
in a pantheistic manner, and suggesting, more or less, a universal gestalt. Chaikin 
did not push so strongly along this path, but the mystical pervaded his book, as 
Blumenthal points out. The problem for social construction, today, has been taking 
up aspects of Rogers and Chaikin’s address while framing it in a different 
epistemology and ontology. Before these ideas are understood, it is difficult to 
figure out a practice ethics. A problem for me is that applied theatre has not fully 
turned this corner. The problem may lie, in part, because an actor’s training needs 
a balance built through more materialist pedagogies. 
 
Somatic and sensate experience 
Within Chaikin’s work, somatic, kinetic, and sensory experience that offer a unique 
kind of knowledge are put in opposition with ‘intellectual understanding’ (Wolford 
1996: 108-109). This makes it extremely difficult to qualify a symbiotic exchange or 
communicative event. Qualification relies on criticality and the objectification that 
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goes with it – both, domains of intellectualism.  
 
However, actors claim to have experienced this specialized knowledge within lab 
work, and speak of the ‘energy’ that passes between players (Zarrilli 2009: 94-95) 
or an ‘act of possession’ (Brook 1996: 110); or ‘somatic perception’ (Wolford 1996: 
108-109). A recent example is applied-theatre practitioner James Thompson 
speaking of an I/Thou Ethic as meaning ‘[b]ecoming sensitized ... to the other’ 
(2009: 169). My assumption is that ‘being sensitized’ means using one’s sensory 
abilities in order to become sensitive towards who the other is. Being sensitized 
can mean perceiving my other directly, without projections, intellectualization, or 
conceptual structuring of who that person is.  
 
When I have worked with a client for a long period, the sensitivity seems to exist 
when engaged in counselling. However, it is a very difficult experience to verbalize 
without resorting to explanations that sound rather esoteric. And, as Hulton 
stresses, you can build structures that can be identified with it, but the content the 
structures house defies direct verbal articulation. 
 
Rogers did not fall victim to esotericism because a metaphysical plan framed his 
understanding. Rogers was interested in psychology as philosophy and as the 
modernists understood the term philosophy: as reflective of a huge system of 
understanding that revealed the truth of our ontological being. In addition, they 
held that they could find it through material means. 
 
Universal truths tend to suggest that we are all interconnected, and therefore, to 
entertain that we are able to communicate through levels of understanding that are 
outside the commonplace or pedestrian. Rogers was interested in uncovering ‘a 
way of being’ in his final work. The project suggested the way of being. Attached to 
the way was a platonic vision of ideals that formulate thought and its processes 





Chaikin was not interested in fixed systems, but in the living out of ‘detours’ that 
call upon the rarified levels of communication associable with spiritually conceived 
metaphysics, an essentialist concern which tends to collapse into justifying an 
ultimate fixed system; one that is universal. 
 
The actor-self as a continuous stream 
  
 When you see differently, both you and that which you see has changed.  
         (Chaikin 1972: 118) 
 
The visualizing of one’s other as a ‘content’ that can be compared with one’s self-
content creates a dynamic of contrasting parts. The dynamic created can be 
looked upon as dialectic. Importantly, the dialectic forces an objectivity that is a 
prerequisite for change. Chaikin was interested in a continuous process of change 
that brings up new choices for the actor. Such an understanding is consistent with 
Husserl’s understanding that our consciousness is ‘a continuous stream’ where 
‘[t]he separate objects of perception are those parts of the stream of 
consciousness which we as subjects constitute by intending them’ (474). The 
continuous stream builds a perceptual field, in other words. However, the stream 
can be divided. This occurs through interpreting what the parts mean or are.  To 
intend, as a subject or self, parts of a stream of consciousness, means to put the 
parts in a meaningful content. The intending is a prerequisite for understanding 
difference or if change has occurred. Once a meaningful content is developed, it 
can become self-reinforcing, and intending no longer matters. Chaikin wanted to 
avoid this. 
  
Chaikin’s understood that his labs should provide a ground whereby the actors of 
the ensemble could be engaged in a dynamic process suggestive of an ever-
expanding feedback system of growth and development; not in a hierarchical 
direction towards a universal good, as became the case with Rogers, but one lived 
in the moment on the brink of astonishment (6) and discovery (1): an actualization 
process with no ends in an ideal. Actualization was a temporary setting for Chaikin 





Unlike Rogers, for Chaikin, ‘reality‘ wasn’t ‘a fixed state’ (8) where there one could 
arrive at a fixed end. Where Rogers spoke of realizing a utopic vision, Chaikin 
spoke of what it took to live through reality without a destination. The authentic 
actor, in this regard, needed to be understood as continuously enlarging her or his 
potential. Intention expands potential. 
 
However, like Rogers, Chaikin’s practice was concerned with development and 
movement towards possibility. Rogers was yoked more into an idealism that found 
its roots explicitly in modernism. While he claimed that his practice was radical, he 
also saw himself building onto the existing truths offered by Enlightenment 
understanding, which characterized the human person as individual, or rather, 
special and unique within an understandable universe. He worked with previously 
fixed concepts.  
 
Chaikin’s formulation of his practice was an attempt to understand the world of the 
‘new theatre’ (1) and the consciousness it could build. A similar ambition is 
recognizable in Rogers’s therapeutic practice, but not to the extent it is found in 
Chaikin.   
 
Chaikin understood his practice as framed by questions (Hulton in Hodge 2000: 
155), and the ‘answers’ provided as ones that ‘blow the questions out of the 
water’. This is in keeping with his understanding that the practitioner needs to be 
‘touched’ by their ‘continual astonishment and bewilderment’ (Chaikin, 1972: 87).  
Chaikin was about continual disruption, while Rogers was concerned with how the 
individual fit within the best scheme of things. Chaikin’s last statement, the end to 
his meditation, is taken from Susan Sontag: ‘The best answers are those that 
destroy the question’ (161).   
 
Establishing how I view principles 
The stuff of Rogers’s practice resonated with me over other theoretical offerings 
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when, years after attending the studio in London, I entered a master’s program in 
mental health counselling. The master’s program I attended was set in a rural area 
of Southeast Idaho. The culture and geographical setting seemed light years away 
from Studio 68 of Theatre Arts, London. However, the theoretical stuff of either 
setting offered an ethical perspective from which to govern practice that was very 
similar. Much of Chaikin’s book exemplified the main practice concerns of Rogers: 
build openness and an opportunity for transformation, and build the perfect 
individual or actor that exemplifies openness and transformation in action. The 
characteristics, for both individual and actor, that were understood as facilitating 
these goals, were being self-determining and self-directional, thereby frustrating 
the status quo. However, these qualities were not so rigid as to frustrate 
interconnectedness between practice participants. 
 
Importantly, for me as a practitioner, both the setting of counselling and actor-
training offered techniques of practice built on specific assumptions of what 
generated good practice. The assumptions easily broke down into principles or 
ideals, and they appeared to be quite similar across the practices. The similarity 
lent a universality to the underlying assumptions, and gave me a strong sense of 
what is right or wrong, or rather, good or bad, for the world in general. These grew 
out of my modernist assumptions.  
 
Hierarchy 
Being open to possibility was a core motivator of both Rogers and Chaikin’s 
practices. To manage this central goal, they each attempted to create techniques 
that fostered interdependence without compromising self-direction. Ideally, being 
open, according to both Rogers and Chaikin, was thought to contribute to a 
symbiotic experience between all involved within the activity of practice without 
compromising individual integrity. It is a small leap to considering that what 
happened for one experientially, happened for all. In other words, there existed a 





With the understanding that there is a symmetry of experience occurring within the 
ensemble, it is reasonable to suggest that a common ground of practice can be 
constructed. From this rationale, it seems plausible that directives, creative 
activity, and the establishment of techniques, if provided by someone within the 
group, is understood to be provided by all. What this implies is that a condition of 
the work is being enmeshed, and that blurred boundaries between the jobs of 
director, player, and writer are enabled.  
 
Ethically speaking, enmeshment or gestalts imply that a collective responsibility is 
established that will promote a best practice. This sensibility echoes the 
Romanticism of the late nineteenth century, which gave rise to the social worker 
movement. 
 
Problematically and paradoxically, such an underlying rationale can become a set-
up that facilitates takeover and authoritarian leadership. Chaikin gained executive 
control of The Open Theatre, and then was able to make executive decisions 
concerning the company, despite his ambition to create a group gestalt. Even with 
the understanding that there could be symmetry of experience, coupled with the 
mind-set that what happens for one happens for all, when Chaikin assumed strong 
control of the his lab and the directorship of the company, a hierarchical 
arrangement ensued. However, according to these terms, he was not taking 
control. He was exercising the control and responsibility natural to the group of 
players within the gestalt of The Open Theatre. This is a way to view the 
company’s history if one tries to make sense of it according to a logic that is 
offered when group gestalts, agency and common grounds are in question.   
 
Needless to say, a power structure was put in place within The Open Theatre that 
frustrated a core assumption of the processing of the lab work. There needed to 
be a good deal of self-direction and self-actualization going on in order to frustrate 
a status quo. Homogenizing the group into a holistic unit did not necessarily build 
a collective that always functioned as a close-knit, enmeshed group. It built a 
group gestalt psychologically, but not political cohesion. And it took an expert, 
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someone who could maneuver and manipulate between the psychological gestalt 
created, to manage the tensions between Chaikin and the other members. A 
negative dynamism was introduced when a core principle for the initial formulation 
of the group was disregarded. It enabled a compromising politics that was played 
out by the whole company.  
 
Psychologically, the group understood itself; holistically and politically the 
members of the group came to see themselves at odds. In other words, there was 
a mismatch between psychological understandings and the politics. By the time 
Chaikin ended his tenure at The Open Theatre, he had assumed strong control 
and many in the company had become bitter. Blumenthal, in her work, Joseph 
Chaikin (1984) explored the politics of the company, which was clearly run by 
Chaikin (141-144).     
 
Collaborative play was emblematic of The Open Theatre. Harding and Rosenthal 
point out that collaboration within the ensemble was an outcome of an 
environment created from a fluid dynamic within the immediacy of the moment 
(Harding and Rosenthal, eds. 2006: 12), and through a climate of ‘openness and 
receptivity (2006:27)’, or rather, attunement. This resonates with Rogers who 
viewed climates as something created through methods of practice that 
established open conditions for therapy, or rather, receptivity between the 
engaged. What contributed to the climate was a common ground of practice where 
each member worked as an equal part within the whole. The goal was to displace 
a hierarchical system of work where power differentials got in the way of the 
creative impulse. As Chaikin (1972: 15) stated in The Presence of the Actor, ‘The 
discipline comes about through creating exercises which bring up a common 
ground to those who study together.’  
 
When reading Chaikin’s work, I had a sense of the ensemble as always turning the 
corner and walking into new, unexplored territory. What I came to understand was 
that from this freeing experience, a climate is established that is not contingent 
upon an authoritarian presence. What also followed is the sensibility that everyone 
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within the ensemble has a job that defines him or her; however, no job is more 
important than another. What is important is the collective whole. The goal to 
frustrate hierarchical arrangements between people was exemplified in Rogers’s 
encounter work (Carl Rogers On Encounter Groups, 1970), which occurred at the 
same time that Chaikin was building his practice within The Open Theatre.  
 
Being open to always turning the corner parallels Rogerian therapy, which begins 
each session open-endedly; a strategy meant to keep the practitioner from 
assuming an expert role and becoming directive rather than facilitative.  
As a practitioner, I do not push to go beyond the reference or parameters set by 
the client’s narrative. I do not ask to go back and rehash the narrative developed 
within past sessions, or project what our professional relationship should 
accomplish for the future. Therapy starts with a ‘hello’ on my part, and I wait until 
the client gives the cue to proceed. If the client is silent, only after sitting with the 
silence do I say: ‘You are silent, there is a small smile on your face, and your eyes 
are red and swollen, and your face has a huge black and blue spot’, for example. I 
do not point out the contradiction evidenced by the smile and swollen eyes. I 
simply point it out, then let the client take the lead. Through this technique, the 
session starts open-endedly and the corners that might be turned are made 
available for the client. As the client opens up and I continue to stay non-directive, 
the session begins to take on an inter-subjective character. Responsiveness by 
both the client and myself seem to be strongly co-sympathetic, so that it feels like 
some internal alignment has occurred between us.  
 
Empathic attunement 
In The Presence of the Actor, Chaikin (1972: 116) spoke of the technique of 
jamming. Jamming, for a Rogerian practitioner of my brand, refers to being 
empathically attuned to the other through experiential or sensory means, which 
allows one to grasp the other’s personal reality through ‘points of contact’. 
‘Storytelling’ provides points of contact through ‘words, sounds, movements, and 
silences’ (Ibid). Through the telling, ‘the storyteller wants the listener to make 
contact with some of the same points that he did’ (Ibid).  For a Rogerian, 
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storytelling and the points of contact generated by it create an empathic 
encounter. 
 
In the Perfect People exercise, Chaikin built devisings that spoke of the non- 
empathic conditions that arise when a market-driven set of values dominates one’s 
culture. Central to his statement is the understanding that institutions, and the 
cultures that house them, should be driven by empathic attunement towards the 
populations they target.   
 
At the heart of Chaikin’s argument is a humanistic project, which is identifiable also 
in Rogers’s writing. The considerations and projects of science, industry, and 
governing cannot be divorced from an ethical or moral ground. Institutions provide 
shaping forces that make up the individual. As non-empathic, or as a force that 
shapes the individual for its own benefit, there is a disruption between the values 
of the institution and the authentic citizen.   
 
The experiential nature of knowledge 
Along with constructing techniques that could foster a symmetry of experience that 
would bring about an understanding between participants within practice, both 
Rogers and Chaikin privileged personal subjectivity when conceptualizing their 
practice philosophy. This privileging, when applied to rules and standardization 
meant that personal, lived experience trumps the standards and rules. It is easy to 
conclude that knowledge, skill sets, setups, or end goals imposed by a status quo 
contribute to unethical behaviour. This rationale complicated the politics of The 
Open Theatre. Experts or directors impose. The understanding of the kind of 
perceptual framework necessary to build the ensemble did not match up with the 
politics. 
 
A problem of abiding by a status quo of practice is that it is generally associated 
with authority. Having an authority within a practice means that his or her practice 
agenda will dominate the ensemble – it will, in effect, be a status quo of one. 
Dissonance will prevail amongst the group if a formulating aspect that forged the 
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group was to frustrate hierarchical arrangements within practice. Any counsellor 
who has done marriage and family or group work understands the negative 
dynamics that will ensue within a relationship if its originating values are 
compromised without being explicitly reworked. In the case of The Open Theatre, 
the members would have not only have had to rework their politics, psychology, 
and perceptual understandings, they would have had to rework the practice 
principles that governed each. Creating movement towards possibility and the 
promoting of openness within practice would have had to be reworked in their 
understanding, and not from a rationale that promoted an idealistic or utopic 
democratic vision. 
 
The self of the actor 
Embedded in the understanding of the self (the person in Rogers’s case, and the 
experimental actor in Chaikin’s) is the understanding that the individual is 
inherently and, therefore, ethically at their ideal best when capable of cultivating 
the capacity to be open, transformational, in tune with their experience and other, 
and self-directing and self-determining. These understandings, within an 
essentialist framing, can lead to a specific rationale. If such capacities are 
naturalized within us, what is suggested is that principled actions are also 
naturalized within us. We are inherently ethical. Our selves are meant to behave in 
certain ways to promote a good. The rationale is problematic for a practitioner who 
operates from the principle of openness, a respect for difference, and believes the 
goal of practice is continual disruption. 
 
However, and not so problematically for me, the rationale that we are naturally 
good supports the view that we are of a humanity; one that is wired to do good, 
both collectively and as individuals. To acknowledge this means that I have to 
bridge individualism with collectivism within my understanding of what practice 
should amount to. As a Rogerian practitioner, whether I am speaking of humanistic 
counselling or applied-theatre practice, I need to set-up conditions where my 
other, whether individual or group, can become opened up to possibilities of 
viewing their world and the others within it. It also means that to the best of my 
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ability, I cannot impose a solution or end goal that would frustrate the open 
condition created within practice. I have to trust that my other is wired to build a 
suitable end goal for his or her self. 
 
The principle 
My overall inquiry within the research is principled. My argument not only concerns 
examining what my personal practice ethics amounts to, it also concerns taking a 
strong position against scientist-practitioner models of care when working with 
over-institutionalised individuals.  
 
Principled arguments generally appeal to an individual who is strongly idealistic. 
And idealism is usually pinned to some form of essentialist thinking. However, I 
recognise that ideals meant to be operationalized through actions understood as 
ethical behaviours (principles in action) are culturally generated. If this is the case, 
cultural exposure and shaping are the sources of my brand of essentialism. This is 
an important consideration for a practitioner who started out this research as a 
fairly entrenched essentialist in the modernist sense, and then switched, mid-
research, to considering herself a modified, or cultural, essentialist.   
 
The understandings gleaned across Rogers and Chaikin’s practices, have 
significance for how I can view what a practice principle is. If the core goal of a 
practice is to open up the engaged to possibilities of being as a self or actor, it 
follows that the core practice principle concerns being open. As a practitioner I find 
that having goals within practice is synonymous with having principles and 
operationalizing them. In other words, my means and objective are the same. It 
follows that any actions taken within practice, ones associated with a particular 
goal or principle, will amount to principled behaviour.  
 
My ground of practice is justified through my cultural essentialism and the 
principles that are embedded within it. It is not justified through the view of having 




Principles of practice concern positive values, meaning they promote my ethical 
positioning. In the case of being open, an ethical action is one that promotes 
openness. When I am open to possibility within practice, I am, therefore, ethical.  
As a Rogerian, I am ethical when I take on the attitudes of being congruent, 
empathically attuned, and unconditionally respectful and consequently exercise 
behaviours that operationalize those attitudes within practice. These behaviours 
were understood to create open conditions within therapy by Rogers. 
 
If the goal is to build openness within a practice, the principle of openness needs 
to be open to interpretation in order to promote openness to possibility. That 
means it has to suit the situation and person because as a practitioner I have to 
keep my client safe. The ACA mandates this. In this sense, it is a soft guideline 
rather than a strong determiner of practice behaviour. This is where judgement 
comes in and puts me in the driver seat regarding how open to possibility one can 
be under certain circumstances; this is a form of discretion. I had to use such 
discretion when working with the women in the prison. I have had to use similar 
discretion when working with so-called ‘cutters’ that want both attachment and are 
fearful of it. Following the same line of logic, if being open within practice is a core 
goal, as a principle it cannot be understood as an absolute marker of what should 
happen within practice. How open one should be will need to be negotiated. This 
will soften practitioner influence but not obliterate it.  
 
I am a modified essentialist, modified by the understanding that my brand of 
essentialism fits with social construction. I understand the person (self or actor) as 
shaped by cultural values. The values are represented by principles that mark out 
an ethics. A question surfaces: can a practice truly aspire to work outside the box 
of cultural shaping? As I understand it, it can – that is, if a core cultural value is to 
create openness towards one’s other and circumstances that promote it. However, 
I don’t think that within present-day America such a value is likely to be sustained. 
Special interest groups representing or influenced by financial institutions continue 
to run our country. Profit over promoting the building of an activated and educated 
citizenry is the main concern of governing institutions, whether they concern 
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health, education, government, or legislative, executive or judicial action. Further, 
there appears to be a general apathy amongst the American public concerning this 
issue. We seem to be too absorbed by the desire for personal comfort and 
technological distractions.   
 
I do not regard principles as simply extractable or reductive elements of a practice 
ideology. I understand principles as important markers or architectural elements 
that build one’s practice context and represent what is of value within a practice. 
As architectural elements of a practice ideology, principles, along with the 
behaviours they suggest as good practice, help shape the practice climate. 
 
Standardization 
Chaikin’s view of us all as intrinsically of humanity is evident in his references to R. 
D. Laing, the existential-phenomenological psychologist:  
  
 If we are stripped of experience, we are stripped of our deeds; and if our  
 deeds are, so to speak, taken out of our hands like the toys from the  
 hands of children, we are bereft of our humanity. We cannot be  
 deceived. Men can and do destroy the humanity of other men, and the  
 condition of this possibility is that we are interdependent. We are not self- 
 contained monads producing no effects on each other except our  
 reflections. We are acted upon, changed for good or ill, by other men;  
 and we are agents who act upon others to affect them in different ways.  
 Each of us is the other to the others.  
            (41) 
 
From an I/Thou perspective it is a small leap into accepting that we as individuals 
or as collectives participate in a humanity; an understanding that fosters the sense 
that we are interconnected and responsible for one another. If this is the case, 
behaving responsibility means understanding the other as other, and not as a 
projection of my ’self’ as a practitioner. Any rules, standards, principles of practice 
or theories that are developed because of the individual relationships created 
through interconnectedness need to be understood as very particular and evolved 
through the circumstances that are present within the moment. If standardization is 
an issue when building an ethics of practice that resonates with Rogers and 
Chaikin’s praxes, it means that standardization must concern an open debate and 
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a strong consensus.  
 
Building standards of practice is reductive. Chaikin’s practice was not reductive. 
He was interested in facilitating the actor to grasp the whole event of the lab work. 
He stated:  
 
The actor’s ‘attention’ should be ‘on the whole event’. He must know the whole 
event in all its incongruities, seeing the chaos clearly. From that perspective we 
have a better view of the structures in which we live, these structures being 
arrangements we make to deal with chaos. (40)  
 
A goal of Chaikin’s was to continually broaden out the possibilities of playing. An 
outcome was that the workshops or labs that he conducted within The Open 
Theatre became a ground for conducting ‘research‘ and experimentation (Hulton in 
Hodge 2000: 154). His research and experimentation was fed by many threads of 
understanding associated with differing philosophical perspectives. Because this 
was the case, Chaikin’s practice was naturally resistant to standardization. 
 
What was to be ‘discovered’ can be associated with ways of thinking that were 
starting to be established within the American conscious, and not necessarily 
within the theatre status quo. Two defenses traditionally associated with 
psychoanalysis, and basically redefined to fit the project of social consciousness-
raising, became influential – projection and introjection. Each defense, understood 
on a social scale, can be found in Rogers’s writing and Chaikin’s The Presence of 
the Actor.  
 
Heddon and Milling (2006: 42) claim that The Open Theatre had an ‘explicit 
interest in play as a social and professional activity [and that it] was ideologically 
inflected’. The statement does not suggest that one single ideology influenced ‘the 
play’. The ideology referred to was a blending of ideological contexts; ones that 
came out of the disparate fields of theatre, psychology and the philosophy of 
phenomenology, and that added a strong and difficult-to-decipher complexity to 
Chaikin’s understanding of what theatre should be. As the ideology behind his 
practice was an amalgamation of philosophical outlooks, or inflecting ideologies, 
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there was no definitive through-line of valuing within that praxis. Any ethics 
referred to was a hybrid or a synthesis. Building synthesis is antithetical to deriving 
reductive standards for practice from chaos.  
 
As with Rogers, any interpretation of Chaikin’s ethics runs the risk of catering to a 
bias in order to manage a through-line of valuing. However, catering to a bias has 
its up side: a through-line of valuing acts as the final word for one’s practice ethics 
and provides a sense of certitude that you ‘act well’, as Aristotle would frame it. 
However, a through-line of valuing is difficult to apply when the practitioner has a 
philosophically pluralistic view of what their world should be or amounts to. 
Standards rely on an existing through-line of valuing that can be isolated when 
reducing practice concerns. 
 
Trying to understand Chaikin and how his practice intersects with different 
philosophies can become terribly complicated because he was interested in the 
ephemeral. Chaikin wanted the actor to explore an ephemeral kind of gestalt, or 
metaphoric location that is not directly observable. Its parts can only be implied 
and are resistant to ordinary, concrete understanding. Standards are concrete. 
 
In making something from the felt chaos of exploring such a location (Hulton in 
Hodge 2000: 155), Chaikin’s project concerned measures that were capable of 
dealing with what can’t be seen or yet understood. Chaikin termed what was not 
yet apparent to understanding by the actor as levels (128), zones (2, 5, 8, 25), and 
realms (5, 9, 138). This is similar to Rogers’s when he became infatuated with 
panpsychic, or transpersonal means of communication. Transpersonal 
communication is not concrete. 
 
A reaction and articulating the goals of the chapter 
My turning towards applied theatre practice came about as a reaction against the 
scientist-practitioner model of therapeutic practice. The political clout of the 
philosophy behind this model dominates U.S. therapeutic practice. A result is that 
humanist practitioners, such as myself, are marginalized and find it difficult to work 
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according to their owned practice ethics. One of the results of this marginalization 
is the wiping out of the dynamism needed and created by oppositional or diverse 
views of counselling practice. The pluralism needed to address populations of 
clients that have been over-institutionalised is stopped in its tracks.  
 
It is an educated assumption of mine that clients (my engaged other), over time, 
become desensitized and resistant to methods that are a variation of or a 
repackaging of the scientist-practitioner model, which is an industrial and 
technological paradigm of practice based on efficiency and results. The relational 
context needed to practice caringly and according to the client’s identified needs is 
missing. 
 
I consider the scientist-practitioner model industrial and technological because the 
psychology and science behind it claim to identify a recognizable problem, have 
the ability to apply a standardized protocol of objectives to manage it, and 
successfully target outcome goals. As a Rogerian and humanistic counsellor, I 
understand that, although there can be a science and a human psychology at 
issue within the therapeutic setting, treatment is foremost a philosophical and 
relational issue when at its best. Rearranging behaviour is not sufficient to bring 
about human change, a sense of well-being, an experienced shift towards positive 
self-esteem, or interconnectedness with one’s other. Behavior change or 
rearrangement is only a small piece of the therapeutic pie. 
 
The problem is compounded when systems of mental health care are parsed out 
to private management firms such as Optum. Though research shows that all 
therapy works as long as the relational element between therapist and client is 
present, Optum requires that therapy be done according to the scientist-
practitioner model, and Optum manages mental health care in most U.S. states.  
 
Further complicating the situation is the gatekeeping enforced by the American 
Counseling Association (ACA), which privileges the scientist-practitioner model of 
therapeutic practice through its standards of practice. The standards are worked 
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into many state-licensing boards, which govern who can practice as a counselor 
within the state and what is acceptable practice.  
 
With the homogeneity brought on by the effects of the over-institutionalisation of 
relational activity, it is difficult to call on techniques and the principles that under-
gird them suggested by the ethical practices of Rogers or Chaikin. Being open, 
authentic, spontaneous, ever-curious, and transformation seeking does not 
resonate with a system that seeks homogeneity through the privileging of the 
scientist-practitioner model of therapeutic practice, which is based on 
behaviourism and the control of responses and cognition. 
 
So, what is a humanistic practitioner to do? I have been unable to choose between 
identifying my-self as being a mental health therapist using applied theatre 
practice or being an applied-theatre practitioner using Rogerian practice strategies 
and the ethics that promotes them. As James T. Hansen, a clinical psychologist 
and academic, brings out in his Philosophical Issues In Counseling and 
Psychotherapy (2014), humanistic counselling does not really belong in the 
category of mental health. This means that one’s mental health and well-being are 
not strictly reducible to treatment as the science of psychology.  
 
My sensibility is that psychology does not make the self, at least in its entirety. 
Psychology is a cultural creation in many regards, and not simply an uncovering 
and articulation of a narrow nature that, when evaluated and applied, cannot be 
reduced only to the categories of ‘behaviour’ and ‘cognition.’ A personal 
psychology can best be built through interconnection between others. The self can 
be built only through relationships and the experiences that can be shared within 
them. 
 
I acknowledge that it requires a philosophy to build the construct of what we call 
the ‘self’, and that this can only be accomplished in relationship with others who 
are also structuring their self. This is not to say that we don’t have innate 
characteristics. We do. The study of genetics bears that out. Darwinian theory and 
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the theories that have been generated from it bear it out. I may have natural 
characteristics, but they do not arrive with me in this world pre-shaped by an 
intact, comprehensive system of personally abstracted or cultural meaning.  Any 
natural characteristics that I may have, arrive fairly inchoate in terms of systematic, 
structured meaning.  
Natural characteristics have to be made meaningful through cultural articulation. 
Philosophical outlooks manage this. The philosophy is received, reshaped, and 
added on to, but not necessarily through co-sympathetic philosophical structures. 
It may be disowned. What ultimately shapes us is a dynamism mediated by 
clashing values amplified between systems of understanding.  
 
To answer the question of where humanistic counselling belongs, I have to look at 
the overall goals of my practice, which are: to promote a sense of belonging to a 
humanity in all its rich diversity; to build interconnectedness; to create 
operationally a means by which my engaged other can build a sense of self-
direction and self-determination, while feeling they are a part of a community 
holding the same democratic principles. But not least of all is the goal of promoting 
a practice that can adapt to the moment and circumstances, not only on my terms, 
but according to those of the engaged, as well.   
 
Counselling practice, as promoted by the American Counselling Association’s 
ethical standards and various organizations like Optum, rules out such practice 
concerns as being central to therapy. Problematically, applied theatre practice has 
not come into its own within the U.S. Institutions do not hire in applied-theatre 
practitioners. Insurance companies do not have the discipline listed as a treatment 
option, although it is sometimes supported by difficult-to-obtain grants or university 
programs. As a practitioner working within a poor, rural area, it is simply stupid to 
think that it’s possible to make a living through private pay. I was naive enough to 
try when working as a counsellor. 
 
Exacerbating the problem is the Licensed Professional counselor or Association’s 
suggestion that the therapist do ten percent of their work pro bono. Making a living 
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is complicated. As a dedicated humanist practitioner, I did a lot of pro bono work. I 
had a difficult time turning good people, especially children, away. This reality of 
rural practice affected my more humanistically inclined cohorts. Institutionalized 
systems of care let people slip through the cracks if they don’t meet criteria for 
care. In my community, counsellors very often take up the slack. 
 
As an exclusively applied-theatre practitioner, my livelihood is at stake. Also at 
stake is the ability to belong to a community of practitioners that identifies itself in a 
particular way and lends each other professional support. There are academic 
positions available to teach applied theatre that give it a presence within individual 
communities, but they are limited, and the politics involved in getting these 
positions is difficult to negotiate. As an applied-theatre practitioner in southeastern 
Idaho, I am a practitioner without a strong anchor. 
 
In view of these considerations, the question still stands: what practice best 
accommodates achieving my overall goals? Hands down, it is applied-theatre 
practice. The interrogation of this research is the threshold from where I begin to 
move beyond doing therapy. The step ‘beyond’ is found in engaging my other in 
relationship through theatrical practice. 
 
Through the research, threads of understanding associable with social 
construction have been attributed to constructing applied-theatre practice. 
However, there are many more philosophical contexts that shape it. In addition, 
applied theatre generally starts with the ethical imperative that the practitioner 
needs to respect difference and critically understand it. Sometimes, that can mean 
understanding what does not philosophically shape your practice. 
 
We are in an age where different cultures, ones that historically have been 
estranged, are interacting. That is true even for someone living in southeastern 
Idaho, a region that has historically been culturally homogenous. Dominating 
cultural and social philosophies that once determined the relationship between 
cultures have been challenged as the politics between differing cultures have 
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shifted according to hierarchical, commercial, economic, technological, and 
political arrangements. That means differing philosophical outlooks may be 
ascending within our culture, and are present even on a global level. As cultures 
shift into view on a global scale, the practitioner’s practice ethics will have to 
accommodate them through critical, comparative, and dynamic evaluations.  
 
Within Chaikin’s The Presence of the Actor there are whole categories of 
understanding that remain unexplored. In his book, the influence of Brecht can be 
identified. I will certainly meet and be challenged in my own thinking on what 
constitutes ethical practice by practitioners influenced by Brecht. His strong 
materialism in contrast to my modernist, ideological essentialist, 
phenomenological, and social constructionist-inflected ethics might open up new 
opportunities from which to build positive oppositions, and thus, a dynamic from 
which to critically evaluate new possibilities that will expand my understanding of 



















Challenging the Universal Applicability of Codes or Standards 
 
 [T]he post-modern perspective shows the relativity of ethical codes and 
 of moral practices they recommend or support to be the outcome of the 
 politically promoted  parochiality of ethical codes that pretend to be 
 universal[.] 
                   (Bauman 1993: 14)  
  
Scrutiny or due-diligence 
  
 Ethical decision-making is an evolutionary process that requires you to 
 be continually open and self critical. 
         (Cory 1977: 51) 
 
Cory’s statement matches up with Pendergast and Saxton’s challenge. To meet 
the challenge posed, I traced my understanding of both Rogerian counselling 
philosophy and my drama school’s brand of experimental theatre that is traceable 
to Joseph Chaikin’s The Presence of the Actor 3 in Chapters Two and Three. In 
both chapters, parallel values and principles for practice were uncovered. Both 
Rogers and Chaikin’s practices, over time, had been naturalized within my work so 
that they were regarded as essential givens of practice; for me, they were 
examples of best practice. However, the incorporation of what can be termed my 
brand of experimental theatre, influenced by Rogerian counselling practice, into a 
type of applied theatre, required a more in-depth interrogation of the ethical 
implications rendered by the addition of a new practice resource. To practice 
ethically means to scrutinize one’s practice assiduously, and not simply 
establishing and relying that one’s well-meaning intentions are carried out through 
one’s practice strategies and methods. Due diligence is in order.  
 
Having due diligence as a practitioner means interrogating the through-line of 
values and principles that underscore one’s practice methods. The through-line in 
                                            
3 The combination of both Rogerian counselling ethics and my received brand of experimental 
theatre ethics garnered while at drama school which is traceable in Chaikin’s work, will be termed 
Rogerian practice within Chapter Four and Five. The combination signifies my crossover from a 
dual practice to an applied theatre practice. 
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my case is built on the principle of being open. It also concerns the promotion of 
the ‘client’s needs’ though setting up a condition where they can self-actualize and 
become self-directing. The condition is fabricated through interrelational activity. 
As Welfel (2006: 49), a clinician and researcher, states: ‘Due diligence [ ... ] is a 
consistent attentiveness to the client’s needs that takes priority over other 
concerns’. I would add that, in meeting the ‘needs’, a clear understanding of one’s 
practice ethics is required. 
 
Welfel (Spruill et al., in Welfel 2006: 49) furthers the statement above by qualifying 
it in terms that speak of method: ‘A more valid and objective criterion for 
competence is one’s effectiveness in helping clients, in developing plans for 
counseling, in implementing those plans, and in evaluating the outcomes of 
counseling’. The diligence Welfel cites via Spruill is not the definition of due 
diligence that can be derived from my particular practice. The terms are adequate 
for an empirical model. Welfel’s definition of diligence is predicated on objectivity 
driving the method, not through an understanding of interrelational activity secured 
through philosophic inquiry. I consider philosophical psychology a particular kind, 
or subfield, of the discipline of psychology. It is through interrogating my 
philosophy of practice that I understand the principles in place that govern my 
relationship with my other. My practice needs to be understood firstly as principle 
driven rather than technique driven. 
 
Additionally, Welfel shapes the meaning of the term objectivity. She shapes it to 
mean ‘knowledge that can be freestanding’. Freestanding knowledge can be 
interpreted as standing apart from an ideological or philosophical driver. She 
states that when practitioners further their competencies through education, ‘they 
need to ascertain whether the proposed training ... is based on scientific evidence, 
objectively obtained’. She implicitly suggests that scientific evidence stands 
outside human perception and interpretation. As used in philosophical terms, 




Also implicit in her statement is the collapsing of a mental function, objectivity, into 
science and its methods. This maneuvers the term so that objectivity can be 
regarded as synonymous with its subject, empirical science, and the subject’s 
exemplars or methods, rather than understanding objectivity as an action of 
distancing that is a property or function of cognition. Consequently, any properties 
that empirical science has, and are operationalized through its methods or 
exemplars, will be considered as having moral or ethical weight in determining 
standards. Importantly, the properties and methods will become linked to a 
cognitive function, which then confers a function with moral or ethical weight.  
 
Implicitly, according to Welfel, if science is knowledge, so is the act of objectivity 
by association. Science, its methods, and the ability of human cognition to 
differentiate between self and other become positively valued. Here the term other 
is used differently than in the rest of the research: it is used to both signify the 
other as other and to distinguish one’s self from the physical world. The function of 
differentiating, or objectivity, is morphed into an ethical attribute and is imbued with 
the status of representing best practice. Objectivity is successfully collapsed into 
ethical action and substantiates empirical science as standing above any other 
models of practice.  
 
My view is that the perceptual function of objectivity is to promote the ability to 
grasp what is other; a being that is outside oneself. The capacity does not 
automatically garner an ethical currency. It is an ethical embellishment bestowed 
by one’s practice philosophy, or rather, ideology.  
 
The term objectivity is usually conveniently put in opposition with subjectivity. 
However, this is a false dichotomy or divide. It speaks of the ability to differentiate 
the internal world of a constructed self from the outside world of other. If we didn’t 
have this functional ability, could we survive the world of the other? Could we 
differentiate between the other and ourselves? The divide speaks of our ability to 
make comparisons, contrasts, correlations and connections, and distinguish 
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contradictions, tensions, and conflicts; abilities associated with cognition and 
critical thinking, but not with ‘Knowledge as Truth’ as the author implies.  
 
As a Rogerian, I do not presume that I come from a moral ground because, 
objectively speaking, I can distinguish differences between others, including 
myself. My ethics is pinned to the relational, a feeling of inter-connection because I 
understand us all as being of humanity, a common denominator between different 
people. My understanding of this is found in the philosophical: modernism, 
romanticism, phenomenology, existentialism and I/Thou ethics. My practice as a 
Rogerian is absolutely reliant upon this understanding. It is the baseline universal 
of my practice, whether the universal is present within my practice philosophy 
through a sense of commitment, or through a classically essentialist position. The 
philosophical underpinning is what allowed me to practice in a foreign country as a 
young actor doing children’s theatre so long ago. 
 
The systemless system 
 
 Terms of practice are value loaded: [E]thical convictions purport to reflect 
 something objective[.] 
                       (Stephen Darwall, 1998: 21) 
 
 
One of my pre-research assumptions was that both Chaikin and Rogers’s 
articulation of ‘open systems’ of play and therapy, purported to be fairly 
structureless and having the appearance of being spontaneously devised, were 
just that. As systemless, the selves of the persons that comprised the systemless 
systems were considered to be equally liberated from the constraints of 
prescription that the term system normally implies (Chaikin, 1972: 12, 15; Rogers 
1995: 345-47). The person, or rather, self, in this sense, became a ‘reality’ that ‘is 
not a fixed state’ (Chaikin 1972:8) and one that has a ‘liberat[ed] consciousness 
(Chaikin 1972: 9). These understandings intimated that systems could exist 
without well-fortified cultural or ideological anchors, so that any practice that was 
derived from such a liberated construct could be very fluid – and, more particularly 
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was imagined as able to yield material not previously explored. Sometimes the 
material was truly original; meaning it seemed to come out of nowhere.  
 
Is choice real? 
In attempting to understand my owned ethics of conduct, a question arose: Is the 
practitioner primarily a reflection of the ideology or ideologies that offer structure 
and context for their practice? Acknowledging that there can be an ethics of 
conduct presupposes that a choice can be made between what is desirable action 
and what is not. If we are conditioned and shaped to act according to an ideology 
that instructs behaviour and creates the professional self of the practitioner, can 
we say there is such a thing as discrimination when addressing practitioner 
conduct? Choice making requires the ability to be discriminatory. 
 
My personal practice ideology values acts and attitudes that are freeing; bring 
about personal change, openness, and flexibility; and provide choice-making 
opportunities. Democratic principles are recognisable in what is valued. I 
understand that when these principles are made operational they are existentially 
real. However, I also understand that because of negative conditioning, my other 
has to make a strong and active effort to operationalize the principles. And, it takes 
repeated exposure to the existential condition created within humanistic therapy. 
 
When these characteristics are operationalized, a climate is set up so that the 
client can act, feel, and think more freely and openly, and personal change can 
occur. The Romeo and Juliet and the City Creek exercises illustrated in Chapter 
Two, for example, evidenced this, as did my training as an actor when using the 
Sound and Movement exercise. The goal of all three exercises was to make 
operational the feeling of being freed up, making spontaneous choices, and being 
flexible within a given, immediate situation. Through experiencing these principles 
in action, introjects were set up that might be internalized by my other.   
 
In order to experience the principles in action my other needs to be confronted by 
a positive opposition that creates a dynamic through which she or he can engage 
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in the process of discriminating and choice making. For the client positive 
opposition usually involves expectations culled from within their lived 
circumstances that don’t authentically represent who they feel them-self to be as 
opposed to an ideal version of who they think they are.  
 
As a modified-essentialist practitioner, I have multiple possibilities at my disposal 
to build contrasts or oppositions within the therapeutic encounter because I am 
philosophically eclectic. For example, I might draw on modernism, 
phenomenology, existentialism, I/Thou ethics, romanticism, or social construction 
to create a climate that promotes an effective dynamic. I can also draw on the 
dynamic identifiable in both Chaikin and Rogers’s work where relational 
interconnection is put in positive opposition to differentiation. 
 
As a Rogerian practitioner, when I approach my other, I do so from the 
understanding that inherently she or he possesses the qualities of being of worth 
and dignity because my understanding of humanity is garnered from a humanistic 
perspective. However, as a social constructionist, I also understand that a person 
self-constructs through taking on introjects. Introjects are not things-in-themselves. 
They are fabricated from the attitudes and actions that express them and that 
moves therapeutic processing along. The attitudes are coveyed through actions 
that operationalize congruence, empathic attunement, and unconditional respect, 
creating a practice context or climate. As a practitioner, I want to provide a practice 
context that facilitates my other’s internalizing of what I consider positive 
characteristics, which is a form of essentialising. I consider this fair when working 
with persons shaped by and accepting democratic forms of political philosophy. 
Since these principles represent a constructed political culture, these 
characteristics are conditional and not universal, and therefore, can be chosen or 
disowned.  
 
To understand the characteristics, or principles, of my practice, I also have to 
understand them dynamically in relation to what it is to be of humanity. The 
understanding that clients are of humanity modulates the egoism inherent in the 
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mentioned principles, which speak of strong individualism. An example of this 
within actual practice is found in Chapter Two, when I was working with the male 
client who was fragmenting psychologically and tried to sexualize the therapeutic 
relationship in order to gain some control. I pointed out that because he was 
feeling vulnerable, an assault on his sense of self, he needed to use a method of 
control, one that he’d used in the past to feel safe. I also set strong boundaries for 
behaviour. However, behind my confrontation I always conveyed the sense that 
my other was of humanity and naturally of worth. I did not shame him or throw him 
out, thereby showing understanding and acceptance of him as a person. Through 
experiencing what it was to be understood and accepted within the therapeutic 
encounter in contrast to unacceptable behaviour, my client was offered the 
possibility of building a positive introject that could facilitate his self-actualization. 
In the future he choose to not use sexualizing behaviours. 
 
This example ties into my training as an actress. It was similar to working with Val 
Colgan, who never appeared to interpret the student actor’s work as bad, wrong, 
or undeserving of comment or attention. She was very warm and attentive when 
giving feedback. She facilitated the actor in critically analyzing the choices he or 
she made regarding playing. Her comments were similar to reframes. When 
working with her, I usually felt an air of collaboration. The dialogue surrounding the 
play concerned discovery. I understood very clearly that she had her standards, 
and they were evident. However, they were backed by the understanding that the 
playing concerned experimentation. That implied that my playing needed to be 
open and that I needed to take risks.  
 
As I reflect on this, I see that her directives were about managing the dynamic 
created between standards and experimentation, and not about perpetuating her 
bias. My worth in the playing was not about meeting standards. It was concerned 
with using the dynamic built from the possibilities the standards offered as a 
backdrop to the possibilities experimentation might garner. The dynamic created a 
setup for criticality that offered choices for performing. By managing the dynamic, 
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whether the student choose to perform according to Val’s feedback or not, she still 
treated each one of us as persons of worth. 
 
Val Colgan had read both Chaikin and Rogers, and she encouraged the student 
actors at the studio to do the same.   
 
Incongruence as part of my skill set 
If the exemplars of being flexible and open govern practitioner conduct when 
engaging the other, the practitioner, when confronted with different cultural 
paradigms that govern individual behaviour, groups, locales, or cultures, should be 
able to discriminate about what is needed by the client and be respectfully able to 
meet the other on their own terms and conditions. In this over-institutionalised 
world, where the marginalized get housed in arrangements that attenuate or 
revoke their rights, this goal is sometimes very difficult to achieve.  
 
In order to clue into my other’s terms and conditions, or rather, understand and 
accept them, I need to be discretionary.  By that I mean being empathically 
attuned and respectful. To be discretionary, I first need to read my own sense of 
congruence regarding my reactions to my other. If I am working in a situation 
where I feel dissonance, or rather, incongruence, it means something is not quite 
right. I am not ‘getting it’ regarding my other.  
 
I have in the past worked in institutional settings where I experienced a good deal 
of incongruence. It signals that I am not being true to myself as a practitioner. I 
can’t walk away from institutional settings; they are where the work is located. But 
when I work in institutional settings, usually those governed by the medical model 
and scientist-practitioner role, the incongruence I feel can be overwhelming. 
However, it is a useful signal. I have to weigh this internal, psychological response 
against an account of the good that I hope to promote. In psychological terms, this 
is called rationalizing, and it sometimes holds me hostage to the dissonance 
experienced. Rationalizing is not necessarily criticality. What is occurring is that I 
am struck between my principles of practice and what I feel are the wrongs of an 
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institution. Usually I am a guest within the institution and have to simply, in my 
region’s vernacular, ‘pony up’ – meaning, endure it with a sense of grit and smarts. 
In ethical terms, this reaction is due to having to compromise in order to promote a 
good for all. It also means that I have not lost sight of my resistant form of ethics 
when interfacing with a ‘dominant’ ideology and the ethical understandings 
associated with it. I have made a judgement call that is directly the result of my 
understanding that I am of humanity in all its divergent forms. My judgements have 
to concern a greater good. In other words, my sense that humanity matters 
modulates my egotistical concerns. 
 
Skill acquisitions, or the building of techniques that operationalize one’s practice 
ethics, very often happen because there has been some dissonance or disconnect 
experienced by the practitioner in the care of the other. Rogers and Chaikin built 
their practices because of dissonance; the reaction happens because something is 
at odds with the values one holds. If practice skills are developed in response to 
dissonance, the practitioner is invested in some ethical outcome prior to 
developing their practice methods. This means that all practice skills originate in 
ethics. There is no such thing, according to this view, that suggests that the 
scientist-practitioner can operationalize ethically neutral techniques, since a 
reciprocal relationship exists between ethics and techniques. The scientist-
practitioner claims that their practice is philosophically neutral. But there can be no 
identifiable problem unless ethics is at stake. Techniques target objects. In the 
case of therapy, the objects are problems. Problems exist because certain values 
exist. 
 
Dissonance can be experienced because of tensions and contradictions within 
one’s practice ideology (Bishop, 2007:17), or because of human frailty; one’s 
values and actions don’t always match up, as Rogers acknowledged with his 
articulation of congruence or authenticity. Dissonance can occur through the 
interfacing of one ideology with another, causing breaks in the logic or alignment 
of values across or between systems. The breaks, if not explicitly worked through 
by the practitioner, can leave the practitioner vulnerable to being shaped not by 
214 
 
their owned practice ideology or ideologies, but rather, by what I would consider 
negative, oppositional forces, especially if one of those forces has been strongly 
entrenched by an institution. My reaction to dissonance within practice situations 
makes me ethically aware. It also reminds me that there are difficult choices to be 
made when working in institutions that do not support humanistic practice. They 
can be made if I keep in mind that the ego needs to be in dynamic relationship to a 
humanity.  
 
One example of being ethically aware is, when working on a mental health unit, I 
encountered my other in her room self-isolating. She was sitting on top of the 
bedside stand that she had pulled over to a window and was looking out. Her 
journal was in her hand, which she closed quickly when I walked into the room. 
She did not look up. Rather, she waited for me to respond to her sitting on the 
table instead of attending ‘group’. She had a history of self-harm and had been 
hospitalized for swallowing a bottle of Ambien. Rather than point out that she was 
missing group, I pulled up a chair and sat on the arm with my feet where my 
bottom should go. I simply said, ‘You were journaling and want to create your own, 
private space’. By sitting on the arm of the chair rather than in it, I enacted the shift 
from expert therapist to her other. I met her where she was, rather than where her 
treatment plan said she should be.  
 
If I had simply said, ‘You are being non-compliant, you need to go to group’, I 
would have felt dissonance. As an employee of the institution, I had to struggle 
with not complying with her treatment plan. It was a judgement call concerning 
what was best for the client in that particular moment. However, other staff 
members might call what I did staff splitting. I was able to be the ‘good’ 
professional while the other staff members, who might have enforced the 
treatment plan, got to be the ‘bad’ staff. As Penny Bundy (in Prentki and Preston 
2009: 233), an applied-theatre practitioner, points out, survivors of abuse ‘often 
lack the ability to reflect’. This client was clearly demonstrating a need to begin the 
process by journaling. As Bundy brings out, the creation of ‘identity‘ is a 




 often lack the ability to reflect. This emerges as a direct result of the 
 dangerous childhoods they experienced. To stay alert to danger, one 
 must continually focus away from internal experience to focus in the 
 external world. The result of such learned response is a reduction in the 
 development of both a sense of identity and self-understanding. Adult 
 survivors often lack self-awareness.  
           (Ibid) 
   
 
This illustration brings up the encounter outlined above, which I experienced while 
working as a RN rather than as a therapist. I was the charge nurse and so could 
make the call that I did. However, I worked in staff as well as with the staff in a 
supervisory role. Many of the staff, especially the psych techs or CNAs, was very 
concrete and rigid in their understanding of how the ‘patient’ should behave, and 
they sometimes resented my humanization of such encounters. This was not true 
of most of the staff, however; most respected my judgement calls. Still, there was 
the issue of staff splitting, and persons who self-harm, often borderline 
personalities, are known for instigating psychological warfare, and the breakdown 
of relations. Although I did not use my expert role with the ‘patient,’ I used it with 
staff that might have resented my going against the treatment plan. My line of 
values was not without problems. Nor were they totally resolvable. To work well 
with one person or group was to err with another. It was a fact of my position. And 
it would be the same for me now, whether as facilitator, therapist, or applied-
theatre practitioner. Because of this, I have to know my ethics inside and out. It 
takes an ego in dynamic relationship with a humanity to accomplish this; it takes 
interrelational consideration interfacing with differentiation.  
 
In the final analysis, as a charge nurse, I was in the position I was in because I 
had demonstrated sensitivity to patient and staff needs in the past. As an RN, 
I had demonstrated the ability to make good judgement calls in bad or conflicting 
situations. However, my position and the justification I could give as an account of 
my actions could not act as consolation. Within the situation, it could not be 
understood as Henry Giroux (in Prentki and Preston 2009: 254), an applied theatre 
practitioner, framed it: ‘a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity 
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can spark like a dialectic’.  I simply relied upon a power differential being in place 
as a last resort for taking action. There was no ‘border crossing’ (Ibid) to speak of 
because a stronger authority than mine backgrounded every choice I made on the 
unit. The authority relied on me to humanize patient care and function in a 
humanistic manner. However, it could take me to task for using the measures I 
did, if and when it chose.   
 
Within the canon of applied theatre there is an articulation of ‘border crossings’, 
which is a metaphor for the concern over ‘strategies of self-empowerment that 
enables communities and individuals to move from one place to another’ (Prentki 
in Prentki and Preston 2009: 251). The term does not necessarily speak of 
physical spaces, though it encompasses them. It is a sphere of ‘transition‘ and, in 
my case, of negotiation between one practice ideology and the next. This is 
something that I, as either an RN or therapist in a hospital setting, have to do 
multiple times a day.  
 
Importantly, the major player between the ideologies establishes how my 
psychology as a practitioner should work, through its building of introjects as well 
as through maintaining the power differential between ideologies or philosophies 
of practice. Mental health units within the U.S. favor a model of care based in 
behaviourism. Both the introjects built from behaviourism and the maintenance of 
power differentials are in direct opposition to the psychological structuring that is 
built within me from threads of understanding garnered from the philosophies of 
modernism, romanticism, phenomenology, existentialism, and I/Thou ethics. This 
dilemma is echoed in the relationship of Chaikin to the ensemble of players within 
the Open Theatre. 
 
An important consideration for me, as I pass through the border-crossing between 
doing Rogerian therapy to doing Rogerian applied-theatre practice, is that applied 
theatre opens up a dialogue through the works of the persons just cited; persons 




As an RN, I also dealt with persons diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder. 
Usually, they arrived at the mental health unit, more frequently termed the 
behaviour health unit (BHU), via the emergency room of the hospital, sometimes 
after they had tried to tear it apart along with a few staff members. These ‘types’ 
can be dangerous, especially if they are on drugs such as PCP. Once stabilized in 
the emergency room (or not), the patient would be sent to the BHU. 
 
I always met potentially dangerous patients on arrival. The first thing I would say 
is, ‘I bet you’d like a cigarette. How about you have one out on the deck, and I’ll 
heat you up a frozen dinner. I bet you are starving. The dinners are in the kitchen. 
How about you going in there and grabbing one?’ By acknowledging my patient’s 
needs before they asked for them to be met, I created a relationship. Also, by my 
building a relationship, the patient was able to exercise his or her need for 
autonomy, or rather, self-direction. He or she was offered a chance to make a 
choice, and was also given the freedom to go into the kitchen on his or her own. I 
knew that that the patient had spent hours in the emergency room without a 
cigarette. By offering a cigarette, I enacted a recognition scene: the patient had 
needs and was worthy of having them met. I also knew that when the psych tech 
that took the patient to the deck would have a cigarette as well. This would further 
the relationship building. 
    
Best practice 
Within the literature of counselling, there is a concept termed best practice. As 
identified by Remley and Herlihy, it concerns, in part, the development of ‘a 
personal identity’ by the counselor. It also concerns ethics, which ‘involves 
becoming familiar with ethical standards for counselors, understanding the ethical 
issues that counselors encounter, developing ethical reasoning and decision-
making skills, and being able to apply your knowledge and skills in your day-to-day 
professional activities’ (2007: 2). Professional identity, according to this statement, 
is linked to the act of abiding by standards as best practice. Importantly, the 
statement ties the identity, or self, of the counselor to both the explicit and implicit 
content of a code of ethics. The explicit content concerns the concrete behaviours 
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that need to be carried out by the therapist. The implicit content references the 
ideological driver that underpins the code.   
 
Further, the authors make a statement concerning the similarity between moral 
and ethical concerns:  
 
The terms ethical and moral are sometimes used interchangeably, and they 
do have overlapping meanings. Both ethics and morality involve 
judgements about what is good and bad, or right and wrong, and both 
pertain to the study of human conduct, relationships, and values.  
          (2007: 2)  
 
The authors then differentiate the terms ethical and moral by stating that moral 
behaviour is relative to culture and a ‘personal belief system’ that ‘affects your 
interactions with others in all aspects [of] your life’. On the other hand:  
 
Ethics is a discipline within philosophy that is concerned with human 
conduct and moral decision-making. Mental health professions have 
defined ethics as standards of conduct or actions in relation to others.  
     (Levey in Remley and Herlihy, 2007: 2)  
 
If the practitioner follows this orientation in defining their ethics, implicitly, through 
the code and by extension its ideology, the ethical code should be capable of 
guiding one’s personal understanding of ethics. Objectively speaking, my owned 
ethics as a Rogerian should fall in line with the ideology that underpins the codes, 
if I care to practice according to what is designated best practice. It should also 
form my identity as a practitioner. 
 
There is a strong political aspect to the codes. What has been identified as best 
practice will determine the grounds for enforcement of the codes by ‘members of 
the counseling profession’ (2007: 3) in the form of ‘ethics committees and 
licensure and certification boards’. The ideological underpinnings of these ethical 
codes most popular amongst the learned professionals, who make up these 
committees and boards, will determine the ideological undercurrent that shapes 




Ethical Responsibility and Social Advocacy 
  
 In recent years there has been an increased awareness of the ethical 
 responsibility of counselors to alleviate human suffering on a broader 
 scale. No longer can practitioners afford to confine themselves to their 
 offices if they hope to reach a wide group of people who are in need of 
 service. Many mental-health professionals now emphasize social action 
 by exerting their influence against such wrongs as discrimination against 
 women and minority groups, the continuation of racism in society, the 
 neglect of the aged, the inhumane practices against children. 
         (Cory 1977: 51) 
 
 My criticism will be in terms of where things seem to be locked. The 
 balance we have to keep is how to discourage ourselves from going in 
 directions which are noncreative, indulgent, and in imitation of 
 constrictive social attitudes, while at the same time leaving ourselves 
 open and available to the tides which are full of life and energy, informed 
 from a vast and infinite place that enlarges.  
         (Chaikin 1972: 85) 
 
 
Prior to this research, I had thought that the similarities captured within Rogerian 
therapy and experimental theatre amounted to the best way in which a practitioner 
could respect the needs of marginalized and vulnerable populations, and manage 
the process of doing so by building a common ground of practice, particularly one 
that was devoid of a hierarchical embodiment of authority. I also thought that such 
a position yielded transformation for those others engaged so that an ‘authentic’ 
voice could be expressed. To promote these sensibilities, I built an axis of practice 
values that concerned intimacy building, the promotion of self-worth, a sense of 
being authentic, unconditional respect, receptivity and congruence. However, I 
was a counsellor working in the closed system of therapy. Something was missing. 
 
By incorporating my brand of applied theatre into practice, I was making a 
deliberate move to work as a social advocate. In dealing with the therapeutic 
resistance evidenced by my marginalized other and locating the root cause in 
over-institutionalisation, I was building into my practice a resistant thread of my 
own. My practice ethics became a resistant ethics when I took up the challenge of 
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advocacy. Importantly, through building that resistant thread, I was making a 
statement: in some instances, therapy no longer works.  
 
My advocacy was in the form of recognition. Since, I recognised that there is a 
point when using therapy with the over-institutionalised does not work, I also 
recognised that theatre could provide an alternative ground of practice through my 
background training as an actor. However, to be concerned with and responsive to 
that awareness would put therapists out of work; me, in particular. My statements 
add up to saying that a different kind of practitioner, one other than the therapist, 
needs to engage these populations. It goes beyond re-visioning or re-establishing 
what therapy should be when dealing with the over-institutionalised. James T. 
Hansen, given his Philosophical Issues In Counseling and Psychotherapy: 
Encounters with Four Questions about Knowing, Effectiveness, and Truth (2014), 
might not agree with me in his argument that humanistic therapy is not therapy; 
that it simply concerns relationships. He suggests, rather simplistically, removing 
humanistic therapy out of the therapy arena and into the relational one. This 
maneuver will not help the existing over-institutionalised. It is a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing. I know from experience. 
 
Embedded in the understanding of resistance is the fact that someone does not 
want something done that is coerced or imposed upon them. My work with a 
Latina population is testament to this. So are the children I encountered doing 
agency work. My work with them at City Creek is an example of their need for 
some other means to provide options for personal growth, interpersonal activity 
and expression.  
 
In ‘crossing over’ from doing therapy into doing theatre, the main aim of my 
practice was no longer targeting personal change; it was targeting the bigger, 
cultural picture of institutionalised care-systems. Within the practice of counselling, 
and contrary to Cory’s view cited above, there is a traditional opposition by many 
counsellors to taking on the role of social activist. 
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Despite the opposition, a growing number of therapists welcome social advocacy 
as part of their professional domain. However, their voices are muffled by the 
politics of power.  
 
The ACA and human rights 
Talk of human rights can easily lead to the conclusion that an important social 
issue is expressed and weighed fairly. Within the American Psychological 
Association’s Preamble of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct is a strong statement concerning the protection of human rights: 
 
Psychologists respect and protect civil and human rights and the central 
importance of freedom of inquiry and expression in research, teaching, and 
publication. They strive to help the public in developing informed 
judgements and choices concerning human behaviour. In doing so, they 
perform many roles, such as researcher, educator, diagnostician, therapist, 
supervisor, consultant, administrator, social interventionist, and expert 
witness.  
 (American Psychological Association [APA], 2002 in Toporek, et.al., 
2006: 17) 
 
The British Association of Counsellors and Psychotherapists (BACP) states under 
the subheading ‘Values of counselling and psychotherapy’ in its Ethical 
Framework for Good Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy that: ‘The 
fundamental values of counselling and psychotherapy include a commitment to 
[the] [r]especting [of] human rights and dignity (2010: 2). 
 
Similarly, the American Counseling Association’s Mission Statement, in its Code of 
Ethics, states: 
 
The mission of the American Counseling Association is to enhance the 
quality of life in society by promoting the development of professional 
counselors, advancing the counseling profession, and using the profession 
and practice of counseling to promote respect for human dignity and 
diversity.  
          (The American Counseling Association Code of Ethics: 2005: 2) 
 
The promoting of human rights physically takes the counsellor out of the confines 
and safety of their office and into the streets, halls, and organizations of the 
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greater society at large. In other words, instigating social justice cannot be a 
position of setting up some secondary gains from the sanctity of the professional 
office, a safe place where the effects of personal counselling are understood to 
quietly bleed out into the larger community. The statements by the ACA and BAPC 
suggest that social activism is a reasonable and needed task to be taken up by 
therapists. At issue within therapy is not solely the self of a client who needs to 
rearrange their self-perception and who can manage to attain positively attributed 
‘goals’ within the narrow confines of the counselling relationship. At issue for both 
therapist and client is a social being interconnected to a greater community of 
power structures that monopolize institutionalised treatment because of their 
position of power.  As Heinz Kohut, a contemporary of Rogers, emphasized within 
his strongly, humanistic inflected psychodynamic praxis, the issue is seeing one’s 
self as efficacious within the world (Rowe and Mac Isaac, 1991: 60). The role of 
the therapist is two-fold: to address the private self of the client and to address the 
social one. In other words, within my practice, whatever form it takes, I need to 
address social agency as well as individual agency.  
 
To be efficacious within the world means that one’s greater, social sphere and 
culture are at least somewhat in sync and sympathetic with one’s ambitions as a 
practitioner. Rogers, with his involvement in the encounter movement recognised 
this (10095a: 183-185). It amounts to fair practice. Problematically, political 
fairness is not a given between a humanistic practice and the institutions in which I 
have worked. Institutionalism can frame our rights as practitioners. This is 
demonstrated in the example above when I described the client sitting on the 
bedside stand and looking out the window.  
 
As a therapist, I understand that personal psychology and social agency are 
absolutely conjoined. Rogers understood this. Chaikin, by splitting the 
psychological self from the political one of the actor within the Open Theatre, did 
not.  One way in which the client can be split off within systems of mental health 




clients may come to think of themselves as broken, deficient beings when 
they are given a mental health diagnosis. For all of the psychiatric research 
... there has been virtually no exploration of the symbolic impact of telling 
someone that they have a mental illness.  
               (2014: 19)  
 
Hansen goes on to say that diagnoses emasculate the client so that they ‘give up’. 
It stands to reason that once a client has given up they become split off from any 
sense of having political efficacy in the world, which is at least a partial result of 
the psychological-self being split off from the political one.   
 
For practitioners who work primarily with over-institutionalised, marginalized, and 
vulnerable populations, the fact that institutions can split off the personal 
psychology of a self from a political one means that I need to advocate for ways in 
which my other has ample opportunity to be an active participant within the culture 
that shapes them, and not a passive bystander.  
 
A way into operationalizing the challenge is through a creative medium. This 
means bringing into practice arts and creativity. Within such a practice, the self 
can create positive introjects that build self-understanding. The client can vision 
their self as expansive rather than a reduction captured by a diagnosis. As 
creators, their sense of efficacy in the world is enhanced, building positive 
introjects that connects the creative self with the political self. 
 
For marginalized and vulnerable populations, the introduction of art into practice 
means that they can self-heal. Becoming healthy means becoming more self-
actualizing and self-directing so that you feel yourself to be authentic in a Rogerian 
sense; in other words, you need to be your own author. Being one’s own author 
means preserving the connection between the personal and political self. The self, 
engaged as creator rather than pathologised, is given the opportunity to self-direct 
and become self-determining. In this way, the self is opened up and becomes self-
healing on its own terms and conditions. When the principles of being open, self-
directed, and self-determining are engaged within creative activity, there is a 
merger between the psychological self and the political or social one.  
224 
 
The kids at City Creek4 were, in effect, able to accomplish this through making 
their costumes and then rocking them in a special setting with only a few rules to 
govern their creative behaviour; rules that had to do with safety rather than an 
authority figure guiding their creation. The tools of their creation were being 
empathically attuned, physically present, and rhythmic.  
 
Empathic attunement and its link to creativity are expressed within the canon of 
applied theatre. In his article, “Reading and acting in the world: conversations 
about empathy”, Chris Holland speaks of the same and contrasts it against a 
‘functional (2009: 530)’ system of learning. Leigh Anne Howard, in her article, 
“Speaking theatre/doing pedagogy: re-visiting theatre of the oppressed”, talks of a 
recognition amongst applied-theatre practitioners that ‘students must be actively 
involved in and responsible for their educational processes’ (2004: 217). What she 
undertakes in her article is to address the relationship of ‘power’ and ‘identity‘ and 
the problems associated with them in the student/teacher relationship, which is 
one of ‘hierarchy’ (218). Within the paper is a call for practitioners to ‘communicate 
their own experiences‘ and mold techniques to their particular practice ‘situations’, 
instead of being concerned with ‘methods’ in addressing the problems that occur 
when issues of identity and power collide. By doing this, she states, the student 
will experience ‘transformation’ (219). Howard also states that performance is ‘a 
psychosocial exploration‘ and a ‘method of self-understanding or tool for personal 
change’ (Ibid). What is recognised within the canon of applied theatre is the 
connection between the political-self and the personal-self, a conversation missing 
for humanistic practitioners who have to use their energy defending their practice 
against a system of care that minimizes what they have to offer.     
 
The act of creation, or rather, making art, is implicitly understood as empowering. 
The space, in which art is carried out offer up the possibility that one part of what it 
is to be a self will not be split-off from another. Both Rogers and Chaikin appealed 
to this holistic aspiration through their praxes. Ethically speaking as a practitioner, I 
                                            
4 An example from Chapter Two of my using Applied Theatre. 
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believe the appeal boils down to managing a creative practice so that my other’s 
selves are not split off from one other.  
 
It is through art that my marginalized and vulnerable others can feel and 
experience themselves as active citizens, carrying out actions that shape them in 
a manner over-institutionalism has ruled out: actively experimenting and 
researching social images and roles; finding choices for actions in given 
circumstances; and accepting the natural consequences that result. Compared to 
the effects of over-institutionalisation, which robs my other of their voice and the 
opportunity for testing out the consequences of their actions or images built within 
their theatrical ‘play’, theatre-making becomes a very special event, juxtaposed to 
what has become their everyday. The example in Chapter Two of the Latina 
women’s role-play evidences the importance of actively experimenting within 
social roles. It shows the importance of play as a special event that, unlike 
therapeutic measures, opened them up to a more expansive vision of themselves. 
The example of the fight scene given in Chapter Two demonstrates the 
importance of play when it builds a context from which to vision one’s self as 
competent. This particular example demonstrates how the children and 
adolescents within the agency where I worked were able to play out a vision of 
themselves that was different from the pathologised one they experienced every 
day. 
 
Toporek, et al frame the challenge of social advocacy by appealing to the fairness 
of ‘distribution’: 
  
 [T]he distribution of advantages [needs to] be fair and equitable to all 
 individuals, regardless of race, gender, ability, status, sexual orientation, 
 physical makeup, or religious creed. Social justice within the context of 
 counseling psychology focuses on helping to ensure equity when 
 resources are distributed unfairly or unequally. This includes actively 
 working to change social institutions, political and economic systems, 
 and governmental structures that perpetuate unfair practices, structures, 
 and policies in terms of accessibility, resource distribution, and human 
 rights.  




The statement above by the counsellor-researchers is very commodity based. 
Distribution is at issue when speaking of the right to ‘resources’. However, this 
research puts forward that the opportunity for social advocacy needs to exist so 
that the client is able to feel themselves as an actor within the political process, 
and capable of preserving and promoting their dignity because of the assumed 
inherent right ‘to be of worth’ through reasonable and safe, self-elected measures 
and non-coerced methods that promote self-efficacy.  
 
The practitioner can facilitate this need by incorporating new methods that actively 
provide a space and means for of the expression of this right. Nicholson in her 
work Applied Drama: The Gift of Theatre identifies a need ‘in interrogating how 
practice in applied drama facilitates the relationship between motives and feelings 
and the more public elements of citizenship’ (2005: 28). As Nicholson’s statement 
leads, as shaped by democracy, we have an interior need to be active citizens, 
and that the act of citizenship concerns ‘the dynamic between social networks, 
personal relationships, and altruistic practice’ (2005: 33) and concerns ‘questions 
about the relationship between private actions and public responsibility, about 
values and practical action’ (2005: 33).  
 
Competing models of care 
The American Counseling Associations preamble to its Code of Ethics states: 
  
 The American Counseling Association (ACA) is an educational, scientific, 
 and professional organization whose members are dedicated to the 
 enhancement of human development throughout the life-span. 
 Association members recognise diversity in our society and embrace a 
 cross-cultural approach in support of the worth, dignity, potential, and 
 uniqueness of each individual.  
            (ACA Code of Ethics 2005: 3) 
  
Because of the statement’s appeal to ‘cross-cultural’ diversity and the ‘individual’, 
the loaded term of science can go unnoticed. Without reflection, the term science, 
as used within the quote, can be equated with a positive valuing of personal and 
cultural difference. The term inclusionary can be equated with the term through the 
appeal to ‘diversity’ and ‘a cross-cultural approach.’ For a Rogerian, these terms 
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can project that the characteristics of openness, flexibility, attunement, and respect 
for difference are active within the ACA’s code. As Kanfer and Schefft state: ‘The 
mission of the scientist is to obtain general relationships between events that 
transcend the individual subject under observation’ (1988: 13). 
 
Conversely, science positively values terms or characteristics that signify a strong 
fixity (Heppner 1999:8), such as the words predictability and reliability, which, in 
turn, are given to measurability (Sexton et.al. 1997: 148). These do not fit with the 
suggested inclusionary and flexible nature of the ACA’s code.   
Using the fixed terms of empirical research compromises my brand of practice 
ethics. If I continue to carry out work with my other, as a Rogerian practitioner 
under the auspices of the ACA, I will need to practice in the role of scientific-
practitioner governed by the medical model or behaviourism. The ACA supports 
the role and the models as best practice.  
 
A reason I turned to applied theatre while practicing was in reaction to the 
scientist-practitioner role and its governing ideology: empiricism, the science that 
the medical model is influenced by.  A strong, initializing motivator for doing the 
research was to understand my dual-practice. However, during the course to 
completion, I have come to the conclusion that applied-theatre practice, in and of 
itself, best preserves my Rogerian sensibilities. It also is a practice where I can 
further explore my social constructionist understanding of what constructs the self. 
However, I have some practical concerns about this work. Applied-theatre practice 
is not a mainstream practice in my country, and this brings on a host of problems 
in attempting to create a financially and institutionally supported practice. 
 
Moreover, applied theatre appears to be on the verge of being subsumed within 
the auspices of the medical model, which addresses pathology, or rather disease 
processes, instead of what it means to be part of a relational construct built from 
an oppositional dynamic; meaning ontologically that I am both an individual and 
relational. Placement on the precipice is evidenced in the language that identifies 
the ‘intentions’ of a model of theatre that targets an ‘integral audience’ (Pendergast 
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and Saxton, 2009: 22-23), or rather, one that is going to be worked upon and that 
has been strongly identified as having a specific need that can be mediated by 
specific interventions. Such language flies in the face of a theatre that is 
‘participatory’ and a ‘collective form of artistic and social engagement,’ a type of 
‘theatre [that] resists the isolating, passive modes of dominant forms’ (Prentki in 
Prentki and Preston, 2009: 182). 
 
Pendergast and Saxton’s article may not launch applied theatre into a purely 
empirical mode in leaning on the language of scientific methods and pathology, 
but what is considered good practice within their helping profession may be 
opened up to change. I see a danger of this in their article. I also worry about the 
same when there arises the question: ‘how do we measure, assess or evaluate 
the transformative impacts of applied theatre in all their different manifestations?’ 
(Preston in Prentki and Preston 2009: 305) This statement can be viewed as a call 
for impact studies and addresses the ethical issue of efficacy of treatment and 
accountability. Hopefully, the call does not eventually reduce impact studies and 
the understanding of efficacy of treatment to scientific method. Once this is done, 
open methods of play, understandable through a dynamic created by oppositions, 
will fall by the wayside. The field of counseling can guide the way! The scientific 
method is reductive, and it can’t handle practice that is based in philosophical 
eclecticism. Any practice that respects difference and pluralism needs to take this 
into account.  
 
It is a short step from thinking about ‘[w]orked upon audiences’ identified as having 
‘a need’, to targeting ‘pathologically driven audiences’ within institutions. In this 
respect, applied theatre that takes such a prescriptive course becomes a 
reinforcer and not a shaper of ‘resistant’ forms.  
 
Problematically, within our institutions of research, education, politics, industry, 
technology, and systems of care, scientific methods and diagnostics are the main 
ideological drivers that determine normalised behaviour, and the determinants of 
what a scientific practice ethics should look like. Applied-theatre practitioners who 
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are interested in pigeonholing audience through identifying interventions and 
outcome goals, simply become an extension of the industrial or institutional 
practice, and participate by inference under those practice ethics. While scientific 
ethics tends to downplay contextual elements when explaining human behaviour, 
theatrical practices depend upon the explanation of contexts and the interplay 
between their parts. 
 
A behavioural example 
As a therapist, when working with small children who act out through tantrums, I 
do not put them in ‘time out’ away from their others until they can settle down, 
become quiet and somewhat withdrawn, and, when quiet, reinforce their passivity 
by letting them return to their peers. This is a behavioural approach. The 
intervention is mechanical and not dependent upon building a psychological 
context of trust. It does not build a contextual world where the child can exercise 
self-efficacy. As a therapist, I interpret the intervention as one that conditions 
passive responsiveness in the child. The intervention is easy to measure in terms 
of changing behaviour. However, as a therapist of my kind, I would see the 
measurement as selective because it could not measure passivity, which is an 
internal state of being. It cannot measure a therapeutic context built from trust, 
either. 
 
Working as a Rogerian, I would sit quietly near the child, playing, doing something 
like shifting sand in a sand box. I would wait it out until the child began to engage 
in the same play, and then point out the child’s behaviours and affect while 
absorbed in the activity of playing in the sand box. I would respect that the child 
can self-direct as she or he builds a sense of trust in our emerging relationship. I 
would facilitate such self-direction with an empathic response: just being there 
playing beside the child, without judgement, expectation, or recrimination. I would 
count on relational activity to produce a change in the child. I would not count on a 
mechanistic method of prescriptive interventions, reinforcers, and end goals 
applied within therapy in order to change behaviour. As Hansen states in his work 
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that speaks of ‘the displaced humanist’ (2014: xi): ‘To help others, one has to enter 
into a relational matrix, full of lush meaning systems’ (ix).  
 
The example in Chapter Two of playing football with children shows the need to 
build contexts within the therapeutic encounter. I managed this through role 
reversal and game playing. The child in the example and I simply went out to the 
soccer field and played. As he became more and more the expert, teaching me to 
play a game I was terrible at, he was able to try being something new; maybe 
setting the ground from which to build a positive introject. 
 
 The problem of intuition  
  
Feyerabend warned of the powerful processes of gatekeeping within empirical 
science. This takes to task the science that the ACA’s code is predicated on:  
  
Science is an essentially anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more 
humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order 
alternatives [ ... ] The consistency condition which demands that new 
hypothesis agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it 
preserves the older theory, and not the better  theory. Hypotheses 
contradicting well-confirmed theories give as evidence what cannot be 
obtained in any other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, 
while uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free 
development of the individual. 
            (1993: 5) 
 
In the quote below, Kuhn warns of the ineffectiveness of a self-replicating system: 
 History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, 
 could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which 
 we are now possessed. That image has previously been drawn, even by 
 scientists themselves, mainly from the study of finished scientific 
 achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, 
 in the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to 
 practice its trade. Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is 
 persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no 
 more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a 
 national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text. 




Concern over the gatekeeping by empirical models of care and the self-replicating 
system of ‘science’ put me on the trajectory to become an applied-theatre 
practitioner. However, when exposed to some of applied theatre’s literature, I had 
to think twice.  
 
Scientist-practitioner models of counselling advocate for the use of quasi-
experimental design. The privileging of this type of design can concern ‘the 
integration of research and practice’ (Sexton, et al, 1997: 7). The result of such 
integration is to establish the means by which behaviour is changed regardless of 
the contexts in which it occurs. As the scientist-practitioner would understand it, 
the knowledge garnered would be objective, capturing a concrete or material 
reality concerning behaviour. This is a very different picture of intuitively gained 
understanding, which is understood as the ability to connect to some kind of moral 
code that stands outside the person. Rogers proposed such a picture in his final 
written work when he articulated his purposeful universe. Intuition is a sort of 
extrasensory ability that allows us to take in complex phenomena across an 
intermediary field; an ambition of Chaikin’s Midsummer Night’s Dream exercises 
(Chaikin 1972: 141-144). However, both give accounts that locate the term in 
another way: as a means of perception. 
 
The type of knowledge garnered from quasi-experimental design is not suitable for 
Rogerian practice. What is of interest for the humanistic practitioner is exploring 
the webs or complex fields of psychological and relational contexts that make the 
self. A context in this respect recalls the perceptual fields articulated within the 
philosophy of phenomenology. Within the perceptual field there is a ‘return to a 
transcendental consciousness before which the world is spread out’ (Colin Smith 
trans. 2002: xii), and where one’s ‘being is directed towards meaningful content 
(Tillich 1952:81).  
 
As Hansen, in the quote above, brings out, the contexts in which the humanist 
practitioner practices are layered with meaning. His depiction also suggests that 
the human self is a multilayering of contexts. The field of our perception cannot be 
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one-dimensional. Knowledge used in therapy to guide treatment needs to be able 
to negotiate that layering. And that brings us to the use of intuition when 
attempting to understand and build a relationship with our other. As a Rogerian, I 
relied upon intuition much in the way I did as an actor. Intuition is where one ‘feels’ 
one’s way through the layering of the person one is working with or the situation 
one is experiencing. It is the taking in of ‘meaningful contexts’, or rather, a web or 
nexus, of meaning. It is a requirement for being empathically attuned to or 
receptive towards what is in the moment of the experience. It is at the heart of 
Chaikin’s Midsummer Night’s Dream exercises.  As Rogers stated:  
  
 Knowledge about is not the most important thing in the behavioural 
 sciences today. There is a decided surge of experiential knowing, or 
 knowing at the gut level, which has to do with the human being. At this 
 level of knowing, we are in a realm where we are not simply talking of 
 cognitive and intellectual learnings, which can nearly always be rather 
 readily communicated in verbal terms. Instead we are speaking of 
 something more experiential, something having to do with the whole 
 person, visceral reactions and feelings as well as thoughts and words. 
               (1995a: 6) 
Chaikin’s equivalent of the perceptual capacity of intuition is framed through his 
articulation of what it means to be present. He stated:  
 
The basic starting point for the actor is that his body is sensitive to the 
immediate landscape where he is performing. The full attention of his mind 
and body should be awake in that very space and in that very time.  
            (1972: 65)  
 
The term ‘awake’ suggests attending strongly within the immediacy of the moment, 
as does Rogers’s use of the terms visceral and ‘gut level’ in the quote above. 
Intuition for both, meant to be drawn into the moment so that you are hyper-
focused and sensitive to what is going on around you, or rather, what it is in all its 
contextual layering that is in your perceptual field of experience.  
 
Chaikin’s articulation was a reaction against ‘[t]he conventional actor’s inquiry’ 
(1972: 19), which for him, ‘tend[ed] to yield whatever it was designed to discover’. 
(This sounds like a defense against quasi-experimental design) Intuition, in other 
words, is the antithesis of uncovering what is designed into an inquiry. It is a 
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perceptual means by which the actor is opened up and, importantly, able to 
experience whatever comes their way within a play situation. The Sound and 
Movement exercise counted on this. 
 
Unlike Rogers or Chaikin, scientist-practitioners are suspicious of intuition; an 
ability, as I understand it, that allows the practitioner to sense their way through a 
situation or in knowing their other. Intuition requires reading the minutiae of 
behaviour and mood expressed by the engaged or established within an 
encounter, and the subtle shifts in both. It is a skill that allows practice to be 
sensitively driven, and thus, empathic and respectful. It allows the practitioner to 
apply their methods non-prematurely and non-oppressively. Intuition is a term that 
signifies that an adaptive and informed observer is on board within the practice. 
Chaikin frames it as being fully present and sensitive. Rogers, in different 
language and expressed in the quote above, approximates the same 
understanding.  
 
Intuition is understood as the perceptual ability to put together a pattern of minute 
behaviours or recurring signals. Sometimes what is perceived feels to be below 
the surface of awareness. Intuition does not speak of a critical capacity as much 
as it does a sensory one that runs off impulse or affect. This does not mean that it 
is not educated. It is educated by sensory-based experience. Its ability to 
recognise is so finely tuned and instantaneous that it seems less than mundane. 
Intuition is where ‘being is directed towards meaningful content’ without the explicit 
articulation of language. It seems pre-verbal. 
 
The statement above by Sexton et al is followed by an implicit appeal to a more 
objective and educated approach:  
  
 There is growing evidence to support our contention that intuitive and 
 experienced-based judgement cannot be the sole factor in effective 
 decision making. The most persuasive of these arguments focuses on 
 the problems inherent in any human decision making. This literature 
 suggests that as human deciders we are inherently biased in our 
 judgements.  
            (Sexton, et.al., 1997: 7) 
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Does this statement suggest there is a way to get around the bias by being 
objective? This could occur by ‘integrating outcome research into counseling 
practice and training’ (Sexton et al, 1997). With the appeal for outcome studies 
comes a certain view: that we can have objective, bias-free information that is 
uncontaminated by ideological or political in-put. Best of all, we can have research 
in the pursuit of ‘[k]nowledge or [t]ruth’ with ‘[g]eneralizable conclusions’ as 
measurable ‘[o]utcomes’ with ‘[e]xplanatory [p]ower’ that can ‘[d]etermin[e] [w]orth 
and [s]ocial utility’ (Isaac & Michael 1997: 9). In other words, we have measurable 
behaviour that breaks down into ‘objectives’, ‘means’ and ‘measures’. 
 
Sexton and her associates’ distrust of intuition, the perceptual function that is 
capable of picking up patterns of minutiae, implicitly references the pan-psychic 
property that has traditionally been associated with intuition, a perceptual capacity 
understood as capable of transcending regular, pedestrian, human understanding 
and that is accessible only to gifted or special people. Arguments that discredit the 
cognitive function of intuition implicitly rely on this understanding of the term. 
Central to the argument is the understanding that cognitive capacities, rather than 
sensory ones, recognise what is concretely or observably evident, and therefore 
are more fully describable in technical terms.  The strictly cognitive becomes the 
standard by with which we should evaluate our other while getting to know them. 
As a Rogerian with a practice ethics strongly inflected by I/Thou ethics, I find such 
concretism flies in the face of my values. Practicing an I/Thou perspective, I 
understand the sensitivity promoted by an intuitive, or sensing, responsiveness is 
required to know my other as other. I cannot speak of empathic attunement if my 
practice needs be reduced to concrete terms. The philosophy that governs my 
practice is not the one ‘of science that has been generalized from physical 
sciences’ (Putman in Heppner, et.al. (1999: 7).’ 
 
Preston is concerned with ‘transformative’ and ‘different manifestations’. This 
suggests that there is value in returning to the ethical sensibilities of Rogers and 
Chaikin, which rely heavily on intuition pointing the way. Operationalizing 
openness or flexibility towards our others does not make sense unless we can use 
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our intuition to manage it. This perceptual function moves us from seeking what is 
immanently known to what lurks in the shadows or unknown. From my standpoint 
as a practitioner, I cannot help but think that what is at stake in Preston’s 
recommendation is what may eventually become an endorsement for the scientist-
practitioner model of care. Problematically, the practitioners that practice from 
such a model are frustrated by and not so tolerant of the capacities that allow me 
to be ‘open’ in approaching my engaged other. Without being open towards them, 
as I understand it, they cannot use a creative means by which to be self-directing 
and self-formulating while also maintaining relational activity. Without these two 
principles actualized through practice, my other’s psychological self is split off from 
their political self.  
 
My leap as a practitioner into applied-theatre practice was intuitive. I had no inkling 
that there was such a thing as a discipline called applied theatre; I hadn’t practiced 
as a theatre professional for a number of years. I also lived in a rural area where 
the idea of theatre was growing, but where theatre was mainly entertainment. 
When using theatre as a counsellor, I simply had that strong and clear sense that 
it would work with my specific clients where therapy had failed them. My intuition 
kicked in. 
  
Measurement presupposes prescription: you have to know prior to measuring 
what you want to measure. And, like Chaikin’s warning about ‘the conventional 
actor’s inquiry’ (1972: 19) that ‘tend[ed] to yield whatever it was designed to 
discover’ (Ibid), measurements are preceded by expectation. You need methods in 
place that make sure what specifically needs to be measured is measured. This 
means that the method has got to play out within the practice in a consistent 
manner. Prescribed behaviour becomes the order of the day because it is 
measurable.  
 
 Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations.  




The question of ‘how do we measure, assess or evaluate the transformative 
impacts of applied theatre in all their different manifestations’ has implications. It 
implies that there are terms in place applicable to practice that do not resist 
measurement. Measurement infers standardization, which means the language 
describing the practice needs to be clear cut, technical, and consistently used. 
From a scientist-practitioner point of view, it is very difficult to measure, for 
example, ‘transformative impacts’; being ‘marked’ (Thompson 2008: 51-52, 61-62); 
‘embodiment’ (Dolan 2005: 2; Thompson 2008: 63); ‘body memory’ (Chaikin 1972: 
9); ‘action matter’ (Thompson 2008: 53); ‘presence’ (Thompson 2009: 124-126; 
Chaikin 1972: 20-23); or ‘depth’ (Chaikin 1972: 85).  
 
It is easier to measure behaviours identified through a language that reflects a 
breakdown of behaviour into concrete, readily identifiable features, which are 
observable, consistently replicable, and require very little interpretation concerning 
the cause of action. They are the antithesis of terms that suggest a relationship. 
As Rush and Zimbardo state: ‘the proof of the method is in the experiment’ (in 
Heppner, Kivlighan and Wampold 1999: 5). 
 
In behavioural terms, here is an example of measurable ‘impacts’: of the twenty-
five children in the village, five were ambidextrous. This is a ten percent increase 
over the testing done thirty years ago. Of the sample of ambidextrous children 
identified in the first study, all went on to complete a research degree in 
engineering. This finding suggests that ambidexterity leads to or indicates the 
presence of high cognitive functioning.  
 
When I first began reading the canon of applied theatre, I got the sense that the 
terms used in describing the practice were meant to evoke a layering, which 
requires interpretation and exists within a rich context that defies reduction. 
Outcome management and methods, which predetermine efficacy of practice, 




The scientist-practitioner models of counselling attempt to isolate features of 
personality in order to establish a fixed sensibility. This sensibility allows for the 
features to be extracted from any contextual setting and become objectified and, 
therefore, measurable. (It is easy to measure ambidexterity, and high cognitive 
function and achievement can be measured according to whether one went to 
graduate school or not.) However, the features measured need to be carefully 
chosen so that they are measurable and translatable into concrete terms. The 
term fixed means that the properties, categories, or events measured need easily 
be separated from the context that breathes life into them. It may even mean that 
the context itself needs to be controlled.   
 
Outcome-centered studies require that what was there at the beginning of an 
engagement still exists in order to make sense of it. This is difficult to accomplish 
within a practice that works open-endedly. Outcome studies require pre-existing 
criteria for evaluation to determine efficacy. This too, does not work with a practice 
that aims to be open-ended.  
 
Preston summons the terms ‘process’ and ‘reciprocity’ (2009: 304) to address her 
concerns over not having a picture of applied-theatre practice’s efficacy. If there 
are identified, pre-existing criteria for evaluation to be managed and integrated 
within the practice, the term ‘process’ cannot manage the openness needed by the 
practitioner, according to Rogers’s attitudes or Thompson’s posture of 
bewilderment (Thompson 2009: 134-135). The ‘process’ and ‘reciprocity’ spoken 
of by Preston will be replaced by the reductive terms diagnosis, intervention, and 
criteria. 
 
Moreover, in establishing the ‘efficacy of treatment’, there needs to be an 
evaluation and assessment, not only after the fact of the engagement, but also 
within the engagement itself. This calls for prescribed features that are measurable 
as actively integrated within the actual engagement. The practitioner will need to 
continually assess and control those features so that they are consistently present 
within the engagement. If this is not done, the measurement may not measure 
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what it says it measures. It is difficult to attend to promoting interrelational activity 
when attending to a collection of features. 
 
Assessment, in this respect, puts the practitioner into the role of expert, so that 
controls can be maintained. Problematically, such assessment makes me no 
longer a facilitator. This slippage will compromise the joining required and evoked 
by Preston’s use of the term ‘reciprocity’, or Thompson’s use of the term ‘besides’ 
(Thompson 2009: 133-134); terms that echo Buber (2004: 13) and Levinas (2008: 
72-74), though having their own distinctions; terms that were taken up by both 
Rogers and Chaikin as they attempted to mold them to fit a sensitive, 
psychological stance towards the other.  
 
Problem identification, interventions, and outcome goals 
The following addresses my personal fear.  However, it is instigated by counselling 
research:  
 
Counseling is a relatively young profession, but it is beginning to mature. 
With this maturity, a theme that continues to appear in the counseling 
literature is the search for new paradigms of professional functioning that 
will assist counselors to be a beneficial presence in Clients’ lives and that 
professional counselors can accept regardless of their theoretical 
orientation or the setting in which they practice.  
           (Purkey and Schmidt 1996:xiii) 
 
To accomplish what Purkey and Schmidt suggest is part of the maturing of the 
counselling profession, there needs to be ideological inclusion. However, there are 
limits to be imposed if the ACA’s code drives ethical practice. 
 
My concern as a practitioner within either an applied theatre or counseling form is 
that the knowledge referenced does not take into account the historical shifts that 
influence what an intervention, identifiable problem, or outcome goal amounts to. 
As times, trends, events, and circumstances change, so do what are understood 




Because there are historical shifts as well as differences amongst existing practice 
ideologies, the code will require certain characteristics. The ongoing introduction of 
multiple and new practice strategies, ones fed by historical shifts, requires a 
standard for ethical practice that can be flexible and very accommodating. This 
requires that there are features or principles of practice that don’t necessarily 
reinforce ‘orientation’, so that new paradigms can realistically surface within a 
discipline.  
 
The ACA’s code and autonomy  
Section A of the ACA code, which outlines the counseling relationship regarding 
the welfare and safety of the client, states: ‘The primary responsibility of 
counselors is to respect the dignity and promote the welfare of clients’. The 
document continues, stating that in safeguarding client welfare, the ‘interest[s]’ of 
the client need to be promoted and that client ‘dependency’ is to be avoided. 
Issues of autonomy are clearly linked upon an axis of positive valuing with the 
integrity of an individual. The term integrity can suggest that a client is shaped by 
cultural circumstances, ones that may be different than the ones a counsellor 
experiences. To maintain the integrity of the client, meaning all they embody as a 
self, calls for respecting their cultural distinctions in social constructionist terms 
because a person is a social construction (Freedman & Combs 1996: 32). The 
term dependency is then referenced, meaning that there is an individual to 
consider with an inherent right to be autonomous.  
 
However, these codes of practice are then implemented in settings where the 
prescriptive accounts of human behaviour offered by the DSM-IV are employed, 
and the interactions between practitioners and ‘their other’ are driven by the 
scientific method of care. In these circumstances, the fostering of autonomy within 
the other becomes a non-realistic goal. The Diagnositc and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (1994) (DSM-IV) discusses in its introduction that ‘utility and 
credibiity’ are the end goals of its ‘focus on its clinical, research, and educational 
purpose ... supported by an extensive empirical foundation’ (1994: xv). The end 
goals count on stable features existing across persons and cultures. Having an 
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‘empirical foundation’ means that the basic to medical or psychological care or 
research are objects that exhibit behaviours that are observable, replicable, 
dependable, and completely malleable; or in behavioural terms, strongly 
shapeable.   
 
Section A asserts: ‘Counsellors and their clients work jointly in devising integrated, 
individual counselling plans that offer reasonable promise of success and are 
consistent with the abilities and circumstances of clients.’ Collaboration is at stake 
within this statement and a joint activity as the ethical basis of practice is inferred. 
However, since the DSM-IV has given a sense of a desirable normal state and its 
methods determine what ‘success’ is for the client, the highly trained and 
knowledgeable expert practitioner must determine what success is, again skewing 
the collaborative ground. There is a gesture towards maintaining autonomy and 
managing collaboration. However, it is fairly hollow.   
 
Further, the code’s provision asserts that there are cultural and personal 
characteristics of the clients that need to drive the counseling relationship. Again, 
the summoning of ‘personal characteristics’ suggests that a respect for difference 
is to be maintained and implies that the client has a big part to play in the 
collaborative process, in turn, suggesting commonality is in effect within the 
therapeutic relationship. This leads to the question: who sets the limits within this 
shared collaboration? As Kanfer and Schefft note: 
  
 The establishment of predictors or diagnostic criteria on which to base 
 selection of the best treatment methods for an individual client represents 
 still be interested in studying the mechanisms or processes that mediate 
 the effect. Generally, however, clinicians seek information to improve, 
 broaden, and refine therapy procedures and predictive criteria. 
                        (1988: 13) 
 
Inevitably, expert trumps non-expert. This is especially true when marginalized, 
vulnerable, and over-institutionalised individuals are involved. As Chaikin’s 
practice within the Open Theatre evidenced within The Presence of the Actor, if 




Working within the institutions of care in the U.S., the practitioner can observe how 
policy and procedures become formalized in a manual. The manual called in 
hospitals, The Policy and Procedure Manual, may differ slightly within specific 
hospitals or medical centers. However, they govern the direct care given by 
nurses, doctors, social workers, and therapists. Under the directives of the 
manual, which is based on the medical model so that there is an objectification of 
disease processes and the prescriptive treatment targeting them, the person of the 
patient is lost. The patient becomes the manual’s object, and can now be looked 
upon as a disease process to be worked upon by prescriptive treatment protocols. 
As an RN I witnessed the negative effects of the over-objectification of the patient 
first hand. 
 
 [O]nce an institution has been founded, it tends to develop a life of its 
 own, independent of original function, and will seek to maintain and often 
 expand its roles and activities. In the United States of America ... the 
 Congress and Social Welfare System are two such examples.  
         (Leong & Santiago-Rivera, 1999: 63) 
 
In the foreword to Dr. James A. Kennedy’s work, Fundamentals of Psychiatric 
Treatment Planning (1992), praise is heaped on ‘Dr. Kennedy and his 
collaborators [who] have performed a singular service: they have tried to bring the 
treatment plan back into service for the patient’ (1992: xii). As a former RN and 
counsellor who worked within hospitals and other systems of institutionalised care, 
I understand the implications of the statement. The statement implies that there 
are fundamentals of treatment planning to be considered, and the term 
fundamentals means that prescribed assessment, diagnosis, interventions, and 
outcome goals are at stake. These fundamentals are tied in with the policies and 
procedures for care, which then work in a similar fashion to the codes of practice. 
Procedures both regulate and constitute practice, and in so doing inadvertently 
obscure the treatment of the patient in favor of maintaining a chart.  
  
The patient chart is a tool within medical care systems that demonstrates that 
policy and procedure (P&P) has been carried out within a practice. On each unit of 
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a hospital there is a Policy and Procedure Manual. It provides a model for 
treatment planning, which is broken down into problem identification, interventions, 
goals, and results. Treatment planning, when carried out by the caregiver, can be 
so rigidly controlled by policies and procedures and the science that backs them 
that the patient chart which tracks the care gets more attention than the patient it 
supposedly represents. Widely promoted as part of a methodology for care, 
charting at best provides information concerning the process of a disease. When 
picking up a chart and reading it, it is very difficult to recognise the particular 
person it reflects. This may not be the intent of the institution of care and all its 
actors, but it is the end result.  
 
This problem associated with care given in a prescribed manner is important. It 
illustrates that what the patient might recognise as his or her person or self can be 
excluded from treatment. In a chart there is no self to speak of; rather, there is 
method, objectives, and diagnostics. The exceptions are token gestures that help 
the chart record that the caregiver (hence the institution) values patient input and 
selfhood. Demonstrating patient input regarding her or his care is generally a 
requirement of the Policy and Procedure Manual and the governing commissions 
outside the care facility that oversee patient care and the manual.   
 
This is not to say that clinical care cannot support person-centered care. Kennedy 
and his colleagues would not have opened the debate around this issue if they did 
not have such aspirations.  
 
Another problem that arises with treatment planning in this mechanistic system is 
that it can facilitate less than exemplary care. I have personally witnessed stressed 
and burned out nurses, who, upon arriving at the beginning of a shift, complete 
their charting before even leaving the nurse’s station. Their charting is impeccable; 
ticking each box that targets a diagnosis, care objective, and outcome goal. 
However, their actual patient assessment is done after the charting event – if it 
ever takes place. I have seen burnt out MDs act similarly. Prescription within 
systems of institutionalised care can become a form of shortcutting, and can 
243 
 
produce a stacking of the evidence so that it reflects the assumed diagnoses, 
interventions, and outcome goals, rather than the actuality.  
 
The problem of institutionalised care is not just relegated to the particular problems 
of the U.S. James Thompson, a British applied-theatre practitioner and researcher, 
states that he is ’not a theoretician who practices. I do not test the theories of my 
practice, but practice to meet the contingencies of each moment’ (2005:8). Both 
Rogers and Chaikin understood their individual practices as doing the same.  
 
In his book Applied Theatre: Bewilderment and Beyond (2008), Thompson brings 
up problems within applied theatre practice similar to those I have faced as a 
Rogerian counsellor, dual practitioner, and RN. The problems arose for Thompson 
within arenas of care serving poorly represented, vulnerable populations, 
marginalized by the systems meant to serve their better interests. The problem 
posed when working with the marginalized occurred because his role ‘always 
operate[ed] within and through the competing discourses’ (Thompson, 2009: 24) 
within the walls of the institution. When working as a practitioner, he needed to 
promote a ‘discourse’ of advocacy, but advocacy pits the practitioner against the 
institution if the practitioner has little power or is a visitor. The practitioner is always 
in a position where they have to address whether they ‘conform in order to evade’ 
(Thompson 2009: 25) and, I would add, evade in order to conform.  
 
Thompson’s remark is important when considering that ‘[t]here are indications that 
therapists tend to rate client therapeutic improvement in terms of the degree to 
which clients take on therapists’ ways of thinking, including therapists’ values’ 
(Kelly in Bishop 2007: 67). It has also been observed that 
 
 therapists’ notion of improvement/lack of improvement are tied up with 
 therapists’ values. To the extent that these values reflect the 
 psychological community’s definitions of acceptable/unacceptable 
 behaviour, the potential for enforcing ‘truth’ in personal beliefs and 
 behaviour is very real.  




To add to the gravity of the problem, Gergan remarks that ‘there is a stability to our 
understandings and meanings due to an ‘inherent dependency of knowledge 
systems on communities of shared intelligibility’. (Gergan quoted by Bishop in 
Bishop 2007: 65)   
 
The tendency of both institutions and practitioners to reinforce their values has 
consequences. The reinforcement puts pressure on the practitioner, so that, no 
matter what their ideological bent may be, they will need to conform in order to 
remain intelligible within the system. They will, as Thompson called it, ‘evade in 
order to conform’. Each system of care demands that a certain language is used 
that reflects the system’s ideology. As a Rogerian, I found adapting my care to the 
scientific-practitioner models with its specialized language was problematic. The 
language that forms my discourse and the concerns it represents are very 
different.  
 
Certain methodologies have been standardized within institutions as best practice, 
and their language or terms convey an ideological bias. No matter what my own 
practice orientation, I need to use the standardized language, even if it does not 
reflect my philosophical or ideological bias. 
 
Mental Illness as a social construction 
  
 In contrast to the disease model, the social constructionist view sees 
 systems of knowledge as reflections of culturally specific processes. The 
 central assumption of the constructionist tradition is that mental illnesses 
 are inseparable from the cultural models that define them as such. Social  
 constructionist studies assume that taken-for-granted categorizations do 
 not simply reproduce the natural reality of mental symptoms; they are 
 socially contingent systems that develop and change with social 
 circumstances.  
                  (Horowitz, 2002:5)  
 
In comparison to the social construction model, the disease model of practice is a 
diagnostic one (3), as indicated by the use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM -IV).  Until recently, the manual was a categorical system of ‘diagnostic 
schemes’ (3). With the latest revision, out in 2014, it is now a dimensional one. 
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However, the schematic version has been entrenched in care institutions for so 
long that it remains a driving force in diagnostics and treatment. As I understand it, 
anecdotally, the dimensional version relies implicitly on the categorization of 
illness, regardless of the more dimensional schematics.   
 
‘[T]he schemes presumably distinguish particular conditions from one another in 
ways that matter for their etiology, prognosis, and treatment’ (Ibid). There are 
about 400 identified mental illnesses and ‘disorders’ (2) now identified. This is in 
contrast to about 120 before Freud. At that time there were about two generic 
types of mental illness identified, which were basically mood and depressive 
disorders. Also identified were disorders that exhibited altered sensory functions 
and bizarre behaviour.  
 
Importantly, illnesses categorized according to the DSM-IV reflect the reality of 
mental illness, which is a categorization in itself. Problematically, a caregiver 
cannot define a categorization by a categorization and say anything salient about 
the individual being treated.  
 
Social construction, on the other hand, claims that mental illness is constructed by 
the systems of meaning making within culture because of a demand for a sense of 
‘coherence’, which is a ‘Christian tradition’ (134-145). To get at the root of mental 
illness, one has to get at the root of what is causing it within the patient’s direct 
environment, social cohort group, or greater culture. Basically, mental illness is a 
cultural fabrication and needs to be approached through methods that are social 
activist in nature. As a practitioner I need to create circumstances that promote 
self-construction. It also means that I need to create a specialized environment 
that promotes fairness, politically, interpersonally, and socially.  
 
Further, the self of social construction is understood as ‘constituted by our very 
acts of trying to use, describe, and understand what is’ (Smith 1996: 9); for the 
Rogerian practitioner, the self needs to be afforded the opportunity to self-shape 
within real-time practice and through conditions that operationalize democratic 
246 
 
rights: rights of fairness, political freedom and equality, and the right to participate 
in a collective citizenry. Our others will be ‘constituted as subjects in ideology and 
not in nature’ (Keenan, formulating Althusser 1997: 24).  
 
 [A]ll natural sciences deal with observer-independent phenomena. 
                                    (John Searle 2004: 4) 
 
This means that empirical science, as representative of nature, ‘can [not] pose a 
subject that can be termed ‘observer independent’ (Searle 2004: 4) or objective.  
   
Burr’s work, An Introduction to Social Constructionism (1995), relates social 
construction to the discipline of psychology and brings out how the philosophy 
shapes understanding of what it means to be a self (which is a contested term). 
‘The self which is constantly on the move, changing from situation to situation, is 
contrasted with the traditional view of the stable, unchanging personality’ (1995: 
29). She emphasizes that  
 human nature becomes historically and culturally bound rather than 
 fixed for all time. What we have traditionally called ‘personality’ begins to 
 look more like a theory that we are using to try to make sense of the 
 patterns we see in our experience rather than a fact of human nature.  
             (29) 
 
Burr leads up to her definition by the statement: ‘There is no objective evidence 
that you can appeal to which would demonstrate the existence of your personality’ 
(1995: 21). This statement puts the social constructionist understanding of the 
person in direct opposition to the DSM-IV project. 
 
As a practitioner who has worked within many different institutions of care, I am 
aware that diagnostics are predicated on a personality or self being present, a self 
that is put together with features and behaviour that can be worked on. Nowhere is 
this more evident than in the DSM-IV, which is strongly reliant on the 
understanding that we are put together as a constellation of concrete features. 
Concrete in this case means that the features are observable, replicate within a 
pattern with other features, are measurable, indicative of functioning, and 
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stubbornly persist over time; features should be comparable to physical 
characteristics.  
 
Whether I agree with the descriptive task of the DSM-IV or not, I am immediately 
aligned with its view by my work. In the institutions where I have worked I am 
mandated to re-orient my practice to such a concrete and diagnostic model. 
Adding to and reinforcing the problem, my professional ethical code of practice as 
constructed by the ACA reinforces this predicament.  
 
In the work Carl Rogers’s Dialogues (1990), Rogers addresses B.F. Skinner, 
describing him as ‘[a] rigorous scientist [who] in his experiments focused on the 
spontaneous behaviour of an organism in response to its environment’ (1990: 90). 
The term spontaneous does not mean random or reflexive, but rather, suggests 
behaviour that is automatic yet proceeded by discrimination. As an empirical 
scientist, B.F. Skinner was locked into identifying relationships of causality. 
Skinner pioneered an early behaviourism that was not necessarily a study of the 
mechanics of responsiveness, but rather, one of selection (Cheisa 1994); 
nevertheless, selecting (which implies a simple judgement) would eventually fall by 
the wayside, and behaviour would become automatic. A subject would elicit a 
response to a stimulus in order to get a reward; Skinner concluded that a positive 
or negative operant would reinforce a particular behaviour associated with the 
stimulus over time. Discrimination or judgement on the subject’s part would fall 
away due to repetition. The subject would be, in counselling speak, radically 
shaped. Out of the causal process, a desired or non-desired outcome would 
eventually be the product of the activity because of a reward system in place, 
rather than one based on judgement. What Skinner proved is that humans and 
animals can be conditioned over time, and through repetition, to lose judgement. 
Since there was selection occurring, judgement and discrimination drove the 
causality. However, such intellectual functions did not pervade the experiment 
once the subject was fixated on an end-goal. He or she lost judgement and 
discrimination somewhere along the line. Out of Skinner’s work grew a whole field 
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of psychology that reduced behaviour to a mechanistic process. Skinner’s view 
was not one that ‘courted uncertainty’.   
 
Behaviorism is implicitly present within the ACA’s code of ethics. It also drives the 
methods that are clinically applied when using the DSM-IV as a guideline for 
diagnosis and care, setting up conditions for learning that require a predictable 
stimulus and response. 
 
The self of social construction  
Burr further states that a way of conceptualizing personality ‘is to think of 
personality [ ... ] as existing not within people but between them’ (Burr 1995: 26-
27). If this is the case, perhaps pathology needs to be understood as not within 
people but, rather, between them. Again, this brings home that most pathology is a 
matter of the conditions created within one’s environment. As Burr states: 
  
 Rather than view personality as something that exists inside us, in the 
 form of traits or characteristics, we could see the person we are as the 
 product of social encounters and relationships – that is, socially 
 constructed. This means that we create rather then discover ourselves 
 and other people. 
            ( 28-29) 
 
Burr, as with Rogers, locates the development of the person within relational 
activity. This means that the person or self, in order to develop, is situationally 
dependent. The need to experience lived-out circumstances, created through 
interrelational activity, factors greatly in who you are. This is not to suggest that a 
patterning of behaviours will not coalesce into what we conveniently term a 
personality, identity, or self. Rather, it is to suggest that the person is a process, 
and that to develop the self as a process rather than a constellation of fixed traits 
is dependent upon the practitioner setting up conditions where there can be an 
immediate input of relational activity. Burr (1995: 30) offers that one’s memory 
provides the cohesion that the term ‘self’ implies, through the remembering of 
one’s ‘narrative’ (Ibid). My particular applied theatre, with its roots in the 
experimental practice garnered at drama school, has the resource to provide the 
needed condition. Within it my other can explore narratives counter to the ones in 
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their memory, thereby opening up to becoming self-directional and self-actualizing 
while using behaviours that rid the self of unwanted introjects.  
 
Applied theatre as Rogerian practice understands that positive mental health 
requires the facilitating of a developmental process; one that builds positive 
introjects as the client is acknowledged and understood. As the introjects become 
internalized, a different account of one’s self can occur. The account will be an 
expression of the client having become more open, self-directing, and self-
actualizing, or rather, authentic. My work with the children at City Creek is 
testimony to this. 
  
The American Counseling5 Association and the British Association of 
Counsellors and Psychotherapists: a consideration 
  
 One of the characteristics of contemporary society is the coexistence of 
different  approaches to ethics. This statement reflects this ethical diversity 
and supports practitioners being responsive to differences in client’s 
abilities, needs and culture and taking account of variations between 
settings[.] 
 (BAPC Ethical Framework for Good Practice in Counselling and 
Psychotherapy, 2010: 2) 
 
The ACA’s code is clearly driven by a scientist-practitioner model that is strongly 
influenced by the empiricist understanding of a fixed reality.  
 
The BAPC’s code is implicitly driven by a social constructionist account that 
respects a pluralistic view. It makes the claim that there are multiple ways to go 
about doing practice. The practitioner’s reality is not a fixed state if there exists 
‘multiple ways’ to go about doing practice. The ACA and the BAPC appear 
strongly bifurcated in their respective understandings of the role of ethics as 
exemplified through codes or standards. The BAPC’s role is to preserve pluralism. 
The ACA’s is to monitor for compliance with a one-size-fits-all standard. 
  
                                            




What is at issue according to the BAPC is that the code ‘should reflect 
contemporary society and respect the varied landscape of contemporary ethics 
that issue from value, principle or moral quality based accounts’ (10). This means 
that the BACP recognises that multiple ethical sensibilities feed counselling 
practices that are a reflection of shifting social contexts. That the code needs to 
reflect these shifts means that the discernment of a practice ethics is an on-going 
process. Implicitly, such a code will positively value the exemplars of flexibility, 
adaptability, and inclusivity. Nicholson’s statement represents this ethos when 
appropriating the term ‘politics of dislocation’, coined by Baz Kershaw: 
  
 The conceptual metaphors associated with social change within this new 
world disorder emphasizes the politics of (dis)location – difference, alterity, 
mapping, hybridity, liminality, borders and margins – all of which draw 
critical attention to the way place and space articulate diverse  cultural 
and political meanings. As the term ‘applied drama’ emphasizes the 
application to specific settings, contexts and audiences, this greater focus 
on spatial metaphors is important, in relation to identity, particularly  as 
applied drama often takes place in situations which are troubled. There is 
often a messiness about work in applied drama, focusing on interrogating 
what Victor Turner has called the ‘contamination’ of  contexts, which 
makes the flaws, hesitations, personal factors, incomplete, elliptical, context 
dependent, situational proponents of performance’ visible. Applied Drama 
is, in Turner’s terms, always contaminated by contexts, and is intended to 
be sufficiently fluid to address the concerns of local audiences and 
participants. 
           (Nicholson 2005: 11-12) 
  
As characteristically more adaptable, inclusive, and flexible than the ACA code, 
the BACP’s code is relativistic and accommodating.  
 
John Shotter, in his work Conversational Realities: Constructing Life Through 
Language (1993), criticizes the discipline of psychology as having ‘its insecurities 
and its struggles to prove itself worthy of a place amongst the hard sciences’ (10). 
Popper also takes issue with the desired alignment (1968: 13). Within this 
struggle, psychology ‘has incapacitated itself from participating in the crucial 




Quite explicitly, my purpose is to offer arguments for relocating or ‘regrounding’ the 
academic discipline of psychology within the formative social activities at work in 
the everyday, conversational background of our lives. Or, to put it in other words: 
to offer arguments for reformulating it in terms appropriate to the study of these 
activities. For – if the claims I have made so far are correct, and our ways of 
talking are formative to our social relations – then, new, more ethical and social 
ways of talking in psychology will work to ‘reconstruct’ it along more ethical and 
social lines, thus to establish within it a new ‘tradition of argumentation’. Then, 
rather  than the old eliminative and exclusionary struggles, we will be able to 
provide opportunities for a whole new set of creative struggles marked out by the 
tensions, not just say, between simply mental representations and connectionism 
in cognitive psychology, but by a whole multitude of other tensions currently 
without a voice within the discipline. 
           (1993: 10)    
 
The BACP code recognises ‘one of the characteristics of contemporary society is 
the coexistence of different approaches to Ethics’; thus, the document ‘reflects this 
ethical diversity ... [t]he presentation of different ways of conceiving ethics 
alongside each other in this statement is intended to draw attention to the 
limitations of relying too heavily on any single ethical approach’. (1) These 
statements are not at odds with Shotter’s concern over the ‘multitude’ of tensions 
currently without a voice; the silenced voices that keep practice closed to 
possibility, unable to adapt across cultures, or to the cultural shifts that occur 
within them.  
          (1993: 10)   
 
Since the BACP’s code of ethics is not as directive as the ACA’s, it does not take 
an overt stand on what particular ideology should underpin clinical practice; 
although, ideology will drive any code. It is social constructionist. The concluding 
chapter of my research will be a reflection on why I have chosen to take my 
practice beyond therapy or, as the metaphor used within the research frames it, 
why I have decided to jump ship. It is certainly because of what I consider the 
homogenizing effects of the ACA by privileging the scientist-practitioner role and 
medical models of practice. It is also because frameworks for ethical practice can 
be inclusive. However, ethics will count on the practitioner taking seriously 
Pendergast and Saxton’s challenge, requiring the practitioner to not be a passive 
joiner when evaluating best practice, but using ongoing criticality.   
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As this research has matured and endured multiple revisions, I realize that in 
evaluating certain threads of understanding that construct my practice ethics, I 
have eliminated precious terrains for interrogation; ones where, for me, barely 
encountered threads of understanding are embedded within philosophical 
contexts. Two unexplored philosophical landscapes that have surfaced are 
American pragmatism and Brechtian theory.  
 
The topic explored within this last chapter was an important for the understanding 
of my ethics. It added to the examination of the personal, historical and 
philosophical contexts that constructed my practice. What I have learned, while 
engaged in the self-reflexive, auto-ethnocentric examination of this research, is 
that when interrogating practice ethics there are several factors involved: a past 
history shaped through ideological or philosophical contexts, a reaction to an 
opposing view, and a propelling into the future by my brief contact with the 
unexplored. Though I am not a proponent of the empiricism used to condition 
behaviour, there certainly is a ‘science‘ out there that I am not at odds with. In the 
future, my critical examination will have to address this part of my practice ethics 
that has been left out. Importantly, the last few statements made here mean that a 
code, such as the ACA’s, cannot capture my practice ethics. The BACP’s can, 














Chapter Five: Conclusion  
Beyond Therapy:  
The Rogerian Applied-Theatre Practitioner 
 
The exit 
Within The Applied Theatre Reader (2009), Prentki and Preston state:  
 
Frequently those who engage in applied theatre are motivated by the belief 
that theatre experience, both as participant and as audience, might  make 
some difference to the way in which people interact with one another and 
with the wider world. For both practitioners and participants  there may often 
be an overt political desire to use the process of theatre in the service of 
social and community change.  
          (2009: 9)  
  
A few paragraphs later, the authors state that, ‘[a]s the applied theatre umbrella 
embraces a wide range of practice, it can be seen as an inclusive term’ (10). If 
different ideologies shelter under the ‘umbrella’ of practices as well as the ethics 
that are derived from their ideological underpinnings, the term inclusivity does not 
simply denote the different categorizations of applied theatre practice. This 
sensitivity welcomes in the practitioner that jumps ship.  
 
An initial concern, when formulating my research, concerned my understanding 
that a code of ethics in place for one specialty within a dual practice will exert its 
influence within the other. This concern was cogent to a dual practice that was 
formulated to counterbalance the effects of the institutionalisation of the scientist-
practitioner model of practice, the model that drives the ACA and its standards of 
ethical practice. Recently, while I was completing my research, Optum, a private 
firm that now runs many of the welfare and counselling services across the U.S., 
gained ground in the State of Idaho. According to Optum, service providers need 
to follow the scientist-practitioner model. Optum determines reimbursement for 
providers. Practicing as a humanistic counselor, I cannot work in Idaho because of 




The self that I bring with me from a Rogerian perspective 
 
A mind or consciousness could be seen not as an atomistic singularity but 
as interwoven within a broader social or cultural contextual field that 
includes others. In such a case, an ‘I’ would be more fuzzy and diffused, 
less coterminous with the body, more intermeshed within its context, more 
interdependent. We would talk of selves, actions, and, even thoughts as 
less exclusively individual and more inclusively relational, wedded, arrayed, 
archaeological. 
       (Scheurich in Thompson 2008: 51)  
 
Thompson, by using this statement, attempts to find a ground of perception that 
makes sense of an ‘I’ constructed through the interweavings of relationship to the 
other and the multiple cultural contexts that shape us; a place where a self exists, 
not as the pure result of an objective world ‘out there’ or a subjective world where 
the ‘I’ is over-isolated, but as a result of being interdependent. Categories of I or 
Thou elude Scheurich, and Thompson takes them up. Thompson argues that we 
are ‘marked people’ (Thompson 2008: 52), and that ‘our actions cannot be 
understood as emanating from the person outwards’. He urges that, ‘we need to 
search for a more complex framework for understanding (Thompson 2008: 51-52). 
And he finds this called-for framework  
 
exhibit[ed] [in] the patterns created by the “little dramatic performances” of 
others, in and through our daily actions. Our bodies and our lives are both 
shaped and we in turn shape our bodies, giving us the ability to engage with 
our friends, families and communities  
         (2008: 52).  
 
Referring to being ‘marked’, Thompson (2008: 52) states: ‘different forms of 
human interaction simultaneously affect and are dependent upon the way we have 
embodied (mentally and physically) past experience [ ... ] We are marked; but 
these contours go beyond our bodies to bind us to wider, shifting networks’.  
 
Thompson’s statement suggests that we are built relationally and culturally. If that 
is the case, as practitioners, our ethical frameworks need to reflect this fact of our 




 [M]odern developments forced men and women into the condition  of 
individuals, who found their lives fragmented, split into many loosely related 
aims and functions, each to be pursued in a different context and according 
to a different pragmatics – that ‘all-comprising‘ idea promoting a unitary 
vision of the world was unlikely to serve their tasks well[.] 
                                    (Bauman 1993: 6) 
  
Bauman articulates the individual of the twentieth century as one who was forged 
from a ‘fragmented’ reality’. The statement puts into question the modernist 
assumptions that there is unity in nature, and because humankind is a part of 
nature, there exists unity between all human beings. The picture of the fragmented 
individual contests the notion of being automatically part of a unity. This is 
antithetical to Thompson’s supposition. However, it points out that our ontology 
arises out of a historical context. Understood within applied theatre, our ontology 
arises from the understanding that we are basically relational and that ‘[d]ifferent 
consciousnesses are constituted primarily in relation to each other’ (Smith, 1996: 
170). As a Rogerian, I would add that different consciousnesses are shaped by 
interfacing with another’s ‘fragmented’ and individualized reality. Further, I 
understand that the process of self-construction is multilayered. 
 
I need ask, how does one differentiate if we are basically relationally constructed? 
How do we escape the solipsism implied? Implicit within Bauman’s statement 
above is the understanding that an affective response that occurred as ‘modern 
developments [forced] men and women into the condition of individuals who found 
their lives fragmented [and] split into many loosely related aims and functions’ 
shapes us. Bauman uses terms like ‘forced’ to make his point. Such loaded terms 
were also used by Heidegger in his phenomenological ontology when he stressed 
the term ‘thrownness’ (1996: 146), which suggests the pain of alienation. Through 
these terms, he built his ontological argument that ‘Dasein’ (34) (roughly, a self) 
becomes a part of the world in which it is thrown. Implicit within his use of the term 
‘thrown’ is the understanding that our affect makes us self, and world aware at the 




The affective loading of terms that are meant to represent our basic condition as 
alienated suggests one can differentiate one’s self from the conditions that make 
it. In other words, one can self-differentiate because one has expressive emotional 
reactions to what is outside one, even if one is interrelationally formulated as a 
self. Within both Bauman and Heidegger’s accounts is an understanding that we 
inhabit (in Heidegger’s case) or can construct (in Bauman’s case) a world that 
causes personal dissonance, which is at once perplexing and fear provoking. 
Dissonance, under either interpretation, is an affect that makes us self, and world, 
aware. This connects us to the ‘shifting networks’ Thompson spoke of above. 
 
Dissonance, or rather incongruence, was a concern for Rogers when he 
articulated the concept of congruence as the direct opposite of incongruence. In 
building this opposition he made it an internal, moral compass as well as a 
dynamic. This understanding fits with social construction and applied-theatre 
practice if one acknowledges that the incongruence and moral compass are 
culturally constructed. Through interaction with ‘shifting networks’. 
  
Philosophically speaking, affective and sensate experience, which is the result of 
interfacing with a ‘fragmented world’ or an alienated one, suggest ethics should 
concern the relational as an antidote to being fragmented, but also that ethics 
should concern pluralism. Fragmentation results in a kind of pluralism. The 
American individual created through Bauman’s framing will have developed his or 
her own terms and conditions for interaction with others. Without this type of 
pluralism one cannot escape relational solipsism and self-differentiate. As a 
Rogerian, I need to build a practice environment that allows my other to be 
formulated through interrelational activity. But, I also need to set up conditions 
where my other can self-formulate through self-reflection. 
 
Whose psychology do I bring? 
Kenneth Gergan, a social constructionist, contests a universalist account of 
psychology, and contests it being looked on as a science. As Bishop, a proponent 
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of scientism (a term sometimes used in place of positivism) and a critic of Gergen, 
states: 
 
[Gergan] argues that the terms in which we understand the world are social 
constructions because these terms are produced in our historically situated 
interactions with each other (1985). According to Gergan, Western culture 
has made individual minds the ‘critical locus of explanation’ in psychology 
and much of the social sciences in general (1994: 3). But this is just a social 
construction, according to him, because inquiry into the historical and 
cultural foundations of ‘various forms of world constructions’ indicates that 
‘psychological processes differ markedly from one culture to another’ 
(Gergan 1985: 267). Hence, he thinks many of the theories and findings of 
social science distort psychological phenomena by pretending that the 
world, self and psychological processes have a transhistorical or essential 
nature. 
         (Bishop 2007: 64-65) 
 
As a social constructionist, Gergan, to borrow from Rideau when tracing out post-
modern ethics, ‘deliberate[ly] court[s] uncertainty’ (2009: 45). Gergan, in other 
words, advances a psychology that does not purport that as beings our nature is 
predictable, reliable, and strongly shapeable. This does not fit with behaviourism. 
Importantly, the psychology formulated by this redirection challenges any dyed-in-
the-wool truths concerning human nature. He breaks with modernism. Human 
nature changes along with historical shifts. The only assertion one can make 
concerning the self is that it is a construction and that different cultures and 
situations make different selves. Applied theatre speaks of this outlook’s relevance 
to ethics, but in terms of political activation rather than ontological and 
epistemological concerns. The direct quote that introduced ‘my exit’ testifies to 
this. 
 
Gergan’s framing makes sense for applied-theatre practice as evidenced in an 
article by Amanda Stuart Fisher. Stuart Fisher, in her “Developing an ethics of 
practice in applied theatre: Badiou and fidelity to the truth event” (2005) asserts:  
 
Our attempts to meddle or intervene in people’s lives and communities must 
... be informed by an ethics of practice that can be responsive and 
responsible to each of the different contexts in which we work.  
           (247)  
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Contexts construct psychology and the means by which we work on it. In 
questioning James Thompson, who she understands as essentialist, Fisher further 
states that, ‘we should not be tempted to turn towards a search for a universal 
definition of truth or goodness, instead we must seek to identify truths that are 
“relative to” each of the different contexts we encounter’ (247-48). Her article 
develops parallel ethical sensibilities between herself and Badiou, whom she 
states does not ‘prescribe a ‘normative’ or ‘predetermined’ ground for practical 
action. Rather, his philosophy is concerned with the emergence of a truth process 
and the subject’s commitment and fidelity to that which is disclosed by 
circumstances of a particular event’ (248). If treated through the building of 
processes, the psychological self can be assumed to be fluid and adaptable and 
not set-in-stone according to a nature. It is maybe because of this that the self, in 
order to have self and world awareness, can ‘bind’ us to ‘shifting networks’. 
 
Vivien Burr points out in her work An Introduction to Social Constructionism, 
postmodern thought is ‘[t]he cultural and intellectual “backcloth” against which 
social constructionism has taken shape’ (1995: 12). As such, it rejects any ‘truth’, 
rather, it ‘emphasizes instead the co-existence of a multiplicity and variety of 
situation-dependent ways of life’ (13-14); a ‘pluralis[tic]’ sensibility that ‘rejects the 
notion that social change is a matter of discovering and altering the underlying 
structures of social life through the application of a grand theory or metanarrative’ 
(14). 
 
Unlike for Rogers, the self cannot be explained as part of a purposeful world and 
located within a grand design. The social constructionist view poses a problem for 
me, I depend on the understanding that we are of a humanity and that we build 
introjects that correspond with the principles of democracy. The notion that a 
humanity exists can presuppose purpose or a nature is at stake. However, it 
always presupposes a commitment to a good. For me as a practitioner, good is a 
commitment to inclusion and a respect for difference and the activism it takes to 
maintain it. Advancing such respectfulness is my end in good. Humanity, for me, is 
at its best when working to actualize the ideal of inclusion while respecting 
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difference. Applied theatre supplies the ground from which to operationalize my 
commitment. Its aims speak of my sense of what it is to belong to a humanity.  
 
Building a global awareness 
During the course of carrying out this research, when examining the canon of 
applied theatre, I found that the principle of inclusion and a sensitivity towards 
pluralism pervaded the texts. Importantly, applied theatre as a form of 
consciousness-raising is growing. As Pendergast and Saxton state: ‘The range of 
applied theatre is vast; it happens all over the world as part of a grassroots 
movement involved in social change and community reflection (vi)’. Nellhaus and 
Haedicke, in the introduction to Performing Democracy: International Perspectives 
on Urban Community-Based Performance (2001), cite that community theatre (a 
branch of applied theatre) 
 
is now a noticeable undercurrent within performance and activist circles. 
From a smattering of isolated activities just twenty years ago, it is now 
reaching ever-growing numbers of audience members – or, rather, 
participants – with its efforts to involve, mobilize, and politicize.  
           (1) 
  
The term ‘activist’ suggests a positive valuing of inclusion as a counterbalance to 
the marginalization of under-represented groups within a particular culture or 
society. This fits with my aims as a practitioner. 
 
Who leads?  
The understanding that, as a Rogerian practitioner, I should be inclusive and 
activist brings up problems of hierarchy, as it did for both Rogers and Chaikin. 
Snyder-Young, in her article ‘Rehearsals for revolution? Theatre of the Oppressed, 
dominant discourses, and democratic tensions’ (2011) speaks of the dilemma of 
the facilitator when shaping the material of a particular event. Her article follows 
the work of Augusto Boal and his ‘rehearsal for revolution’. She states that practice 
  
hinges on participants’ power to select material for inquiry and frame, 
shape, script, and perform stories of problems/oppressions in their own 
lives and communities [ ... ] As a facilitator, I struggled with the tension 
between my desire to intervene in discourses in embedded assumptions I 
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found problematic and my fears that by doing so, I would be colonizing the 
workshop with my own privileged agenda.  
           (29) 
 
Snyder-Young shows a strong willingness to be open and inclusive, in a manner 
that recalls Rogers’s attributes of empathic attunement and positive regard. 
Importantly, her openness and inclusivity demonstrate a strong capacity for ethical 
reflection, problem solving, and personal responsibility. She also shows that the 
problem of hierarchy requires a strong commitment to stay abreast of your own 
inclination to colonize; building ethical commitment and self-awareness is the final 
solution to the problem of hierarchy within practice. 
 
A perplexing dynamic revealed through the research 
Through combining applied theatre with humanist counselling and the training I 
received as a student-actor, I was able to articulate a perplexing problem that I 
have repeatedly come up against as a practitioner. It has to do with authenticity, or 
rather, personal integrity as a counsellor, dual practitioner, or applied-theatre 
practitioner. 
          
Both applied-theatre practice and counselling practice are relatively new fields. 
They are subject to what Bishop cites in The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, as 
a pre-paradigmatic state. Bishop references Kuhn in his discussion: 
 
Kuhn characterizes a paradigm [...] as ‘universally recognized scientific 
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a 
community of practitioners (Kuhn 1996:x). In Kuhn’s storyline, a particular 
scientific achievement starts out in a pre-paradigmatic state, where there is 
little or no agreement about subject matter, what counts as evidence, what 
the key problems and exemplars are. Eventually, the discipline coalesces 
around a paradigm, a dominant set of achievements or exemplars. These 
exemplars represent techniques and strategies for problem solving and an 
organized collection of such exemplars may be taken as representing 
theory.  
        (Bishop 2007:17) 
 
Kuhn’s portrayal has particular resonance for a Rogerian practitioner with a history 
of working within medical models of care, driven by treatment planning and the 
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particular institution’s Policy and Procedures Manual, which contributes to a 
strongly constructed system that is self-generating and self-reinforcing.  
 
In considering theories as ‘the systemization of collective and organized 
exemplars into a paradigm of practice’, it becomes clear that theories are 
contingent structures. They have no solid ground for ‘agreement about subject 
matter, what counts as evidence, [and] what the key problems and exemplars’ 
(Ibid) of the theory should be. This means that no hard-core truths concerning a 
theory’s methods can be established. Importantly, from this line of reasoning, 
methods can only address a contingent means of practice. Nevertheless, they can 
eventually come to be developed into a system of truths concerning the person. 
That is not always problematic until a dominant system’s collection of truths 
interfaces with another system’s truths. This would decrease exposure to ‘shifting 
networks’ of practice. 
 
Once the entrenchment of a theory occurs, practitioners are set-up to accept the 
exemplars of a theory as givens of practice, which means they can put their 
criticality and discrimination on hold. They can fall into the trap of allowing codes of 
practice, derived from the theories and which reflect a dominate system of care, to 
subtly shape their conduct over time so that the exemplars of practice not 
compatible with their owned practice ideology get privileged. As Skinner brought 
out, repetitive behaviour overrides judgement, and simply becomes a response. 
 
Bishop further states, accounting for Kuhn: 
 
The exemplars provide the paradigm for normal-science problem solving 
(perhaps through explicit rules, tacit rules or no rules at all)  and scientific 
theories of a given discipline are dependent on the reigning paradigm in that 
discipline.  
        (Bishop, 2007:17) 
 
What Kuhn’s understanding of paradigm building brings out is that there are 
‘reigning paradigms’ that drive the viability of a system. This would apply to a 




The medical model is a paradigm built from the theories of science. As a reigning 
paradigm within institutions of care, it will shape or inflect alternate models that 
may not match directly with its exemplars. However, over time, these alternative 
practices will get edged out, or compromised, within the overall system because of 
the power differential existing between them and the ‘reigning paradigm’. This 
dynamic will have consequences for the actors within the larger system of 
institutional care or rehabilitation, who are not in tune with the constellation of 
exemplars that the empowered paradigm represents. The possible exposure to 
‘shifiting networks’ won’t happen. 
 
An ethics of dynamism 
The goal of this research was to begin the conversation concerning the bridging of 
humanistic or Rogerian counselling practice with applied-theatre practice. This 
was accomplished by focusing on a foundational moment for both fields within the 
mid-twentieth century. Within the United States at this time, the philosophy of 
modernism in its various forms began to interface with the philosophies of 
existentialism and phenomenology. What transpired within the field of psychology, 
and within what would become my brand of experimental theatre, was a blending 
of all three philosophies. During the mid-twentieth century, the introduction of the 
more pre-paradigmatic philosophies established a bifurcation within the field of 
psychology between empirical forms of psychology and philosophical psychology. 
This also established a bifurcation in practice values. At the same time, within 
experimental types of training for actors, there emerged practice philosophies that 
resonated with the same philosophical movements that inspired Carl Rogers. Both 
have formulated my practice ethics, shaping what I consider to be valuable or 
principled within practice. Both construct a personal, historical, practice context 
that offers the choice to construct a practice that actively maintains a ‘shifting 
network’. 
The research exemplifies the level of scrutiny it takes to build a critical model by 
which to derive one’s practice ethics. It is a case study of the impact of criticality 
on actual ethics construction. What is ultimately presented here is an argument in 
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favour of critically derived models of ethics that can be extracted from the 
philosophical ideologies that govern the practitioner’s specific practice. This 
‘shifting network’ created built oppositions. From the methodology of interrogating 
oppositions I was able to look at my practice ethics dynamically. This broadened 
out my understanding of what ethics could be.  
  
Finding a critical ground that structures practice ethics and concerns is an issue 
faced in applied-theatre practice today. Kuftinec in her work Theatre, Facilitation, 
and Nation Formation in the Balkans and Middle East (2009), reveals the 
problems that the practitioner has when working with culturally mixed populations. 
James Thompson explored his practice ethics in “Applied Theatre: Bewilderment 
and Beyond” (2008) and began work on the same theories as Kuftinec.  
 
Inherent within these works is the understanding that one’s practice ethics need to 
be critically evaluated and established outside of practice. If this is done, a 
comparative ground is set to anticipate competing viewpoints and for getting 
acquainted with the needs of our cultural others. This runs counter to Stuart 
Fisher’s proposal, which is predicated on the assumption that the existential now 
of process work matters. However, we do need to keep our cultural other safe. 
One position should not necessarily rule out the other. They can work dynamically, 
modifying each other.  
 
In his co-edited work The Applied Theatre Reader (2009), Tim Prentki, in his 
introduction to a set of articles that tackle the problem of active intervention within 
practice, speaks of a critical ground that concerns an interrogation of the power-
over problem of ‘closed‘ systems‘ and the resultant ‘predetermined inequalities‘ 
endemic within the institutions that embed the systems (181-183); ones that the 
practitioner needs to negotiate in order to work with the more marginalized and 
disempowered within these systems. As he points out, there are various attitudes 
and behavioural options that the practitioner can implement in negotiating the 
system. Implicit in his argument is the need to be fully cognizant of the implications 
and consequences of one’s practice. A way into this is through examining 
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behaviours and attitudes operational within the processes of practice and the 
institutional ones that inflect them. Intrinsic to what Printki states is that assessing 
for both requires criticality based in dynamism.  
 
Standards of practice 
When working within institutions or fields, ethics usually amounts to building 
standards of practice. As an emerging field of practice becomes more 
institutionalised, so do its ethics. Pendergast and Saxton’s Applied Theatre: 
International Case Studies and Challenges for Practice (2009) suggests that this is 
the case for applied theatre. As an emerging topic within the field of applied-
theatre practice, which to date has no standardised code of practice or strong 
centralising organization by which to manage a code’s construction, there is no 
critical focus or philosophy that has gained a hold in determining what a future 
code might look like. However, since impact studies are at issue for applied 
theatre (Preston in Prentki and Preston 2009: 305) because of the need for 
funding resources, it is not difficult to assume that empirically based models of 
practice will shape future codes and perhaps to the exclusion of different 
philosophically driven practice ideologies. For many institutions that fund projects, 
implicit within the term impact study is the demand for empirically based research. 
Prendergast and Saxton essentially build the ground work for constructing a 
standard. This is problematic for a social constructionist or Rogerian practitioner. 
Rogers (1995a: 194) stated: ‘Values that are based on authority, that derive from 
sources external to the person, should be resisted because [t]he locus of 
evaluation is in the person, not outside’ (Ibid). As a modified-essentialist 
practitioner, I totally agree with this. To deal with such gatekeeping, I will have to 
rely on an ethics based in a dynamic method to further evaluate for fit when 
applied theatre squarely faces the methods of empirical science.  
 
Rogers also understood that practice should not simply concern what is 
intellectually put forward by institutions (248-49). Codes are institutionalised ethics 
shaped by specific systems through intellectualisation, leaving out much in the 
way of immediate human experience. Stuart Fisher’s concern is grounded in fear 
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of this danger. As Rogers understood it, institutions tend to ‘dichotomize’ (248) 
intellect and experience, limiting the scope of what codes can address concerning 
human behaviour.  
 
Psychologist Kenneth Gergan challenges practitioners to look outside practice 
standards, or ‘codes’ for ‘controlling’ our ‘conduct’ (2009: 356-357). He questions if 
‘alternative[s]’ exist. For Gergan, they exist not simply within the individual but 
within the experience of building relationships. He states: ‘Let us consider the 
possibility from the standpoint of relational being. [ ... ] Let us view this process of 
generating goods within a relationship as an establishing of first-order morality’ 
(Ibid). Implicit within this statement is that morality comes from within. It is within 
one’s internal locus that standards between individuals are established. When in 
relationship to one’s other, conduct is a matter of interpersonal dynamics, and 
therefore cannot be imposed extrinsically from without.  
 
Ethics based in relational dynamism 
Rogers stated: ‘ 
 
Very compelling is the evidence that our most serious problems are not 
brought about by the failures of our society, but by its successes. Hence, 
our past and current paradigms cannot possibly deal with our present 
problems by extending the old principles.  
         (1995: 230) 
 
However, Rogers’s statement is problematic. Modernism, as a paradigm that 
exemplified democratic principles as the measure for good conduct, permeated his 
practice philosophy, as did Romanticism, a brand of humanism that led to the 
creation of the social worker. The new paradigms that influenced Rogers’ work, 
which brought out the more relative aspects of morality, did as well. 
The constructionist position fledgling in Rogers resonates strongly with these. The 
position attends to what it takes to exemplify individual processing, empathic 
attunement, and deep respect. In some regards, social construction is a nouveau 
form of I/Thou ethics (or at least compatible with it). What is of concern is 
processing that creates a field of understanding through relationship building. This 
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is evident when Gergan states: ‘To function within any viable relationship will 
virtually require embracing values inherent in its patterns’ (Ibid). Gergan further 
states: ‘We establish and perpetuate what has become the ‘good for us.’ There are 
no articulated rules in this case, no moral injunctions, no bill of rights ... The rules 
are all implicit, but they touch virtually everything we do, from the tone and pitch of 
my voice, my posture, and the direction of my gaze (Ibid)’. However, ‘the good for 
us’ can be modulated and broadened out through building inter- relationships. 
Applied theatre, since it addresses groups creatively interacting bringing up 
possibilities for play, has created the ground for the broadening out to happen. 
 
Gergan’s appeal makes even more sense when back-dropped by a statement 
made by Chaikin:  
 
Theories or systems on paper are seldom what they are when they are an 
active process. Once on paper they get frozen by their most serious 
adherents, become intractable, and are applied for all occasions.  
         (1972: 34) 
  
Codes are underpinned by philosophical biases. If they are underpinned by a bias, 
such as the one that underpins the BACP, social construction, the code will be 
able to accommodate a discipline representative of differing philosophies of 
practice. If the codes are underpinned by a bias such as the one that underpins 
the ACA, the science of empiricism, the codes will not be able to accommodate a 
discipline that is representative of differing philosophies of practice. That is chilling 
since embedded in the call for impact studies is a means to standardise applied-
theatre practice. 
  
 All drama is ... a political event: it either reasserts or undermines the 
 code of conduct of a given society. 
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